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BLOCKCHAIN PARA A SUSTENTABILIDADE SOCIAL

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BLOCKCHAIN PARA A SUSTENTABILIDADE SOCIAL

SET '18

8-11

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RESUMO

A tecnologia de BlockChain tem sido a tecnologia suportando cripto moedas, um instrumento financeiro proporcionando níveis de segurança de registo adequados, graças à criptografia usada na comunicação de operações financeiras em cripto moedas, proporcionando uma excelente rastreabilidade, uma vez que todas as transações em cripto moedas são públicas no interior da comunidade de utilizadores da criptomoeda.

Apesar de alguns esforços terem sido feitos no sentido da avaliação das organizações do setor Social, tais como <https://www.charitynavigator.org/> ou <https://www.charitywatch.org/charities>, a rastreabilidade das transações blockchain pode fornecer rastreabilidade excepcional, permitindo que as pessoas que efetuam doações para a inclusão social se certifiquem que os fundos doados alcançam os beneficiários corretos. Este projeto de investigação pretende avaliar os seguintes pressupostos: (1) os doadores potenciais para a inclusão social têm sido algo desencorajados por um conjunto de notícias que divulgam informações que podem levantar dúvidas sobre o uso de alguns dos fundos recebidos pelas organizações na área Social; (2) A

tecnologia blockchain é aplicável ao processo de recolha e entrega de doações; (3) A rastreabilidade fornecida pela tecnologia blockchain proporcionaria encorajamento para os doadores, uma vez que estes poderiam verificar o uso dos fundos que eles doaram; (4) A rastreabilidade fornecida pela tecnologia blockchain poderia incentivar gestores do Sector Social para direcionar uma percentagem superior dos fundos recebidos para seus recetores naturais.

Se alguns dos pressupostos acima forem válidos, a introdução de blockchain na gestão da entrega de doações aos seus beneficiários aumentaria o volume de ajuda social voluntária e, por conseguinte, aumentaria a inclusão social.

PALAVRAS CHAVE

BlockChain, IPSS, Economia Social, Apoio Social.

ABSTRACT

BlockChain technology has been the technology supporting crypto currencies, a financial instrument providing adequate security levels, thanks to the cryptography used on the communication of financial transactions on crypto currencies, while providing an excellent traceability, since all transactions on crypto currencies are public within the community of the crypto currency users.

Even though some efforts have been made towards rating organizations of the Social Sector, such as <https://www.charitynavigator.org/> or <https://www.charitywatch.org/charities>, the traceability of blockchain transactions may provide insurmountable traceability, allowing the people donating for social inclusion to make sure that the funds donated reach the correct beneficiaries. This research project intends to proceed towards evaluating the following assumptions: (1) The potential donors for social inclusion have been somewhat discouraged by a set of news disclosing information that may raise some doubts on the usage of some of the funds received by the organizations on the Social Sector; (2) The blockchain technology is applicable to the process of collecting and delivering donations; (3) The traceability provided by the blockchain technology would provide encouragement for donors, since they could check the usage of the funds they donated; (4) The traceability provided by the blockchain technology would encourage Social Sector managers to direct a superior percentage of the funds received to their natural receivers.

If some of the assumptions above would be valid, the introduction of blockchain on the delivery of donations to its beneficiaries would increase the volume of social help and consequently, would enhance social inclusion.

INTRODUÇÃO

Numa sociedade em que as condições de vida dos vários cidadãos apresentam assimetrias consideráveis, que incluem situações de carência de bens essenciais por parte de alguns cidadãos, é fundamental que, aqueles que têm condições materiais para ajudar os menos favorecidos da sociedade se sintam impelidos a fazê-lo.

A propensão para ajudar depende naturalmente da sensibilidade social daqueles que têm possibilidade de o fazer, ainda que a pirâmide de Maslow apresente resultados encorajadores ao considerar que, satisfeitas as necessidades mais elementares e individuais, os humanos progridem para a tentativa de satisfação de necessidades mais amplas e altruístas, como a contribuição para o bem-estar global.

Contudo, mesmo os cidadãos com a possibilidade e a vontade de ajudar os menos favorecidos podem deparar-se com fatores desencorajadores, tais como a pouca interação direta entre quem gostaria de ajudar quer gostaria de beneficiar da ajuda e a insegurança sobre se a ajuda entregue a Instituições Provadas de Solidariedade Social (IPSSs) chega efetivamente aos seus beneficiários naturais.

Assim, este artigo discute a possibilidade da tecnologia blockchain, através da sua elevada segurança e rastreabilidade, aumentar a confiança de quem gostaria de ajudar o próximo, aumentando também a proporção de donativos que é efetivamente utilizado para melhorar as condições dos seus beneficiários naturais.

REVISÃO BIBLIOGRÁFICA

A NECESSIDADE DE APOIO SOCIAL E O IMPACTO DO NÍVEL DE CREDIBILIDADE DOS PROCESSOS DE AJUDA NA PROPENSÃO PARA AJUDAR

Ainda que fosse desejável que o enquadramento socioeconómico possibilitasse a todos os cidadãos condições de vida condignas, em Portugal, segundo o INE (2017), existem pessoas em privação material (18,0%, que compara com 19,5% em 2016) e em privação material severa (6,9%, que compara com 8,4% em 2016). Estes números, ainda que em trajeto positivo, são ainda muito melhoráveis e recomendam que o apoio social voluntário de cidadão (ou organização) para cidadão seja dinamizado e assuma tanta eficiência quanto possível.

Acreditando que existem pessoas com capacidade material e vontade de ajudar terceiros, é fundamental manter os beneméritos encorajados a ajudar, sendo para tal necessário que eles acreditem que a sua ajuda é eficaz, ou seja, que a sua ajuda chegará efetivamente aos beneficiários naturais que fundamentaram a vontade de ajudar. Contudo, existem indícios de insegurança sobre a eficácia da ajuda proporcionada através de IPSSs.

Tal insegurança poderá estar a ser desenvolvida por mensagens difundidas pelos media indiciando utilizações de fundos recolhidos por IPSSs que podem não corresponder às intenções de quem tem propensão para ajudar através de donativos. (Observador, 2018)

Além do mais, segundo Kastberg e Osterberg (2017), as atividades do sector social são cada vez mais auditadas, mas devido à sua natureza pouco estruturada e algo difusa, o aumento da estruturação do processo e dos indicadores de auditoria têm vindo a resultar num menor escrutínio.

Pelo exposto acima encontra-se evidência da necessidade de dinamização de apoio social que, conjugada com uma convicção limitada dos potenciais beneméritos sobre a eficiência dos processos de ajuda, explicita a necessidade de a sociedade encontrar processos de apoio social em que o benemérito consiga ter a total convicção que a ajuda por si proporcionada chega aos seus beneficiários naturais.

A TECNOLOGIA BLOCKCHAIN E AS SUAS CARACTERÍSTICAS

Enquanto as bases de dados convencionais possibilitam, a quem tenha as permissões de acesso necessárias, a manipulação dos registos, isto é, a criação, edição e destruição de registos, com a tecnologia Blockchain os registos são partilhados pelos participantes na cadeia, ou utilizadores do sistema, passando todos eles a poder verificar os factos que foram registados nos dados. (Gupta, 2018).

Os dados geridos em Blockchain são guardados, devidamente criptografados, em nós (computadores) de uma rede peer-to-peer (P2P), ou seja, de uma rede entre computadores com igual estatuto, por oposição às arquiteturas cliente-servidor em que o servidor tipicamente gere os dados enquanto o cliente acede aos dados, podendo também geri-los na medida em que tenha permissões para tal. Cada nó da rede pode propor o registo de transações a outro (s) nós, transações que, após a validação pelos nós envolvidos, serão registadas como “blocos” no final da “cadeia”. A arquitetura P2P da rede blockchain torna a desativação da rede ou a alteração do seu conteúdo muito difícil pois os dados estão replicados em vários nós e qualquer alteração depende do acordo entre os nós envolvidos. (Nakamoto, 2009)

Assim, a tecnologia blockchain permite uma excelente rastreabilidade, graças à persistência do registo e à possibilidade de acesso às transações por todos os elementos da rede, associada a elevados níveis de segurança obtidos através da persistência do registo, da criptografia dos dados e da necessidade de validação das transações.

PROPOSTA PARA INVESTIGAÇÃO

O risco de os potenciais beneméritos se sentirem desencorajados de efetuar donativos por recearem que uma percentagem considerável dos valores doados pode não chegar aos seus beneficiários naturais, conjugado com a rastreabilidade e a segurança possibilitada pela tecnologia blockchain, encorajam a investigação sobre a aplicabilidade

da tecnologia blockchain ao registo de apoios sociais voluntários como forma de dinamizar a vontade de ajudar pelos beneméritos, pois estes passam a ter acesso a mais informação sobre o que acontece às suas doações, e, por sua vez, a mesma rastreabilidade pode encorajar as instituições que geram apoios sociais voluntários a utilizar uma maior percentagem dos fundos recebidos no apoio aos beneficiários naturais desses fundos.

Para confirmar a exequibilidade do presente projeto de investigação e desenvolvimento será adequado estabelecer através de *Design Science* a especificação da abrangência adequada da tecnologia blockchain e especificação técnica do sistema para fundamentar a recuperação da confiança dos beneméritos no processo de apoio social voluntário.

Para confirmar os pressupostos e a atractividade do presente projeto de investigação e desenvolvimento devemos realizar inquéritos à população visando a Recolha e análise de dados sobre que variáveis influenciam a perceção da população sobre a eficácia e eficiência do apoio social voluntário, assim como o efeito desta perceção na propensão para ajudar, e os efeitos que a possibilidade de rastrear o donativo através de blockchain possam ter na propensão para a realização de donativos.

CONCLUSÕES

O presente projeto propõe a utilização de uma tecnologia de sistemas de informação inovadora, ainda que já utilizada para outros fins, como a cripto moeda, como forma de dinamizar o apoio social voluntário. Tal proposta decorre da perceção, fundamentada na literatura, de que os potenciais beneméritos podem sentir insegurança sobre a eficácia das suas doações na melhoria das condições de vida dos beneficiários naturais da doação, conjugada com as características da tecnologia blockchain, que possibilita a rastreabilidade das transações e elevada

segurança dos registos.

Para a continuidade do presente projeto de investigação e desenvolvimento será necessário identificar o âmbito e os detalhes técnicos da estrutura de blockchain a implementar e verificar, através de um inquérito à população, os pressupostos de aplicabilidade e de desempenho social da solução proposta.

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#2

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CONSUMER NEUROSCIENCE - GETTING INSIGHTS INTO CONSUMERS' BRAIN FUNCTION (AND OTHER PEOPLE TOO)

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SOCIAL AND CULTURAL CONSUMER NEUROSCIENCE GETTING INSIGHTS INTO CONSUMERS' BRAIN FUNCTION (AND OTHER PEOPLE TOO)

MAY '18

14-34

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ABSTRACT

The article is divided into two halves. In the first I frame the theme, addressing the necessary building blocks: how Social Neuroscience began, how Cultural Neuroscience began, the construct "cultures" in Marketing, focusing on consumers and brands, all converging to the definition of the Consumer Neuroscience discipline; and also addressing the main techniques used in the field to acquire neural data, specifying the differences between mapping and intervention.

In the second half, I discuss two past studies with fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging) that we conducted aiming to explore the underlying psychological processes of brand perception, emphasising the participation of the social brain. Follows two actual studies: one that is exploring the first 500 milliseconds of brand perception with high definition EEG, and another, which also uses EEG, which aims to explore free-riding behaviour in the Portuguese and Irish cultures, as free-riders may ruin the economic performance of cultures from their inside. This section finishes addressing the future directions. Future directions mostly extend the actual works. However, an emphasis is made concerning the advent of two new branches of Neuroscience: Neurosemiotics and Neuroethnography.

Neurosemiotics concerns the neural supports of meaning formation, meaning assignment to signs, and meaning decoding by the interpretant. The formation of meaning and its assignment to signs is intrinsically a cultural process, which brings to the discussion the need of neural data acquired in the field in addition to observations and interviews, i.e. the need of Neuroethnography. These two new proto-disciplines weave together while contributing to Consumer Neuroscience.

KEYWORDS: Brands, Consumer Neuroscience, Cultural Neuroscience; Cultures, Game Theory, Neuroethnography, Neuromarketing; Neurosemiotics, Social Neuroscience; System 3/Imitation.

FRAMING THE THEME

This section explores two vectors that usually point in opposite directions: Neuroscience and Marketing. Even the methods that each field employs use to be different. The interesting facet is that the combination of the opposing vectors may shed light on commonly intractable problems in Science, e.g. what goes in the consumer's brain when s/he interacts with other consumers employing marketing elements (commodities and brands).

THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL AND CULTURAL NEUROSCIENCE

Since the beginning of this century, Neuroscience is exploring unexpected areas, delving into the social (Adolphs, 1999, 2001; Decety & Keenan, 2006; Insel & Fernald, 2004; Norman, Cacioppo, & Berntson, 2010) and cultural domains (Chiao, Cheon, Pornpattananangkul, Mrazek, & Blizinsky, 2013; Han, 2013; Han et al., 2013). This means that, in addition to self-reports, behaviour observations, and interviews, brain function may also be addressed and considered in order to create and develop theories that understand, explain and predict how humans establish relationships among them and how they make normative-based perennial groups.

The mirror neuron system is among the most important neuroscientific discoveries in the recent years. The system was firstly identified in monkeys. These neurons fire either when the monkey is seeing another monkey performing a certain action, and also when the monkey itself performs the same action (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi, & Rizzolatti, 1996; Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Iacoboni (2005) suggested that this process supports action understanding in others, involving imitation, i.e. one may know what the other is doing by reading in his/her brain the neural code that s/he uses to perform the same action, which leads to understanding. In such case, learning, doing, and understanding are subserved by the same group of neurons, the mirror neuron system. This is the ideomotor framework which advocates that perception and action rely on the same neural system, contending against the sensory-motor framework, which considers different brain regions for each one (Iacoboni, 2009). The extension of the role of the mirror neuron system from motor tasks to social navigation was an immediate consequence (Dapretto et al., 2006). Imitation was proposed as one of the main girders of social cognition, involving the neural substrate of imitation, the mirror neuron system, in social playing and understanding, termed social mirroring (Byrne, 2005). Therefore, the mirror neuron system may be a “social door” in the brain, through which much of the social


pertinent information flows.

But, the social brain is not limited to the mirror neurons system. Another important finding in Neuroscience in recent years is the biology of Theory of Mind and empathy. The ideomotor framework, relying on the mirror neuron system and the limbic system and insula, provide the basis of a biological simulation system, which supports empathy (Iacoboni, 2009), i.e. the ability to understand someone else’s experiences and feelings by reflecting such experiences and feelings in one’s own (like the aphorism “wearing other people’s shoes”). Empathy is more than motor actions. It is also about feelings. While simulating, one gets to know what the others are experiencing and feeling (Singer & Tusche, 2014). Therefore, empathy is an important process in social navigation.

However, Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-Peretz, and Perry (2009) split empathy into two systems: emotional empathy, which relies on the simulation system (essentially the mirror neuron system) and provides emotional contagion, empathic concern and emotion recognition; and cognitive empathy, which subserves perspective taking and supports on the ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Cognitive empathy is Theory of Mind (ToM) or mentalising, i.e. the ability that one has to put thoughts, beliefs, goals, and intentions in other people’s minds (Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Rilling, Sanfey, Aronson, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2004; Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003). ToM makes one able to guess the moves of other people, especially what they want to get or where they want to reach (Stone, 2006). Such information is critical in the social chessboard.

Hence, imitation, empathy and ToM are three building blocks of social cognition, core in the creation and development of cultures, where one must adjust his/her behaviour, beliefs, goals, and intentions to others, sharing a common set of norms. Collaboration, which means shared goals and shared intentions define shared intentionality, which is the ground of cultural cognition (Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005), and, so one knows the goals and intentions of the others, one needs imitation, empathy, and ToM. These building blocks are not abstract concepts, yet they have neural supports which allow to identify them in the brain. Today, with the aid of neuroscientific techni-

Fig 1: Movement of meaning in a cultural setting between the cultural system, consumer goods, and consumers, detailing the interactions between consumers groups, which define and produce cultures. Adapted from McCracken (1986, p. 72)



ques, it is possible to recognise if the social brain is participating in a certain task, expressly social tasks.

CULTURES IN MARKETING

The study of the social dimension in Marketing is a bit older than in Neuroscience. The seminal article of Levy (1959) is among the first (at least it is the most impactful) that emphasises that brands, products, and services (goods) have more roles besides their function: “At the heart of all this is the fact that the consumer is not as functionally-oriented as he used to be — if he ever really was.” (Levy, 1959, p. 118). The exploration of the symbolic nature of brands with effects in the social arena continues to have more recent counterparts (Elliott, 1994; Elliott & Wattanasuwan, 1998), revealing how consumers include brands and products in a narrative of socialisation aiming “making-up” who they want to be (Shankar, Elliott, & Fitchett, 2009), bringing to mind the ideal social self, proposed by Johar and Sirgy (1991), as a motivating objective for the consumer. Products, better, products’ symbolic dimension is a raw material that consumers include in their everyday socio-behavioural practices in order to structure social reality (O’Cass & Frost, 2002; Solomon, 1983). Consumers are an active and critical part while creating and developing meanings, therefore actively and critically contributing to the definition of consumer cultures, which encompass their unique symbol-meaning settings (Hirschman, 1986; McCracken, 1986). On their side, cultures, supported by the fashion system and its commodities, transfer meanings to the individual consumer (McCracken, 1986). Stepping forward, brands, besides mediating cultural meanings, “(...) have become ideological referents that shape cultural rituals, economic activities, and social norms.”


Schroeder (2009, p. 124), i.e. they have an active cultural role (cf. [Figure 1](#)). Consumers also use brands meanings in order to define their in-group (reference group) and simultaneously to define the other out-groups (Escalas & Bettman, 2005), acknowledging that the social spectrum is hierarchical, which means that stereotyped socio-economic levels are marked with particular products that define one’s position (Dittmar, 1994; Dittmar & Pepper, 1994). Pro-

ducts (and brands) are social tools.

The Symbolic Interactionism framework is also brought to understand how the symbolic content of garments and the concomitant fashion system generate meanings which are concerted in the social domain framed by the postmodern condition (Kaiser, Nagasawa, & Hutton, 1991). While recognising that postmodernity is the “age of Marketing”, Firat and Venkatesh (1993) identify five conditions of this age, hyperreality, fragmentation, reversal of consumption and production, decentering of the subject, and paradoxical juxtapositions (of opposites). Even more, Marketing may be a postmodern institution itself, assuming that postmodernity may hold institutions. Within this characterisation and while all conditions have a contribution to the exacerbation of the image, which meaning is negotiated in the social and cultural domains, the reversal of consumption and production, where images became the producers and consumers are the products, and the decentering of the subject, where the products, not the consumers, determine the flow of the social interactions, assume a pivotal role in mediating the relationships among brands/products, the consumers, and other consumers (Kuksov, 2007). The three entities occupy the vertices of a triangle, which area is the socio-cultural milieu, as depicted in [Figure 2](#).

Consumers establish relationships with brands (Fournier, 1998) in an anthropomorphising scheme where brands are brought into the human level, which means that brands are assigned with human-only abilities like beliefs, desires and intentions (Owens, 2007). The surprising finding is that the same norms the humans rely on in order to rule relationships among them are the same that consumers use to rule relationships between the consumer and his/her brands (Aggarwal, 2004). One step further, consumers either establish relationships with brands and also establish relationships with other consumers mediated by brands (Muniz Jr. & O’Guinn, 2001; Veloutsou, 2009). Brands serve as catalysts that join people, assuming an active social role. Therefore, the vertices of the triangle are more homogeneous than expected. All the vertices’ occupants are beings that relate to each other, establishing a social constellation, which becomes a culture because it is ruled by norms concerted among them (cf. [Figure 2](#)).

Fig. 2: The three interacting agents that contribute to the definition of a consumer culture: the consumer, other consumers, and brands. The area (arena) produced by the three agents is the socio-cultural milieu.



Hence, one may consider a sociological model of brands (O'Guinn & Muniz Jr., 2010) where meanings figure in the centre, being concerted between consumers in social interaction, and symbolic products/brands are their physical/virtual custodians.

The social groups and their set of norms are formalised in tribes or communities (Cova & Cova, 2002; Cova, Kozinets, & Shankar, 2007; McAlexander, Schouten, & Koenig, 2002; Muniz Jr. & O'Guinn, 2001). The consideration of consumers, brands/products, and the ruling set of norms as tribes or communities is not just a mere case of adjectives. Consumers, brands/products, and the ruling set of norms compose a socio-cultural system and the system, which is more than the simple sum of the parts, is characterised by "(...) shared consciousness, rituals and traditions, and a sense of moral responsibility." (Muniz Jr. & O'Guinn, 2001, p. 412) or by the "(...) .re-appropriation in the acts of being, gathering and experiencing together." (Cova & Cova, 2002, p. 595). Cova and Cova (2002) speak about the "shared experience of tribes" and Tomasello et al. (2005) about the "shared intentionality". Sharing may be the keyword for cultures, as norms, traditions, consciousness, care for the conspecific and, of course sharing brands and commodities' meanings and cultural roles.

Ethnography may be the most suitable method to make emerge and explore the sharing among elements in a culture and most of the researches above mentioned have used it. Arnould and Wallendorf (1994) proposed the market-oriented ethnography, establishing four guiding vectors: 1) prefer data gathered in the natural settings (and disregard data gathered in labs), 2) do participative observation, where the researcher immerses in the cultural context (emic), feeling and living the experiences, 3) produce credible interpretations of consumer's actions, and 4) encompass assorted sources of data in order to get multiple perspectives of the behaviours and contexts. If these guides are followed, the resulting theory would have thick explanatory capacity because its ground is "pure" data generated by consumers while in their natural settings and interactions, as in everyday life.

In conclusion, there is a wealth of knowledge explaining and describing how consumers establish relationships with brands and commodities, assign

meanings to them, while such assignment is concerted in the social arena, and these relationships are ruled by norms, which are also concerted within the social group, that these norms protect the group's cohesiveness in time, defining, finally, a culture.

DEVELOPING CONSUMER NEUROSCIENCE THEORY

The scientific literature has been prodigal in what it relates to the benefits of neuromarketing/consumer neuroscience, alerting also to some caveats and flaws. Conspicuously, the first articles that appear in scientific journals match in time with the advent of Social Neuroscience. However, in his book, Zaltman (2003) was among the firsts to anticipate the use of neuroscientific techniques (e.g. fNIRS)(1) to get insights into the minds of the consumers.

Focusing on fMRI Kenning, Plassmann, and Ahlert (2007) explore some applications in the Marketing field, like brand positioning, advertising and pricing strategies, as they mostly rely on emotions, and emotions is a psychological process that fMRI is able to colour (literally, as the data analysis process uses colours to identify the voxels(2) that correlate more – from red to yellow – and less – from dark blue to light blue – with the emotional tasks). Besides fMRI, Senior, Smyth, Cooke, Shaw, and Peel (2007) include also MEG(3) and TMS(4) for mapping purposes, although TMS is used to do interventions in the brain. Lee, Broderick, and Chamberlain (2007) consider that the scope of consumer neuroscience extends from the "traditional" (very recent, in fact, at that time) applications on branding and consumer behaviour and even assume that the new Neuromarketing discipline contributes to reconceptualise the broader Marketing, which is also a matter of discussion elsewhere (Hubert & Kenning, 2008). In the same vein, Plassmann, Ambler, Braeutigam, and Kenning (2007) summarise some findings from consumer neuroscience that may be useful for the advertisers.

A couple of years after, the point of the situation is made by Ariely and Berns (2010). These authors find that one main cause of the neuromarketing

hype is the hope (today, already operationalised) that the neuroscientific techniques help marketers to go further in consumer understanding, hopefully where conventional marketing methods have been failing. For example, Plassmann, O'Doherty, Shiv, and Rangel (2008) found that price manipulation influences the taste perception of wines, coupling with the brain bases of the assessment process, something that would be almost impossible to do with common surveys or focus groups. Talking about pricing manipulation, in our own study we found that, although half the time prices were changed between national brands and own-labels, subjects could unconsciously detect that and screen off between the two categories of brands, virtually "buying" only the typical deals (Marques dos Santos, Martins, Ferreira, Ramalho, & Seixas, 2016). These studies are a demonstration of the possible depth that neuroscientific techniques and knowledge may provide to the Marketing world.

While celebrating the consumer neuroscience's tenth year, some pioneers reported the recent progress of this discipline and forecast the next steps: the involvement of genetics, cellular and molecular neuroscience, the creation of brain-based computational models that yield extensive behavioural predictions, and the consolidation of the relations between brain regions/networks and function through meta-analyses (Smidts et al., 2014). In parallel, Plassmann, Venkatraman, Huettel, and Yoon (2015) called for more studies in marketing itself (and less neuroscientific basic research), and suggest five ways to do that: 1) objectively identify the neural underlying mechanisms that subserve the consumer's behaviour, 2) measure implicit processes (which are not reachable with conventional methods), 3) identify specific psychological processes and disentangle between them, 4) understand consumers' individual differences (which contribute to large variances in surveys and focus groups), and 5) improve the predictions of consumers' behaviour.

More recently, Lim (2018) reconceptualises the discipline of Consumer Neuroscience/Neuromarketing and reviews the range of techniques that are being employed nowadays, while also addressing the ethics concerns rose in the discipline. Interestingly, this study surveys the articles published so far in scientific journals of the business and management field, revealing that almost 40% of them address general issues and the pertinence of neuromarketing, and

the remaining 60% address specific issues like brand attention, packaging, pricing, and decision-making. It is remarkable that neither the social nor the cultural domains are considered.

In short, Consumer Neuroscience/Neuromarketing has come to stay, providing deeper insights into consumers' minds, which has been resulting in tangible advancements in knowledge and understanding. The next steps promise to continue the revolution by extending the participation of other fields of Neuroscience, which are expected to either let us understand consumers deeper and improve the prediction of behaviours.

TECHNIQUES IN CONSUMER NEUROSCIENCE (MAPPING AND INTERVENTION)

Despite EEG(5) and fMRI were the first techniques to be used in consumer neuroscience/neuromarketing, either in the academia and in the industry (Ohme, Reykowska, Wiener, & Choromanska, 2010), the range of available methods is far more extensive nowadays. Lim (2018) divides the neuromarketing methods in three groups: those that record brain activity (i.e. register data originated in the Central Nervous System), those that record neural activity outside the brain (i.e., register data originated in the Peripheral Nervous System), and those that manipulate neural activity (i.e. actuate over effects – electrical, magnetic, and/or chemical – of the Central Nervous System). The first ones, those that record brain activity, are also split into those that rely on the electromagnetic activity produced by neurons, and those that rely on the metabolic activity also produced by neurons and other partnering brain cells. EEG, its parental technique SST(6), and MEG, measure and register, respectively, electric and magnetic fields originated during neurons' firing. Action potentials, i.e. the propagation of the electric field throughout neurons' axons, leave electric and magnetic fingerprints, which may be non-invasively detected at the scalp surface, respectively by electrodes and SQUIDS(7). The major advantage of these sort of techniques is their temporal resolution, which may be 1 millisecond or even less. fMRI and PET(8) detect variations in molecules involved in the metabolic activity. The underpinning rationale is that brain regions that hold neurons

with increased activity rise the local metabolism, which, in turn, recruits more energy supply (glucose in PET), and more oxygen (which originates the BOLD [9] signal in fMRI). Although their temporal resolution is not optimal (more than 1 second), the spatial resolution is very good (it may reach 1 mm side voxels). All these techniques are said to do mapping, i.e. either temporarily, or spatially, data analysis results indicate when or where some process is happening in the brain.

Other methods explore manifestations of the Peripheral Nervous System. This is the case of ECG(10), which monitors the heart rate (it is supposed that high arousal prompts higher paces), facial coding, which may be complemented with facial electromyography (it detects expressions and micro-expressions, usually connected to specific emotional states), EDA/SKR(11), which measures the skin conductance mostly altered by perspiration (it is supposed that arousal, linked to certain emotional states, has its effects spread through the Peripheral Neural System, there actuating over glands, which fluids change the skin's electrical conductance). Eye-tracking is also included in this group of techniques. The eye-trackers detect and follow the eye gaze using an infrared light. It is used to evaluate attention because it allows registering where the subject is looking without any questions that could disturb the measurement.

The third group encompasses methods that manipulate the neural activity. One approach is to inject magnetic fields or electric currents through the skull. These magnetic fields or electric currents interfere with brain functioning, more specifically, with the neocortical regions beneath the skull. TMS relies on high magnetic fields (around 2 Tesla) and some cautions should be taken because it may induce action potentials. The group of the tCSs(12) rely on electric currents: tDCS(13) (the basis is a direct current with an anode and a cathode), tACS(14) (it is an alternating current that flows between the electrodes), tRNS(15) (the signal of the current polarity varies randomly), and the recent tPCS(16) (which injects pulses of current, similarly to the train pulses in TMS). Depending on the polarity, the electric field induced in tDCS causes the depolarisation (anodal tDCS), or the hyperpolarisation (cathodal tDCS). tDCS facilitates/hinders, respectively, the propagation of the action potentials, therefore interfere-

ring with the ongoing processes in the targeted brain regions. Another approach to manipulate brain function is with neurochemicals. They may be neurotransmitters, neuropeptides, etc. For example, Zak, Kurzban, and Matzner (2004) used oxytocin to manipulate subjects' decisions in a social dilemma. Because the aim of these methods is to manipulate brain function, they raise more ethical concerns than the mapping methods.

For the purpose of this article, hyperscanning deserves a special consideration. Hyperscanning is running simultaneous acquisitions involving multiple subjects and may be employed with fMRI, fNIRS, EEG, and any other mapping method. The benefit is that it may be possible to register the activity of two or more brains while they interact, which is interesting when the object of the study is social interaction and cultures (Babiloni & Astolfi, 2014; Montague et al., 2002). In one of the first examples with fMRI, the brains of two subjects were scanned while they performed multiple rounds of the trust game (King-Casas et al., 2005). By this way, it was possible to register the dynamic of trust evolution as two subjects interact. Similarly, hyperscanning may be a valuable tool to explore social interactions among subjects or even the evolution of norm creation in cultures.

Ethnographic research prefers data collected in the field and people interacting integrated into the natural setting. Most of the neuroscientific techniques, however, are based in labs, reflecting the hypothetico-deductive research model. Nonetheless, this scenario is changing. Technical improvements have been turning possible to take the recording devices from the lab and make them portable. This does not apply to fMRI scanners, but it is already possible with fNIRS or EEG. In this respect, the project OpenBCI(17) delivers a 3D printable, low cost and portable EEG device equipped with 4, 8, or 16 channels (cf. Figure 3). It also may encompass electromyography. Devices like this may contribute to the democratisation of EEG hyperscanning applied to the neuroscientific study of cultures.

CONSUMERS AND BRANDS: A PERSPECTIVE FROM SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE

The studies herein reported integrate a research line that aims to un-

derstand how consumers relate with brands and, more specifically, how brand (symbolic) meanings are created and evolve within a culture. The way, however, is just in the beginning and the reader should not hold high expectations. The last section addresses the future directions and purposeful collaborations are welcome.

PAST STUDIES

The first study was inherently exploratory (Santos, Seixas, Brandão, & Moutinho, 2012). It included assorted brands' logos, from several categories, and there was no previous screening, except all the logos represent known brands in the market (as assessed during the debriefing). The brains of 12 subjects were scanned with fMRI while they were passively seeing brands' logos in a block design. The logos, however, were presented in two runs: in the first one there were not any kind of instructions, i.e. the subjects just passively looked at the logos, aiming to capture the implicit processes during brand perception; in the second one, the subjects were previously instructed to mentally do covert hedonic assessments of the brands (just if they like, not like, are indifferent, or not know the brand). Based on the brain activations, the psychological processes that subserve brand perception were inferred using a conjunction data analysis. Figure 4 represents the parsimonious model yielded, depicting the contribution of emotions, self-relatedness, and social relevance during brand perception. It is interesting to note that just seeing the brands or do hedonic assessments is sufficient to involve the participation of the social brain.



Fig. 3: An OpenBCI 3D printed EEG cap with integrated HD-tDCS. The blue electrodes are EEG, the red electrode is the anode (tDCS), and the black electrodes are the cathodes (tDCS)

This finding is coherent with the brand literature that posits that brands have a symbolic dimension that consumers handle for social navigation.

In the second step, the brands' logos are also shown in blocks during a fMRI session but, this time, the analysis separate brands in preferred, not preferred, and indifferent (mixed paradigm), according to the subjects' self-reports (Santos, Moutinho, Seixas, & Brandão, 2012).

Figure 5 represents the evolution of the model, now encompassing more details. Both social relevance and emotion feelings participate in the general hedonic appraisal of brands, either if they are preferred or indifferent. It seems then, as previously found, brands hold information that consumers may use for social purposes. This was also previously concluded in behavioural studies. Berger and Heath (2007) propose that consumers actively do "identity-signalling", i.e. they use certain products and styles (e.g. hair) so they project the desired identity, hoping that the

others do the correct interpretation of those symbols. Brands, like symbols, are meaning carriers and, using this framework to interpret the findings of the study, it was possible to make evident that the social brain is active while decoding the symbolic and meaningful messages. In the same vein, Reed II (2004) find the "identity salience" participation while consumers judge each other. Again, products function as social meaning holders and consumers assimilate and use those meanings for projecting their identity in the social arena. One possible reason for consumers to prefer one product over the others may be its socially-useful-meaning content. Therefore, it is not surprising that consumers' brains automatically start to try to extract meanings every time a brand enters his/her visual field.

Thus, right in the entrance, it was possible to report the participation of the social brain in brands appraisal. Because of the technique used, fMRI, it





Fig. 4: Constructs and parsimonious model inferred in the experiment (retrieved from Santos, Seixas, et al., 2012)

Fig. 5: Evolution of the parsimonious model, now with greater details. Social relevance and emotion feelings both contribute to the global appraisal of brands, either they are preferred or indifferent



was not possible to explore when the social brain intervenes and, therefore, the process is far to be complete. In parallel, there were some pioneering studies that employed MEG and branded products on a shelf to study preference (Braeutigam, Stins, Rose, Swithenby, & Ambler, 2001). MEG portrays the temporal dynamics of brand choice in the brain and the information flow from the caudal to the rostral and back to the rostral brain again. Ambler, Braeutigam, Stins, Rose, and Swithenby (2004) split the process into four sequential stages: firstly, the visual, secondly, the temporal, thirdly, the frontal (510 milliseconds after the onset), and finally the parietal. The authors attribute the first and second stages to task-related issues, like problem recognition, and the choice itself is made on the third stage. This is in line with the dominant theory on decision-making, involving the prefrontal cortex (with latencies over 500 milliseconds) in the decision-making (Grabenhorst & Rolls, 2011).

Findings in our studies, however, do not follow this trend (Marques dos Santos & Moutinho, 2015). Firstly, while trying to confirm the participation of the secondary emotions inducer in the theory of Damásio (Bechara & Damásio, 2005; Bechara, Damásio, Damásio, & Lee, 1999; Damásio, 1994), the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), we registered the participation of the vmPFC, but only after the decision was already made (Santos, Seixas, Brandão, & Moutinho, 2011). Even more, using methods from Artificial Intelligence to analyse the fMRI data, we found that information collected in the fusiform gyri (a brain region located in basis of the temporal lobes, i.e. in the second stage of the four stages model referred to above) allows to classify brands and disentangle brands from persons and objects (Marques dos Santos, Moutinho, & Castelo-Branco, 2014). It seems then that, firstly, brain structures located in the early stages of processing already disentangle between types of brands, preferred and not preferred; and secondly, brain structures located in advanced stages of processing may have a role in the process, but which it is not necessary for deciding, at least involving preference. Therefore, probably the “decision pipeline”, which metaphorically links the decision-making process in the brain to computer processing does not hold, and probably brand appraisal, which largely involves brands’ symbolic-useful-meaning dimensions is biologically an intuitive process that may run irrespectively of conscious emergence (Marques dos Santos &

Moutinho, 2015).

CURRENT WORK

Current work points into two directions: on the one hand to explore the time dimension of brand perception in the brain and, on the other hand, start to explore specific cultural processing in the brain.

The first direction, i.e. do the temporal mapping of the information flow during decision-making involving brand preference, grounds on a previous study which used two categories of brands, preferred and indifferent, and also fictitious logos, i.e. brands’ logos that resemble real brands in the market, but that were designed specifically for the study (Santos et al., 2011). It is worth to say that the screening between preferred and indifferent brands is more sophisticated than in previous studies. For that purpose, it is used the PAD(18) scale (Mehrabian, 1995; Mehrabian & de Wetter, 1987; Russell & Mehrabian, 1977) and the SAM(19) (Bradley & Lang, 2007; Morris, 1995). The referred article reports the selection criteria and procedure. A noteworthy fact is that preferred brands were significantly rated faster than indifferent and fictitious brands, as depicted in Figure 6. This suggests that the decision-making process for preferred brands is different than for indifferent and fictitious (if the choice would result from a decision pipeline, then there would not have time differences; therefore, multiple parallel processes may coexist).

The Dual Process Theory is assumed (Evans, 2008). It considers two cognitive systems: System 1, which is fast, automatic and largely rely on heuristics; and System 2, which is slow, ponderous and largely rely on reasoning (Kahneman, 2011). Darlow and Sloman (2010) rename the two systems, but maintain the essential characteristics: Intuition, which is automatic, driven by similarity and association, fast and parallel, and the product is conscious but not the process; and Deliberation, which recruits effort and volition, is driven by structured relational knowledge, slow and sequential, and both the product and the process are conscious. The components of this theory receive other denominations as emotion vs. reason (Damásio, 1994), empathising-systemising (E-S) (Baron-Cohen, 2009), and experiential vs. rational (Pacini & Epstein, 1999).

Conspicuously, social decision-making situates in System 1/Intuition/..., as social heuristics (Gigerenzer, 2001; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). Therefore, it seems that the neural basis of System 1/Intuition/Emotions/Empathising/Experiential should be explored in order to understand social-based brand preference.

Actually, we are running a high definition EEG experiment that largely reproduces the same stimulation procedure as in Santos et al. (2011). The objective is to temporarily map the ERPs(20) involved in brand perception and explore if there are ERPs that distinguish between preferred, indifferent, and fictitious brands. So far (unpublished data), a clear N170 component is identifiable in PO7 and PO8 electrodes but, apparently, not disentangle between the three brand categories (cf. Figure 7). Nonetheless, this finding is interesting as far as such ERP in these electrodes is characteristic of faces perception (Hinojosa, Mercado, & Carretié, 2015; Rössion & Jacques, 2012) and perceived emotional arousal of faces (Almeida et al., 2016).

The second direction points to the exploration of specific cultural processing in the brain. More specifically, the study is being conducted in Porto, Portugal, and Dublin, Ireland, using EEG and games from Game Theory in order to explore the free-rider effect. Free-rider is the person that, instead of cooperating with others, all working and producing the common good, s/he benefits from the system without contributing to it, adopting a parasitic posture. It has been shown that if free riding is not punished, it degrades the social group/culture, and also that people feel rewarded when free-riders are punished (de Quervain et al., 2004; Fehr & Gächter, 2002).

In a previous behavioural-only study (not published), undergraduate students from Portugal and Finland played the Third-Party Punishment game. While there were no differences between the two cohorts in what it concerns the expectation of a social sanction, i.e. both groups recognised that another person was free-riding, when it came to doing altruistic punishment, i.e. pay to punish the free-rider without an immediate compensation, other than block the free-rider activity and preserve the group cohesiveness in the long range, the Portuguese cohort kept their money, but the Finnish cohort paid and did the punishment. Gürerk, Irlenbusch, and Rockenbach (2006) have found that insti-

tutions with rooted altruistic punishment always win sanction-free institutions, identifying greater cooperation in the formers (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr & Gächter, 2002). Maybe the lack of altruistic punishment in the Portuguese culture has been allowing greater levels of free-riders and free-riding, and maybe this scenario is one of the foundations of the systematic poor economic performance of the country, at least when compared with Finland and the Finnish culture. This is the study's hypothesis. As stated above, actually it is being run in Portugal and Ireland, two countries that faced national bailouts at the beginning of the decade. Cohorts from the two countries are playing the Ultimatum Game (as receiver), the Centipede Game (McKelvey & Palfrey, 1992; Pulford, Krockow, Colman, & Lawrence, 2016), the Public Goods Game (Chung, Yun, & Jeong, 2015), and the Volunteer's Dilemma (Diekmann, 1985; Goeree, Holt, & Smith, 2017) while their brains are scanned with EEG in order to detect culturally shaped free-riding behaviour (Rilling, King-Casas, & Sanfey, 2008).

FUTURE DIRECTIONS (NEUROSEMIOTICS AND NEUROETHNOGRAPHY)

As discussed earlier in this article, it seems that the neural basis of System 1/Intuition/Emotions/Empathising/Experiential should be explored in order to understand social-based brand preference. The contradiction is that System 1/Intuition requires previous learning, which is done with experience. Intuition is the accumulated knowledge that results from the increasing situations that one faces, developing heuristics that help him/her coping with them. However, one heuristic serves one situation, and situations are particular, as contextual elements do reproduce recurrently. The set of heuristics forms the habits, where one "decides" the same way before the same, or similar, situations (Rangel, Camerer, & Montague, 2008). But, do people need extensive experience in order to smartly navigate in the social world? It does not seem so. On the one hand, social situations are so extensively diverse that probably one would need decades, so s/he acquires the necessary intuitive knowledge to cope in the social world. On the other hand, human brains would need to be large and swift enough to store the heuristics coding and deliver it quickly, although some au-

Fig. 6: Reaction time of preferred (green), indifferent (grey), and fictitious (yellow) brand logos. Reaction time in preferred brands is significantly faster than in indifferent and fictitious (retrieved from Santos et al., 2011)





Fig. 7: EEG electric potentials for PO7 (E65) and PO8 (E90) electrodes. Black corresponds to preferred, red to indifferent, and blue to fictitious brands



thors argue that this is the reason that explains why human brains are some large when compared with other animals (Whiten & van Schaik, 2007). Because System 2/Deliberation is inherently slow, it does not fit the requirements for social navigation. Therefore, one question arises: are System 1 and 2 enough to explain decision?

Pelzmann, Hudnik, and Miklantz (2005) suggested an alternative system that does not need extensive previous experience, nor powerful hardware: use the others as a pool of knowledge. How do people choose their mobile phone tariff plan? On the one hand, computational requirements would be enormous, so one could optimise the best tariff plan. It would have to account for all the service providers, the modalities of plans (pre or post-paid), the varieties in pre and post-paid plans, the inclusion (or not) of a phone, and grouping or individual plans. It would be difficult to join all the data in order to compute the optimum... and the optimum would be ephemeral because, in the living markets, offers change soon, and all the process would have to be rerun again. System 2/Deliberation would not work. On the other hand, also because of the large set of possible combinations, it would require an extensive accumulated experience in order to develop the necessary heuristics, risking that they would become outdated soon because of the market dynamics. The dynamics of social settings (and markets are social settings, where people trade with each other) seem to not accommodate System 1/Intuition and System 2/Deliberation decision-making processes. However, relying on the others' knowledge, as proposed by Pelzmann et al. (2005), may explain how people behave in such settings. It is fast, it is available, and it uses to deliver appropriate solutions for a large number of situations, even if one knows nothing about that particular setting. S/he just have to imitate, and the Dual Process Theory may need a third companion, so social-based behaviours are explained: System 3/Imitation.

The building blocks of System 3/Imitation were already discussed: social mirroring, empathy, and Theory of Mind. Reflect in one's own body the actions and the emotional states of the others, so one understands what the others are doing and feeling, and imagine what are the beliefs, goals, and intentions that are going in the others' minds. One future direction is to explore the combined participation of all these processes in what concerns Marketing and, more

specifically, Branding.

Brands participate in this process, either providing a support for socially-useful-meaning content and as carriers of the meaning from consumer to consumer. Inherent to this content-carrier process is Semiotics. Once, Semiotics provided a framework to understand Marketing actions, especially when what relates to meaning transfer between consumers supported in signs (Kehret-Ward, 1988; Mick, 1986; Nöth, 1988; Pinson, 1998), which has some more rare reappearances (Mick, Burroughs, Hetzel, & Brannen, 2004; Schembri, Merri-lee, & Kristiansen, 2010). Another future direction points towards the neural foundations of meaning formation, meaning assignment to signs, meaning decoding by the interpretant, and the metamorphosis of indexes into symbols, in one word: Neurosemiotics (not to be confounded with Biosemiotics (Nöth, 1990)). Neurosemiotics have been sparsely addressed in the literature, usually more focusing on the concept and scope, than in doing it (Bouissac, 1998; Favareau, 2002; Grzybek, 1993; Jorna, 2009). However, it urges to neuro-substantiate its concepts, like meaning formation, meaning assignment to signs, and meaning decoding by the interpretant, so the framework is complete and, primarily, objectively identify the processes. Neurosemiotics will be one main girder in the future.

Another future direction is to operationalise the ethnographic method to encompass neural information. As reported above, there are already portable devices that may record neural activity while subjects are in their natural settings. This means that Technology is delivering ways to social scientists, so they go to the field and record neural data, besides the traditional observations and ethnographic interviews. Neural data may contribute to overcoming known limitations of the ethnographic method. For example, one common dilemma in participative versus non-participative observations is that, in the former, the researcher may influence the flow of the affairs, deviating it from what is natural, and, in the latter, the researcher adopts a passive posture, not influencing the course of the interactions, but simultaneously possibly lacking depth in the interpretation of the actions, which may lead to erroneous understanding of the situation and bad theories. Because neural data grounds on the biological supports of the psychological processes and assuming that different psychological

processes depend on different biological supports, neuroethnographic data may help the research in doing the desirable correct interpretations and theories.

On its side, the literature is void in what it concerns Neuroethnography and its methods, assuming that its scope is shared with the traditional Ethnography. Nonetheless, the advent of Neuroethnography weaves with Neurosemiotics, at least for Branding studies. The formation of brand meanings (and every other symbol) is a social task run inside cultures. Hence, if one has the intention to know how the meanings are formed and symbols decoded in the brain (Neurosemiotics), one must quest the involved brains situated in the natural settings (Neuroethnography), which is a challenge for the next decades.

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NOTES

1. Functional magnetic resonance imaging.
2. A voxel is a pixel with thickness, let say a “cube”. The brain is split in in “cubes” and the analysis is run in each one.
3. Magnetoencephalography.
4. Transcranial magnetic stimulation.
5. Electroencephalography.
6. Steady state topography.
7. Superconducting quantum interference device.
8. Positron emission tomography.
9. Blood-oxygen-level dependent.
10. Electrocardiography.
11. Electrodermal activity/skin conductance response.
12. Transcranial current stimulation.
13. Transcranial direct current stimulation.
14. Transcranial alternate current stimulation.
15. Transcranial random noise stimulation.
16. Transcranial pulsed current stimulation.
17. <http://openbci.com/>
18. Pleasure – Arousal – Dominance.
19. Self-assessment manikin.
20. Event-related potentials.

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#3

UNDERSTANDING CONSUMER'S MULTIPLE CHANNEL USAGE IN THE MOBILE-MEDIATED ENVIRONMENT: DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

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ABSTRACT

The increasing number of channels in the retail environment due to technology developments has made understanding consumers' multiple channel usage more important than ever. While, until recently, studies have focused on the dichotomy between computer and physical store usage, the introduction of the mobile channel and the shift to Omnichannel shopping created profound changes in the way consumers navigate between channels. Besides contributing to more dynamic, complex and non-linear consumer decision journeys, it is believed that the addition of mobile device usage during purchases may have driven a more proactive and socially informed facet of the consumer. This may

negatively affect consumer relationships with brands and profitability, as firms have little or no control of information attainment and channel usage by consumers. Although much is known on individual choices of more traditional channels, many questions remain unanswered regarding consumer channel-related decisions during their decision journey in the current mobile context. Based on recent literature, the aim of this paper is to discuss current research gaps in omnichannel research and provide directions for future investigation. In particular, the present work discusses the need for holistic consumer-centric decision journey mapping, and a directed approach in the examination of omnichannel behaviors, both in backward-looking models, regarding motivations leading to the behaviors, and in forward-looking models, regarding the impact the behaviors have on loyalty determinants. The design of the study is conceptual. Findings include a research agenda for future research in the omnichannel domain. This research contributes to current knowledge by suggesting new perspectives for understanding omnichannel behaviors, which can inspire future research, advance theory and aid managerial practice.

KEYWORDS: Omnichannel behaviors, mobile, consumer decision journey, motivations, loyalty.

INTRODUCTION

Consumers search for information, purchase products and connect with organizations through an ever-increasing number of channels and touchpoints. With the recent diffusion of digital technologies, the usage of mobile Internet devices, social media and online review websites is now commonly added to more traditional but still very important channels, such as brick-and-mortar stores, call centers, and online websites in the omnichannel environment. Channels are mediums through which consumers can search information, purchase and engage in post-

purchase activities. Of these, mobile device usage, in particular, has expanded rapidly (Park & Lee, 2017). According to Zenith (2017), smartphones and tablets registered a worldwide penetration of 63% and 18.7% in 2017, respectively, with an estimated increase to 66% and 19.5% in 2018. Additionally, by 2019, it is estimated that 76% of Internet access will be made through these devices, including information and purchase-related activities (Zenith, 2017). Currently in Europe, although 74% of consumers continue to use computers, 71% use smartphones, 36% tablets, and 71% admit being multidevice users (Google Consumer Barometer, 2017).

Taking advantage of channel-specific attributes, consumers prefer and utilize different information and distribution channels at different stages of their purchase process to better satisfy their shopping needs (Verhoef, Neslin, & Vroomen, 2007). Although brick-and-mortar stores serve consumers' need for instant gratification and immediate physical evaluation and purchase (Brynjolfsson, Hu, & Rahman, 2013), location issues may undermine efficient product information gathering (Alba et al., 1997). The Internet, on the other hand, has unique characteristics that allow large quantities of detailed information and recommendations to be accessed rapidly at any time, entailing lower search costs (Kaufman-Scarborough & Lindquist, 2002).

Recently, the technical features of mobile devices have offered consumers additional value to Internet access, which has profoundly impacted consumer purchase and channel choice behavior in the recent omnichannel environment (Park & Lee, 2017). With wireless connection, ultra-portability, location sensitivity and real-time interaction as key properties (Shankar & Balasubramanian, 2009), consumers can receive, search, share and manage product, firm and competitor information on their mobile devices everywhere, even while evaluating products and services firsthand in-store (Rapp, Baker, Bachrach, Ogilvie, & Beitelspacher, 2015). Social media apps gain particular importance with the mobile channel, being a central source of remote electronic word-of-mouth (Shankar, Venkatesh, Hofacker, & Naik, 2010). The ubiquity associated with mobile devices overcomes geographic limitations, blurs the natural distinction between channels, and empowers consumers (Brynjolfsson et al., 2013).

Additionally, mobile devices facilitate consumers' seamless and interchangeable use of channels that is difficult or impossible to control by firms (Verhoef, Kannan, & Inman, 2015).

For firms, omnichannel retailing implies developing new forms of integrating and managing channels and intermediates (Ailawadi & Farris, 2017). The consumer's effortless switch and combination of channels from different competitors in the decision process may easily lead to cross-channel free-riding (i.e., searching products through the channel of Firm A and purchasing through another channel of Firm B), which can erode profits (Chou, Shen, Chiu, & Chou, 2016). Thus, in the current omnichannel environment, being able to provide consistent experience that retain consumers across traditional and new channels becomes the challenge for firms (Piotrowicz & Cuthbertson, 2014).

Although understanding how consumers choose channels has become central in current literature, the effect of mobile device usage in consumer decision journeys and omnichannel behaviors is still an under-studied domain (Lemon & Verhoef, 2016). This study aims to discuss some gaps in current research and provide directions that may guide future studies, help develop theory and assist managerial practices.

CONSUMER DECISION JOURNEYS AND OMNI-CHANNEL BEHAVIORAL MODELS

Firms providing new search, purchase and contact channels for their customers are believed to entail considerable benefits. In addition to staying ahead of competition (Pozza, 2014), employing multiple channels increases customer satisfaction and loyalty (Wallace, Giese, & Johnson, 2004), and provides superior customer value (Kumar & Venkatesan, 2005). However, research regarding consumer decision journeys and multiple channel usage remains highly fragmented, with a still limited amount of empirical knowledge on the influence of mobile devices in current consumer behavior (Lemon & Verhoef, 2016). The scarcity of studies focused on understanding more recent consumer journeys in today's mobile-mediated environment, and the need to develop better multi/

omnichannel models, is recognized by the Marketing Science Institute (2014-2016; 2016-2018), which has included, and is expected to continue to emphasize, these domains as important research priorities in current and nearby future Marketing investigation.

The consumer decision journey is defined as the process consumers go through across all touchpoints and decision stages that compose the consumer experience (Lemon & Verhoef, 2016). Due to the increasing presence and use of online and mobile channels in today's shopping environment, decision-making processes, and consequent consumer decision journeys, are believed to be more dynamic, complex and unstructured compared to those of traditional purchase behavior literature (Court, Elzinga, Mulder, & Vetvik, 2009; Edelman, 2010). Existing knowledge has mainly derived from either conceptual (e.g., Voorhees et al., 2017) or organizational (e.g., Edelman, 2010) sources. In most cases, a unidirectional and static view of the decision journey is considered, which may posit severe bias in understanding actual consumer journeys.

Within the consumer decision journey, various channel choice behaviors can be identified, such as showrooming and webrooming, posteriorly discussed. Models analyzing these behaviors have mostly focused on the antecedents leading to the behaviors (e.g., Frasquet, Mollá, & Ruiz, 2015; Sands, Ferraro, Campbell, & Pallant, 2016). By understanding what determines these behaviors, managers can more effectively design and manage channel-related strategies (Neslin et al., 2006). However, current research has taken an approach that is too broadened and general in analyzing channel choice behaviors. This posits challenges for managers and theory development, as each behavior is individual, with idiosyncratic characteristics that should be analyzed separately (Flavián, Gurrea, & Orús, 2016; Gensler, Neslin, & Verhoef, 2017). Also, benefits and costs that determine channel usage motivations are also believed to weight differently for consumers with the technological diffusion (Lemon & Verhoef, 2016).

Less emphasis has been given to consequences of channel choice behaviors. Studies in this domain indicate that higher loyalty may exist for firms employing multiple channels (Wallace et al., 2004) and for consumers perceiv-

ing higher channel integration (Zhang, Ren, Wang, & He, 2018). Nonetheless, more channel choice options potentiate channel cannibalization (Kollmann, Kuckertz, & Kayser, 2012), and cross-channel free-riding is an increasingly salient issue in multiple channel usage contexts (Heitz-Spahn, 2013). This is believed to be particularly problematic with mobile device usage, where consumers have remote access to information that can instantly aid their purchase decision and choice of brand (Spaid & Flint, 2014). As with antecedents, those studies focused on channel choice consequences also tend to ignore differences at an individual behavioral level. Due to the opportunity for more integrative and personalized information and marketing online, loyalty in the online and offline environments may, however, vary (Shankar, Smith, & Rangaswamy, 2003).

To aid theory development that can assist managerial practice, the present study argues that an organizational-centric view on consumer decision journeys, and a broad, general, mostly backward-looking perspective on channel choice behaviors is no longer appropriate. In accordance, the present work identifies specific gaps in three key domains and indicates directions for future research. Particularly, the work highlights the need for: A holistic consumer-centric decision journey mapping; A theoretically directed approach in the examination of motivations of mobile-mediated omnichannel behaviors; and, A synergic-specific analysis of loyalty determinants in the mobile and multiple channel source environment.

RESEARCH GAPS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This study is driven by challenges and limitations in current literature that emerge from mobile device characteristics, which are believed to affect consumer multiple channel usage behaviors. The study focuses on understanding consumer channel choice behavior in three domains, in which research gaps and future research directions are explored.

INSUFFICIENT KNOWLEDGE ON ACTUAL CONSUMER-ORIENTATED DECISION JOURNEYS

The consumer decision journey has been conceptualized as a process model in current literature, built on consumer behavior process models from the 1960s and 1970s (e.g., Batra & Keller, 2016; Lemon & Verhoef, 2016). According to its definition, it comprises both the stages of the decision-making process and the corresponding touchpoints at each stage (Lemon & Verhoef, 2016). Due to more recent channels that facilitate interconnections, consumers are no longer passive information receivers from brands, but are active information searchers with more complex, non-linear and socially influenced consumer decision journeys (Batra & Keller, 2016). They are co-creators of value (Bolton, Gustafsson, McColl-Kennedy, Sirianni, & Tse, 2014), constructing their own decision journeys according to their needs.

Existing models, however, tend to contemplate the consumer decision journey partially. For example, focus has been given to the analysis of the impact of multiple touchpoints on only one stage of the decision process, such as brand consideration (e.g., Baxendale, Macdonald, & Wilson, 2015). Also, probably due to the availability of data provided by monitorable firm channels (i.e., clickstream data), online attribution modeling has gained interest (e.g., Anderl, Becker, von Wangenheim, & Schumann, 2016; Anderl, Schumann, & Kunz, 2016). Although these attribution models have contributed greatly to recent literature, they consider only the online consumer journey, and have difficulty distinguishing between the contribution of traditional online and mobile device usage to infer about consumer online decision processes. When more than clickstream data exists, it tends to be collected using internally-oriented methodologies, such as blueprinting (e.g., Bitner, Ostrom, & Morgan, 2008), which does not sufficiently focus on the consumer's own view (Lemon & Verhoef, 2016).

These partial examinations of the consumer decision journey provide both a one-way, incomplete view of the consumer decision journey, and limited knowledge on how different online and offline channels individually influence the decision journey. McColl-Kennedy et al. (2015) drew attention to the fact that little is known regarding how consumer interactions with all firm touchpoints

constitute a process, which can be attributed to a lack of research considering a holistic, dynamic and consumer-centric decision journey. Recent studies acknowledging these journey characteristics are, however, conceptual (e.g., Batra & Keller, 2016; Lemon & Verhoef, 2016), offering little empirical evidence.

RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

To extend the scope of consumer decision journey analysis, consumer decision journeys need to be mapped beyond service blueprinting, in a holistic, consumer-oriented and empirical manner. First, studies should detaily analyze the entire consumer decision journey at a micro-level, across all channels and stages of the decision process. Although entailing higher constraints than cross-sectional research, longitudinal studies could be applied to understand the dynamism of decision journeys and how touchpoints are integrated by consumers over time (McColl-Kennedy et al., 2015). Sequence analysis, which breaks down complex patterns into sequences of tasks or activities, may offer a rigorous approach to track and analyze longitudinal interactions transversally (McColl-Kennedy et al., 2015). Relying on recent tracking technology, such as eye-tracking or wearable devices (e.g., smartwatches), allows these sequences to be more accurately captured (Kannan & Li, 2017).

Second, studies should involve the consumer in the decision mapping and adopt a consumer-centric view. Diving deeper into consumer decision journeys allows firms to identify opportunities for influence and intervention (Lemon & Verhoef, 2016). Because consumer experiences are personal and unique, questioning them about their actual journeys enables firms to decrease discrepancies between what is planned by the firm and what is actually experienced by consumers (Halvorsrud, Kvale, & Følstad, 2016). The use of diaries, for example, can provide detailed descriptions and emotional indicators that are part of their personal journeys.

LACK OF STUDIES ON MOTIVATIONS SPECIFIC TO PARTICULAR MULTIPLE CHANNEL USAGE BEHAVIORS

Within the context of multiple channel usage, channel choice behavior has many forms. In current literature, cross-channel behaviors are the most common, where consumers' switch and combine different channels at different stages of the decision process (Flavián et al., 2016). The most evidenced cross-channel behaviors are showrooming and webrooming (Verhoef et al., 2015). Showrooming is defined as the search for product information offline and purchase online (Rejón-Guardia & Luna-Nevarez, 2017), and webrooming the search for product information online and purchase offline (Flavián et al., 2016).

In order to develop a comprehensive and systematic understanding of each behavior, investigating the drivers leading to them is particularly important. Recently, the popularity of showrooming has led some authors to structurally analyze the showrooming construct, which includes investigating specific underlying motivations (e.g., Gensler et al., 2017; Rapp et al., 2015). However, webrooming has been evidenced as the most prevalent and profitable cross-channel behavior. For example, for electronic products (i.e., laptops/mobile phones/televisions), 44% of consumers confirm the practice of webrooming against 9% of showroomers, in Europe (Google Consumer Barometer, 2015). Additionally, sales in physical stores based on Internet information account for four times the amount of online sales in Europe and are projected to continue to dominate by 2020 (Forrester, 2015).

Although it is the most profitable cross-channel behavior, webrooming lacks a theoretically structured treatment in current literature. Several studies have contributed to understand the drivers leading to individual consumer channel selection (e.g., Noble, Griffith, & Weinberger, 2005). Except for the few studies analyzing motivations specific to showrooming, those considering particular behaviors have mainly taken an exploratory focus, first identifying various multiple channel usage behaviors, including webrooming, and posteriorly characterizing them based on the same generic set of channel usage motiva-

tions (e.g., Frasquet et al., 2015; Schröder & Zaharia, 2008). Nonetheless, it is not only the lack of investigation of webrooming-specific motivations that deserves research focus. In current motivational literature, Park and Lee (2017) noted that “the mobile channel is not incorporated into the research”, in this domain (p. 1400). The increasingly dominating role of mobile devices in shopping situations, sometimes replacing traditional online channels, makes its inclusion in future research particularly important.

RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

More research on motivations specific to individual behaviors, specially webrooming, is needed. Recently, Flavián et al. (2016) suggested that, as a distinct cross-channel behavior, with specific usage patterns and characteristics, webrooming is better understood recurring to more directed theories that have a potentially higher explanatory influence, such as information-processing and uncertainty-reduction theories. Future studies should base themselves on these or other related theories to derive specific motivations that could help explain webrooming. For example, consumers search online and posteriorly go to the store to confirm product information and purchase because physical manipulation is required for them to decrease purchase uncertainty. Thus, need for touch may be a specific webrooming motivation related with uncertainty-reduction theory.

Studies analyzing motivations specific to particular behaviors, whether webrooming, showrooming or others, should also examine motivational differences for those using the mobile channel. Due to their recent impact on shopping patterns, the need to differentiate motivational factors for multidevice users has become particularly relevant (Singh and Swait, 2017). For example, webroomers or showroomers using laptops, mobile devices or both (i.e., multi-device users) may be driven by different motivations among themselves based on the online search or purchase channel.

PAUCITY OF STUDIES ON CONSUMER LOYALTY DETERMINANTS FOR SPECIFIC MULTIPLE CHANNEL USAGE BEHAVIORS

Understanding the determinants of consumer loyalty has long been a priority in traditional consumer purchase behavior literature (Lemon & Verhoef, 2016). With the proliferation of the Internet, investigating loyalty-related constructs in the online sphere has also gained interest (e.g., Rose, Clark, Samouel, & Hair, 2012). However, studies analyzing consumer loyalty in multiple channel usage contexts are scarce (Hsieh et al., 2012), especially those considering specific omnichannel behaviors. Loyalty studies in a multiple channel usage context have mainly focused on understanding how channel attributes (e.g., Shankar et al., 2003), channel integration (e.g., Zhang et al., 2018), perceived multichannel quality (e.g., Hsieh et al., 2012) or value (e.g., Kim & Lee, 2014) affect loyalty-related variables, such as satisfaction, trust and loyalty itself. Specific behaviors, like showrooming and webrooming, on the other hand, involve particular synergetic effects between offline and online channels, which can affect loyalty determinates in both channels.

Loyalty in multiple channel usage settings has been analyzed for a single firm, with the majority of studies sustaining that loyalty is enhanced when firms provide and integrate multiple channels (e.g., Wallace et al., 2004; Zhang et al., 2018). Nevertheless, from the consumer's perspective, purchase decision-making in a multiple channel environment implies being able to use various channels from multiple providers and sources (Neslin et al., 2014), with the potential to impact repurchase behavior. This, however, is not accounted for in previous studies (Larivière, Aksoy, Cooil, & Keiningham, 2011). Recent mobile channels may likewise affect loyalty. They empower consumers through unlimited access to information from multiple sources and entail limited human contact, which can weaken relationships between consumers and firms (Neslin et al., 2006). Although this is known, the explicit analysis of the effect of mobile and multidevice usage in consumer loyalty is lacking in current literature.

RESEARCH DIRECTIONS

Very little is known regarding loyalty mechanisms in the context of specific omnichannel behaviors, where synergetic effects between offline and online channels exist. Jin, Park and Kim (2010) were one of the few to explore the impact of offline satisfaction and loyalty on the same variables online, thus evaluating showrooming synergetic effects. However, as in motivational literature, the inverse effects in consumer loyalty, referring to webrooming mechanisms, remains unexamined. Due to the importance of this behavior for firm sales, understanding loyalty in this context deserves great attention.

Empirical tests including the influence of multiple channel sources (various competitor, social or other channels), mobile device and multidevice usage on loyalty-related variables are also needed in current literature. Consumers value and integrate channels from various sources in their decision process, including those of other providers and more recent ones, which may have a profound impact on their loyalty towards firms. The influence of constructs such as multiple channel sources and mobile/multidevice usage could be included and tested in future behavioral-specific studies as moderate variables (e.g., Larivière et al., 2011).

CONCLUSION

The emergence of recent technologies as shopping aids, such as mobile devices, has impacted shopping patterns of consumers and the way they relate with firms. Developing a deep understanding of consumer's channel choice behaviors in the current omnichannel environment allows firms to more efficiently manage channels and engage consumers in profitable relationships. This paper highlights specific research gaps in the literature related with multiple channel usage and identifies research directions for advancing knowledge in the field. Although various research opportunities exist, it focuses on three major areas: the consumer decision journey, behavioral-specific motivations, and the impact of specific channel synergies on loyalty determinates.

First, managers often face limitations with online attribution modeling and

difficulties in obtaining path-to-purchase data outside monitorable firm channel sources, which leads to partial analyses of consumer decision journeys. Particular attention should be given to empirical, holistic and consumer-centric journey mapping, taking into account the consumer's own sequential perspective regarding the shopping experience, across all touchpoints (controllable and uncontrollable by the firm) and stages of the decision process.

Second, although much research exists on the determinates of individual channel selection, which provides actionable contribution for managers, little is known regarding the drivers of specific and increasingly evidenced cross-channel behaviors. Specifically regarding webrooming, focus should be given to theoretically deriving and testing motivations that may have higher explanatory power of the particular behaviors. With the proliferation of mobile device usage as an alternative Internet access point within cross-channel behaviors, analyzing and comparing motivational differences for mobile and multidevice users is a promising research agenda.

Finally, consumer loyalty is one of the core constructs in Marketing, studied in diverse contexts. Although combining channels can potentially have a negative impact on consumer loyalty and erode profits, limited loyalty studies in the context of multiple channel usage have been conducted. In particular, research regarding the effect of synergies between online and offline channels on loyalty-related determinants is encouraged, especially for webrooming. The effect on loyalty of using channels from various sources and, as with motivations, including mobile devices in cross-channel behavior studies is also considered an important research avenue.

In sum, it is proposed that practitioners and researchers approach consumer decision journeys and omnichannel models from other perspectives. Adjusting research methods and practices to consider these areas, which have a significant potential to mold future research, allows advancements in current knowledge and managerial practice.

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#4

RESEARCH AND GLOBALIZATION: THE VICIOUS CIRCLE AND THE WASTE OF KNOWLEDGE – A CASE STUDY

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RESEARCH AND GLOBALIZATION: THE VICIOUS CIRCLE AND THE WASTE OF KNOWLEDGE - A CASE STUDY*

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ABSTRACT

By force of the increased global competition among universities and research centers all over the world, scientific research and knowledge became more and more conditioned mostly in “peripheral countries”. By invoking the need to make research outputs comparable for funding purposes and by exaggerating the requirements needed to facilitate international mobility of researchers, students and professors, academic and research knowledge are made more and more homogeneous. International evaluation and accreditation procedures, the processes whereby equalization takes place, as well as quality control devices, tend to be single oriented towards the dominant paradigm and closed to the plurality of conceptions, methodologies and results, which compound research effectively produced. Given the strength of American and English publishing markets, most countries’ research has to align with them and the dominant knowledge they serve most of times or else become invisible and wasted, despite not sharing the same values, culture and social aims.

Academic careers’ evaluation are as well shaped by that equalizing principle, namely for funding purposes; likewise researchers and professors are compelled to publish in those dominant papers and repositories at the same time that most of them reproduce this kind of knowledge by teaching. In the meanwhile, papers and other research outputs, which escape or cannot accede to those markets deal frequently with the analysis and policy proposals addressed to some of the most important country’s issues, as in the case study we develop in this paper, relative to ISEG. Unfortunately, the latter risk to remain in the dark most of times and thereby the knowledge results they contributed to.

JEL KEYWORDS: A2 – Economics Education and Teaching of Economics; C – Cross section Models; I23 -Higher Education and Research Institutions; O3 – Research and Development.

**Note: This communication is an adaptation of the article Fernandes & Chagas Lopes (2018). Research Evaluation, Bibliometric Indicators and Impact on Knowledge Development. The Case of ISEG. IUP Journal of Knowledge Management, Vol XV.*

INTRODUCTION

The turning to the new millennium has been marked by an important improvement in Portuguese S&T indicators, mostly on account of the returning of expatriate scientists and also due to the European Social Fund transfers. An huge increasing in the number of FTE researchers – 91% between 2004 and 2015, compared to 38% for EU in the same period – went in parallel with an astonishing increase in global R&D expenses, 95%, in terms of PPP. But the most impressive growth concerned the number of well known International Peer Reviewed (IPR) articles which increased by three times.

This very positive evolution had to do with the modest position occupied by Portuguese S&T and R&D indicators by the end of the last century. Nevertheless, they had to suffer again an important backlash on account of the economic crisis and austerity measures imposed by Tröika. In spite of it, Portuguese scientists and researchers resilience has been very strong and the number of IPR didn't diminish, on the contrary, during the austerity period.

Likewise, we could expect a very meaningful impact on knowledge development in Portugal to have occurred on account of that evolution, what happened indeed. Notwithstanding, a bundle of meaningful barriers prevented it to go even further as we discuss in the next section.

GLOBALIZATION, OFFICIAL THOUGHT AND WASTE OF KNOWLEDGE

With the reinforcement of global competitiveness also knowledge, the leading production factor of nowadays, became a strongly disputed marketable good. Internationally, universities and research centers compete in order to attract the best students, professors and researchers.

To make it possible two requisites must be met: that these personnel may be mobile and also that their knowledge and research skills may be comparable.

Throughout procedures such as teaching's and research's national and international evaluation and international accreditation of faculties and syllabuses made by universities' associations and agencies, as for instance AACSB, that goal is achieved; most of times, on the burden of an excessive harmonization and alignment with *mainstream* knowledge.

Why is that so?

In order to become internationally recognized and also to meet the demanding set by academic career regulations, most research articles must be accepted and published by well known IPR journals and repertoires, the relevance of which depends on the dimension of the scientific markets they represent. This has been mostly favorable to UK and USA research centers and universities: by using the most widespread common language, English, by controlling a large share of the world's R&D budget – the major part of which becomes reinvested in those same economies – and last but not least by vastly using crossed citation and referencing among English and American authors, those two scientific communities are increasingly auto-reinforcing and give place to the most important publishers scientific market.

Even though the relevant social and economic values of the “periphery countries”, as well as their most important topics to be addressed, don't coincide with the English and American ones, the former countries have no alternative but to submit their research outputs to those international publishers in order to become “certified”. Which implies that they are compelled to select research topics which more probably will be accepted by those journals and also that they are also contributing thereby to the reproduction of dominant knowledge(1).

What happens, then, with the research articles which don't apply or are not accepted to “reference” journals? They become almost neglected, even though they constitute an important share of the country's research effort and deal with the leading economic and social problems of the corresponding community. As we shall see throughout the case study we will address later, this means that an important waste of relevant knowledge occurs most of times.




Figure 1: The vicious circle between Bibliometrics, Official Knowledge and Knowledge Waste [Source: Adapted from Fernandes & Chagas Lopes (2018, op cit)]

LITERATURE REVIEW

Given this framework, universities and specially research universities suffer an enormous pressure to get international accreditation and to impose increasingly stringent evaluation criteria for their faculties (Bornmann & Leydesdorf 2014). In most cases these evaluation criteria don't take into consideration national culture, values and social goals as well as scientific areas' specificities. Subordination towards mainstream journals and criteria led to a hierarchization of the scientific domains elected for funding throughout the alliance with national agencies for science and research most of times. In accordance, "hard sciences" became mostly favored, as they are more prone to produce market goods (Chagas Lopes 2016).

Relatively to faculty's evaluation and classification, bibliometrics became the leading criteria for accreditation purposes and academic career's progression. By selecting "reference journals" bibliometrics enlightens the way scientific and academic outputs are communicated and how do they circulate, which is positive. But misuse and preponderance of this methodology bears a number of negative consequences as have been pointed by several authors. "American orientation" and the corresponding trend towards insularity facilitate cross reference among English and American scientists thereby inflating the perceived prestige of the journals and repertoires in which they publish (Mingers & Willmott 2012; Altbach 2015). Actually, bibliometrics can be very misleading: a higher number of citations does not necessarily mean that the corresponding articles are better in quality, only that they are more accessible.

Mingers & Willmott (op. cit) write in that light that a strong trend towards a monoculture is developing within the share of the world's scientific communities aligned with "reference" journals and repertoires, which is neglecting important research topics proposed by "peripheral" countries. And some other authors stress that those journals and repertoires are but a small part of the world wide scientific journals, although their aim and scope are presented as constituting dominant or official thought (Zanon 2012; Anninos 2014; Altbach 2015, op cit). This trend becomes increasingly reinforced by the fact that the "reference" journals and repertoires belong frequently to important international

publishing organizations, like Elsevier or Thompson Reuters, for instance, ruled according to management strategies and for profit goals.

Beigel (2014) explains why less developed countries' researchers and scientists seek to get published by such journals and therefore align with the paradigms which support them: for sake of noticeable publishing which will increase the opportunities to get higher financing and a fast academic career progression. Nevertheless, a sound number of researchers from less developed countries publish in Non Mainstream Journal (NMJ): because of their citizen orientations and social responsibility, they select for research topics, which are relevant for their societies and economies thereby risking not to be accepted by mainstream journals. Likewise they contribute to the knowledge gap filling by exposing research subjects and methodologies which otherwise would remain in the dark (Beigel op cit; Chavarro et al 2017).

But there are also important financial and linguistic barriers from "peripheral" countries to access to the mainstream journals, of course.

According to Anninos (op cit). the evaluation and classification of faculty and researchers throughout bibliometric criteria should be carried out with the greatest precaution, taking into account the specificities of the different disciplines and scientific areas as well as their types of outputs, faculty size and observation period. Whenever possible, bibliometrics should be supplemented by peer evaluation.

ISEG AS A CASE STUDY

We decided to take the Portuguese School for Economics and Management (ISEG) as a case study of the topic, which concerns us most in this paper. We were professor and are a researcher at ISEG, have been involved in the accreditation process some years ago and we have access to the faculty databases although strictly for research purposes.

The main research questions we set are:

- Is there any association between the publishing in "reference" repertoires and journals and their authors' academic classification?
- How meaningful is the share of the research made "invisible" by not

being published in such journals and how pertinent are the corresponding research topics for the Portuguese economy and society?

Given the very distinctive traits of the implementation of AD regulation among Portuguese universities, a case study proved to be an adequate methodology to assess its impacts. Relatively to ISEG we performed both a quantitative and a qualitative analysis.

We used two databases: the database of publications of ISEG Faculty and the database of ISEG Faculty's classification according to the current accreditation process with AACSB. As to the journals and repertoires in which ISEG's Faculty published during a period of five years – 2012/2017 – we classified the IPR (Internationally Peer Reviewed) ones in three classes: 1) Top Tier Peer Reviewed Journals (PRJ) articles or equivalent; 2) PRJ articles within repertoires JCR, SCOPUS or equivalent; 3) PRJ articles published in journals outside those repertoires. Faculty is classified as Scholarly Academics (SA), the top position, or Others, according to AACSB demands.

Our sample was composed by 94 ISEG's teachers – the ones that published at least one paper in the time interval 2012-2017- which gives a total of 1428 published articles, irrespective of their nature.

In the quantitative analyses we computed frequencies for the number of published papers in all three classes and crosstabs for number of published papers by their authors' academic classification. For a further analysis we performed Qui-square tests of independence for the main associations in order to check if two variables could be random independent or the contrary.

In the qualitative analysis, each paper published within the interval 2012-2017 was analyzed, looking on the internal or international nature of its dissemination, the corresponding edition and, most of all, topics covered.

Still in the quantitative analysis, we computed the total number of teachers that had published 1, 2... 4 or more papers during 2012-2017 interval and obtained the following Table. As we see from **Table 1**, a little more than one half of the Faculty only published a paper during the referred time interval.

When we crossed compute this result with the Faculty's classification on the classes Scholarly Academic (SA) and Other, we obtained the following

two tables:

From the above tables we conclude that among SA more than 2/3 published several papers in Class 1 (Top Tier IPR journals) and almost 50% published in Class 2 (other IPR journals).

In the meanwhile, Faculty classified as Other published at the most two papers in the same 5-year period; for the latter teachers, not only the number of published papers lags well behind from their SA colleagues' as also their articles were mostly published in Class 2 journals.

However, the above results don't allow us to derive any conclusion relative to the potential association between the total number of papers published and the classification of the Faculty. We then performed a Qui-square test of independence between those two variables and obtained that the hypothesis of independence was rejected at a 5% significance level. Thus, we can say that the Faculty classification is not independent from the number of papers published in IPR journals as we were trying to prove.

Moreover, a test of equality of proportions between SA and Others who published 1, 2 or more papers in IPR journals shows evidence that Others publish in a larger proportion just 1 paper while SA publish 2 or more.

In the qualitative analysis we looked at the way papers not published either in IPR journals or reference repertoires were presented and what were the main scientific areas and research topics they concerned. Among the 1428 scientific papers published by ISEG's Faculty between 2012 and 2017 only 455, say around 32%, were published in IPR journals or repertoires. The remaining 68% papers have been published as non-IPR articles, conference minutes, books or chapters in books, working papers or pedagogical resources. They focused on areas such as labour law, applied mathematics (operational research and actuarial sciences, mostly), Portuguese economic and social analysis (public budget, taxes, labour market, poverty, demography, immigration, gender issues, history and education) which represent important problems and research issues for Portugal.

The areas of unemployment containment, regulation and changes in the legal framework of the labour market, global economic growth, among oth-

Table 1: Number of SA by number of published papers in classes i=1, 2, 3

	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
1	49	52,1	52,1
2	21	22,3	22,3
3	9	9,6	9,6
4 or more	15	16,0	16,0
Valid Total	94	100,0	100,0

Table 2: Faculty breakdown by numbers of papers published

Number of published papers	Class1	Class2	Class3
1	36	21	6
2	13	7	3
3	2	5	1
4 or more	4	3	
Total	55	36	10
System Missing	20	39	65

Table 3: Number of Other by number of published papers in classes i=1,2,3

Number of published papers	Class 1	Class2	Class3
1	2	6	2
2	1		
Total	3	6	2
System Missing	8	5	9
TOTAL	11	11	11

ers, should be analyzed throughout the various phases of the economic cycle and especially in the periods of economic recession as the one considered in this study, because such topics are strongly associated with government's fiscal, income and budgetary policies.

As well as it happened with other southern European countries, as Greece, also Portugal had to suffer the impact of austerity measures imposed by Troika(2) upon governments' poli-

cies during the crisis which lasted from 2008 to 2015. As it became clearly evident, austerity measures severely contributed to aggravate the main features of the economic recession and led to a significant rise in unemployment, inequality and poverty levels. After the 2015 electoral process, a new Government entered in duty, with a centre-left orientation. The new policy measures it launched proved to have led to a stable growth of the economy and a growing level of social well being. The repercussions of the cabinet change in economic and social areas such as poverty and inequalities alleviation, migrations and demography, among others, would greatly benefit from a comparison with the corresponding trends, which occurred from 2012 onwards. This could only be possible throughout a greater visibility and utilization of the scientific work on those issues a large amount of which is the focus of the "remaining 68% papers" which were not published as IPR papers. In a certain way, this 68% measure the share of the knowledge waste in ISEG, as we have been defining it. Let us now consider the main conclusions we may derive from this paper.

CONCLUSION

Despite some 89% of ISEG's Faculty having published their papers in IPR journals during the period 2012-2017, this only accounts for 32% of the total publishing made by ISEG's Faculty.

Table 4: Qui-square Test of Independence between Faculty Classification and Number of IPR papers published (Pearson Chi-square tests)

	Faculty Classification
Total	7,527
R^2	
Qui-square	
Df	1
Sign.	0,006

It became clear that publishing in IPR journals, mostly in those affiliated with anglo saxon research markets and among them those taken as reference by accreditation agencies, exert a sound influence on the achievement of a SA classification by Faculty and therefore on the progression in the academic career. These results confirm both evidence and theoretical developments analyzed and proposed by Altbach (2015, op cit) and Mingers & Willmott (2012, op

cit) among other, in what has to do with the increased visibility and perceived prestige of scientific articles published in the reference repertoires.

Moreover, we can now affirm that there is a meaningful statistical association between the number of IPR articles published and their authors' classification as SA or Other. SA not only publish more than Others as they also publish mostly in IPR Class 1 journals. Therefore, it seems that the metrics concerning publishing in these Class 1 journals have a positive impact on Faculty's classification, the main criteria for academic progression.

The share of ISEG Faculty's papers published outside both IPR journal and repertoires such as ISI, SCOPUS and ABS is large - 68%. But qualitative analysis revealed that those papers dealt with topics very relevant to the knowledge and discussion of important Portuguese socio-economic issues. Likewise, they contributed to the knowledge gap filling, although they risk remaining "invisible" on account of not being published in "reference" journals and repertoires.

Accordingly, an important waste of knowledge is also taking place. This finding is in line with Anninos (2014), Altbach (2015, op cit) and Chagas Lopes (2016, op cit). There is also evidence in favor of the existence of an important vicious circle in the production, dissemination and use of the scientific knowledge results as described in Figure 1. The results of knowledge which are not disseminated throughout journals and repertoires appointed by accreditation become obscured and underutilized irrespective of their scientific quality

and relevance to the country, even though they are published by other kind of journals. On the other way, research outputs which have been accepted and published by those appointed journals are well recognized, widely disseminated and perceived as prestigious even though their contribute to the leading economic and social problems of the country is none. It often assumes the character of “official knowledge”(3) and successive generations run the risk of being fed with.

NOTES

- 1.Or *official knowledge* according to Michael Apple (2014).
- 2.European Central Bank, European Commission and International Monetary Fund.
- 3.Michael Apple op cit.

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#5

MIGRAÇÃO, EDUCAÇÃO E DESENVOLVIMENTO

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RESUMO

A Educação é um elemento chave do desenvolvimento humano e um instrumento primordial para o crescimento económico sustentado, uma vez que o capital humano é um recurso produtivo que influencia o crescimento económico, entre outros, através da capacidade de inovação da economia.

No caso específico dos países em conflito ou emergentes de conflitos, a sua importância é fundamental no auxílio aos migrantes e refugiados que se pretendem estabelecer em novos países. Desde a aprendizagem de uma nova língua ao reconhecimento de qualificações académicas ou profissionais, a Educação é essencial no processo de integração destas populações, mas os desafios são vários devido a razões de natureza económica, cultural ou, até mesmo, religiosa.

Os migrantes podem ser uma mais-valia para a força de trabalho dos

países ou regiões de acolhimento, mas o nível de escolarização e as barreiras linguísticas, culturais e religiosas muitas vezes impedem o uso das suas capacidades e competências, e o acesso a direitos básicos como educação, saúde e trabalho que obstruem o processo de paz, não apenas política, mas também social, que ambicionam.

As migrações e os desafios sociais e económicos que lhes estão associados são um fenómeno cada vez mais global e que, por isso mesmo, merece uma maior reflexão.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE Desenvolvimento Económico, Educação, Globalização, Migrações

INTRODUÇÃO

O tema das migrações tem sido estudado de forma interdisciplinar e pouco autonomizada, ao contrário de outros temas como o trabalho e a educação (Peixoto, 2004: 3), apesar do crescente interesse pelo fenómeno e do reconhecimento da sua importância na sociologia contemporânea. Entre as várias disciplinas, surge a geografia como aquela que lhe tem dado mais importância, devido à associação com o espaço, porém, como refere Jansen, a migração é também um problema demográfico, económico, político e sociológico (Jansen, 1969:60).

Por seu turno, a educação é considerada, de forma mais consensual, um elemento chave do desenvolvimento humano nas economias ditas desenvolvidas e em desenvolvimento, e um instrumento primordial para o crescimento económico sustentado, uma vez que o capital humano é um recurso produtivo que influencia o crescimento económico, entre outros, através da capacidade de inovação da economia (Paiva, 2016: 20). Pelo seu papel gerador de benefícios individuais, ao nível do desenvolvimento pessoal, da saúde

e do rendimento, e colectivos, ao nível da redução dos efeitos da pobreza, promoção da paz e democracia, e aumento da competitividade económica, a Educação é hoje considerada um direito humano e universal, consagrado em diversos instrumentos internacionais.

A teoria do capital humano aplicada às migrações defende que o agente realiza uma análise económica de custos/benefícios, na qual a expectativa de obtenção de maiores rendimentos no futuro deverá superar o custo a curto prazo do investimento realizado na deslocação individual ou do seu núcleo familiar. Como refere Sjaastad (1962: 83), a migração pode ser encarada “(...) como um investimento que aumenta a produtividade dos recursos humanos, um investimento que possui custos, mas que também envolve retornos”. Entre os custos desse “investimento” destacam-se a procura de informação sobre novas oportunidades profissionais e de formação, os custos de deslocação e os custos de adaptação, enquanto os benefícios da migração passam, em contrapartida, pelo aumento de rendimentos.

No caso específico dos países em conflito ou emergentes de conflitos, os benefícios estendem-se ao plano da própria integridade física, sendo que a educação assume um papel fundamental no auxílio aos migrantes e refugiados que se pretendem estabelecer em novos países: desde a aprendizagem de um novo idioma ao reconhecimento de qualificações, a educação é parte essencial do processo de integração destas populações, mas os desafios são vários, desde logo, porque a sua presença é muitas vezes encarada de forma controversa devido a factores de natureza económica, cultural ou até mesmo religiosa (Wang et al, 2018: 76).

No estudo de caso que realizei sobre o acesso e qualidade do ensino primário em quatro províncias angolanas (Paiva, 2016), analisei, entre outros, o impacto do fenómeno migratório ocorrido durante as quase três décadas de guerra civil angolana sobre o desenvolvimento assimétrico do ensino primário nessas regiões. De facto, o mapa territorial de Angola, tal como grande parte do território africano, foi desenvolvido de forma artificial sem atender a fronteiri-

ras étnicas ou a características geográficas, o que levou à divisão de vários grupos étnicos em regiões ou até mesmo países diferentes (Paiva, 2016: 77).

Assim, a sociedade angolana pós-independência possuía uma enorme diversidade etno-linguística que trouxe sérios desafios em matéria de educação quando arrancou o forte fenómeno migratório interno, sobretudo inter-provincial, gerado pela guerra civil. As províncias mais afectadas pelo conflito defrontaram-se com problemas de falta de professores, destruição de infra-estruturas escolares e alunos com problemas de saúde (traumas físicos, psicológicos e malnutrição) que afectavam o seu rendimento escolar, enquanto as províncias menos devastadas sofriam de excesso de procura escolar para os poucos recursos existentes, já que a defesa era a prioridade e não a educação, e muitos dos novos alunos não falavam Português mas a língua da sua região, e apresentavam atraso escolar. O próprio fenómeno das migrações internas não se alterou com a paz porque o persistente cenário de insegurança (física, laboral e alimentar) nas zonas mais afectadas pelo conflito continuou a levar milhares de deslocados a abandonar os campos e a procurar melhores condições de vida em meios mais urbanos, mas que não estavam preparados para os receber (Paiva, 2016: 112).

O caso Angolano é representativo dos desafios que se colocam em termos de integração social quando o fenómeno migratório ocorre na sequência de um conflito armado e em sociedades com baixo nível de literacia, onde o alcance da paz política não se traduz necessariamente em paz social. Porém, existem outros tipos de migrantes, com motivações e níveis de qualificação diferentes, e que podem representar uma mais-valia para a força de trabalho dos países ou regiões de acolhimento, mas barreiras linguísticas, culturais e religiosas impedem muitas vezes que usem as suas capacidades e competências, contribuindo para a sua exclusão social ao invés de se integrarem no seu novo território, de forma digna e auto-suficiente.

É importante não esquecer que, se por um lado, o fenómeno das migrações é tão antigo quanto a própria Humanidade, hoje em dia estamos a

assistir a fluxos migratórios sem precedentes, em particular ao nível das populações deslocadas por motivo de guerra ou perseguição. Segundo dados do Alto Comissariado das Nações Unidas para os Refugiados, cerca de 65 milhões de pessoas em todo o mundo viram-se obrigadas a deixar a sua terra natal, entre as quais um terço são refugiados, e mais de metade dos refugiados têm menos de 18 anos (UNHCR, 2018).

Se no caso de Angola estas movimentações foram essencialmente internas, existem muitas outras que ocorrem além fronteiras, como é o caso do Sudão do Sul, Afeganistão e Síria que só entre si representam 55% da população refugiada do mundo, e que frequentemente encontram obstáculos no acesso a direitos básicos como educação, saúde e trabalho, o que mostra que a migração, voluntária ou forçada, e os desafios sociais e económicos que lhe estão associados não são um fenómeno necessariamente local ou regional mas global (World Bank, 2017).

As migrações são processos dinâmicos, temporários ou permanentes (Nolasco, 2016:4), que afectam o desenvolvimento económico e social dos países dos países de origem e de acolhimento, e naturalmente as gerações vindouras. Tal como a educação, também a migração pode constituir um importante factor de desenvolvimento económico, existindo mesmo uma inter-relação entre ambos pois o desenvolvimento económico é um dos elementos que mais estimula o interesse dos migrantes e, por seu turno, os processos migratórios bem-sucedidos, tendem a influenciar positivamente a economia dos países de acolhimento.

De facto, os migrantes que vêm de regiões de baixo rendimento e com um nível de escolaridade mais reduzido, tendem a mudar-se para lugares de rendimento mais elevado, a fim de aumentar o seu bem-estar individual ou dos seus familiares, o que acaba por influenciar o desenvolvimento económico das regiões de envio e acolhimento de migrantes. Através da migração, é esperado que os indivíduos passem a auferir um rendimento mais elevado, sendo que parte pode ser enviada para casa como remessas e investidas em educação

ou produção, criando assim novas formas de rendimento nas regiões de origem. Para as regiões de acolhimento, os migrantes com nível educacional mais elevado oferecem um potencial de capital humano que é canalizado para o aumento da produtividade nos países anfitriões, podendo assim impulsionar ainda mais o seu desenvolvimento económico. Porém, quando os migrantes são pouco qualificados, acabam por competir com os residentes locais com baixa qualificação, levando ao desemprego de muitos deles, que passam a depender de um subsídio do Estado sem gerar qualquer produtividade. Nesse caso, estamos perante um efeito negativo das migrações sobre o desenvolvimento económico (Xie, 2014:1) e que, frequentemente, está na origem de muitos comportamentos xenófobos em relação a estas populações.

Uma vez que um indivíduo com elevado nível educacional tem maior probabilidade de ascender e permanecer nos quintis superiores da distribuição de rendimento que um indivíduo de baixa escolaridade, e tendo em conta os efeitos de um acréscimo de rendimento no desenvolvimento económico e social, a educação surge aqui como elemento determinante não só na diminuição da desigualdade, mas também na ligação positiva entre Migração e Desenvolvimento Económico. Este ponto remete para a importância de conhecer quem são os migrantes, já que a resposta ajuda a explicar os efeitos esperados da migração nas economias dos países de origem e de destino, nomeadamente através dos fenómenos do *brain gain* e *brain drain*.

Por último, importa também reflectir sobre os filhos dos migrantes, já que o seu sucesso futuro está muito associado aos seus resultados educacionais, à acumulação de conhecimento por via da aprendizagem ao longo e ao largo da vida, e das oportunidades profissionais. E, inevitavelmente, sobre o seu papel na inversão do processo de envelhecimento e declínio populacional das sociedades ocidentais, na reposição da força de trabalho nas áreas onde existem maiores necessidades e na sustentabilidade da segurança social aos cidadãos dos estados enquanto “migrantes de substituição” (Peixoto et al, 2017: 11).

Estou certo que esta visão de longo prazo da imigração e do seu impacto nas sociedades será um tema bastante discutido nos próximos anos dado o crescente número de países que tem assistido ao aumento da sua população estrangeira e seus descendentes, com os desafios e oportunidades que tais fluxos comportam.

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#6

***ATITUDES POLÍTICAS, CONFIANÇA E DEMOCRACIA:
UM ESTUDO NA GRANDE LISBOA***

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ATITUDES POLÍTICAS, CONFIANÇA E DEMOCRACIA: UM ESTUDO NA GRANDE LISBOA – UM ESTUDO EMPÍRICO

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62-67

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RESUMO

Esta apresentação visa identificar valores, atitudes e comportamentos políticos de diversos grupos, baseando-se primordialmente num estudo efetuado com base numa amostra de 600 indivíduos, adultos e habitando na Grande Lisboa, estratificados por sexo, idade e habilitações literárias.

As perguntas referem-se nomeadamente a: identificação com partidos

políticos; voto nas últimas eleições; razões para o voto e/ou a abstenção; grau de interesse pela política; características percebidas nos agentes políticos portugueses; aspetos relevantes para as escolhas partidárias; grau de confiança relativamente a partidos políticos, Parlamento, Presidente da República e governo; grau de corrupção percebida dos políticos em Portugal; satisfação com o funcionamento da democracia em Portugal; influência percebida dos cidadãos no decurso dos acontecimentos políticos; perceção de si em termos da dimensão esquerda-direita.

ANÁLISE

Relativamente ao interesse pela política, obtemos um valor médio de 2.44 (numa escala de 1 a 5). É de notar que tínhamos já antes registado, em estudo análogo realizado em 2006, uma média de 2.3, pelo que se regista um ligeiríssimo acréscimo (ver [Figura 1](#)).

Quanto à dimensão relativa à perceção de si próprio ao longo dum eixo esquerda-direita (desde 1, 'extrema-esquerda', até 9 para 'extrema direita'), observa-se na amostra uma elevadíssima frequência nos valores centrais (sobretudo 5).

O valor médio das respostas é de 4.97, parecendo genericamente indicar uma aproximação ainda maior ao centro do que o valor médio de 4.71, obtido em estudo análogo realizado em 2006 (cf. Graça et al. 2012a, 2012b, 2014, 2016, no prelo).

Quanto à regulação desejável da economia, as respostas são de 49,8 a favor de mais estado, 39.3 em prol de mais mercado e 10.8 em defesa de um maior papel do 'terceiro sector' (ver [Figura 3](#)).

Estes valores devem ser confrontados com os registados em 2006:

Figura 1




Figura 3




Figura 2





Figura 4



respetivamente 52.3 (estado) 28.8 (mercado) e 18.9 (terceiro sector), parecendo indicar uma paulatina evolução *free-marketeeing* da opinião pública portuguesa. Esta evolução deve ser considerada relacionando-a (mas talvez não diretamente) com a ligeira deslocação para a direita que também é perceptível na questão anterior. Relativamente à dimensão da identificação com partidos políticos, verifica-se acima de tudo o peso da resposta “Nenhum”, englobando mais de metade dos respondentes.

Os níveis de identificação com partidos políticos permanecem assim bastante baixos, e mesmo muito inferiores aos dos votos, não obstante todo o crescimento da abstenção que se tem verificado nas últimas décadas.

São também dignos de nota, quanto a este critério de análise: o nível comparativamente muito elevado da identificação com o PS (o maior partido quanto a este critério, embora não em votos), bem como a fraca performance do PSD e, por contraste, o bom desempenho do Bloco de Esquerda.

Se a identificação com partidos não chega a metade dos inquiridos, o voto naqueles atinge e ultrapassa essa marca, ficando-se em 67 por cento (ver [Figura 5](#)). Ainda assim, abstenção, voto nulo e voto branco correspondem, somados, a praticamente 1/3 dos inquiridos, e constituem um valor crescente ao longo das últimas décadas.

De entre os inquiridos que declaram ter votado, 17.2 por cento afirma, entretanto, ter votado branco ou nulo, um valor onde provavelmente está englobada alguma abstenção (considerando a questão anterior). Embora o PS recolhesse maior identificação (ver [Figura 4](#)), o PSD é agora o partido mais votado, com 26 por cento, contra 25.3 do PS.

Parece digna de nota a elevada percentagem recolhida pelos “outros” partidos, sobretudo o PAN, com 3.7 por cento, deixando-o muito perto da marca do CDS/PP. Destaque-se também o desempenho notável do Bloco de Esquerda, com um terceiro lugar correspondente a 15.5 por cento.

Os elevados níveis de abstenção, voto nulo e voto branco, a importância do voto em “outros” partidos e a fraca performance dos dois partidos hege-

mónicos da vida política portuguesa (PS e PSD), bem como a fraca identificação declarada com partidos políticos (ver supra, [Figura 4](#)): eis um grupo de aspetos que nos parece deverem ser considerados colocando-os em paralelo outrossim com as perceções prevalecentes quanto aos políticos.

Nesta matéria, deve destacar-se antes de mais o nível muito elevado de concordância com os qualificativos “excessivamente remunerado”, “corrupto” e “carreirista”. Por contraste, “tolerante”, “competente” e “acessível” registam marcas muito baixas, o qualificativo “experiente” obtendo uma marca intermédia (ver [Figura 7](#)).

Este padrão de opiniões afigura-se igualmente compaginável com o baixo grau de confiança declarado quer quanto aos partidos, quer quanto ao órgão de soberania (o Parlamento) a que estes se encontram mais diretamente ligados (ver infra, [Figura 8](#)).

Por oposição a essa tendência, a magistratura mais eminentemente personalizada do quadro constitucional português, a Presidência da República, obtém os níveis mais elevados de confiança, e com larga vantagem. O governo ocupa, quanto a este critério, uma posição muito próxima da Assembleia da República.

Quanto aos motivos de escolha partidária, e de acordo com padrão referido para a forte ‘personalização’ das atitudes políticas, o “perfil do líder” é a dimensão declaradamente mais importante. Entretanto, o “programa do partido” segue de perto aquela dimensão, embora se trate dum programa considerado de forma algo ‘desideologizada’ dado que a “ideologia do partido” se mostra bem menos importante. A “prática partidária” e a “equipa dirigente” ocupam posições intermédias no ranking dos fatores da escolha.

De acordo com o padrão identificado de relativo ceticismo (ou mesmo cinismo) face à vida política, mas mesmo assim de forma algo surpreendente pela dimensão revestida, a perceção de corrupção dos políticos é elevadíssima, apenas 3.9 por cento dos inquiridos respondendo “ nenhuns ” ou “poucos” (ver [Figura 10](#)).

Figura 5




Figura 6




Figura 7




Figura 8




Figura 9




Figura 11




Figura 10





Figura 12



A satisfação declarada com o funcionamento da democracia também se afigura preocupante, 60.8 por cento estando “insatisfeitos” ou muito “insatisfeitos” (Figura 11).

Esta marca de 60.8 por cento de respondentes declaradamente “insatisfeitos” ou “muito insatisfeitos” com o funcionamento da democracia deve ser cotejada com 57.3 por cento que pensam terem os cidadãos pouca ou nenhuma influência no curso dos acontecimentos políticos em Portugal (ver infra, Figura 12).

Embora não tenha sido feita por nós a análise detalhada do ‘cruzamento’ das duas questões, é razoável supor que perto de 3/5 de respondentes globalmente insatisfeitos estejam perto de 3/5 também de respondentes com percepção de escassa ou nula influência dos cidadãos na vida política; mais ainda se acrescentarmos a esse panorama a informação de que também perto de 3/5 dos respondentes não se identificam com nenhum partido ou se identificam com um “outro” (ver supra, Figura 4).

O tratamento mais detalhado das possíveis relações entre estas várias dimensões políticas da opinião da população portuguesa será efetuado em estudos ulteriores.

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#7

***O PROJECTO NILUS - NARRATIVAS DO OCEANO ÍNDICO NO ESPAÇO LUSÓFONO
(PTDC/CPC-ELT/4868/2014)***

GIULIA SPINUZZA *et. al.*

O PROJECTO NILUS-NARRATIVAS DO OCEANO ÍNDICO NO ESPAÇO LUSÓFONO

(PTDC/CPC-ELT/4868/2014)

JUL '18

70-75

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RESUMO

Na sequência das produções teóricas que pautam a reflexão crítica e cultural sobre os espaços líquidos da contemporaneidade — do Black Atlantic (Gilroy, 1993) ao Atlântico Sul (Santos, 2001; Vale de Almeida, 2000; Shoat & Stam, 2012) — o Projecto Narrativas do Oceano Índico no Espaço Lusófono fundamenta-se numa articulação teórica e disciplinar entre os Estudos do Oceano Índico — *Indian Ocean Studies* — e os Estudos Literários, Visuais e Culturais Lusófonos. Pretende-se deste modo colmatar uma lacuna disciplinar significativa motivada pela quase total ausência de um diálogo crítico entre estas duas áreas de estudos, sobretudo nos contextos de língua portuguesa.

Observando a produção científica que se situa na área dos Estudos do Oceano Índico os estudos de natureza histórica, nas suas articulações políticas e antropológicas, sobressaem como os mais desenvolvidos, principalmente no que diz respeito ao período anterior à chegada dos europeus no Índico e à época pré-moderna, permanecendo menos aprofundados os períodos moderno e contemporâneo (Pearson, 2011). À luz destas considerações, julga-se que o diálogo disciplinar proposto por este Projecto aponta para potencialidades analíticas, conceptuais e epistemológicas de grande relevo e actualidade, proporcionando um alargamento significativo das áreas de estudo em objecto.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE Estudos Culturais Lusófonos; Oceano Índico; Goa; Moçambique; Timor-Leste; Portugal

ENQUADRAMENTO DO PROJECTO NILUS

O Projecto de investigação NILUS - *Narrativas do Oceano Índico no Espaço Lusófono* (PTDC/CPCELT/4868/2014), coordenado pela Professora Ana Mafalda Leite (CEsA e FLUL), teve início em Julho de 2016 após a aprovação do financiamento por parte da FCT (PTDC/CPCELT/4868/2014). Este projecto é fruto de uma parceria entre várias instituições internacionais. Integra investigadores e professores no Brasil, Alemanha, Portugal, Países Baixos, Itália e África do Sul, incluindo quatro membros do CEsA (Joana Pereira Leite, Jessica Falconi, Kamila K. Rodrigues e Giulia Spinuzza). De ressaltar, entre outros aspectos, o facto de que o projecto NILUS integra professores agregados, investigadores em pós-doutoramento e doutorandos.

O projecto NILUS vem também estabelecer uma continuidade com os anteriores projectos aprovados pela FCT coordenados pela Professora Ana Mafalda Leite: o projecto NEVIS-Narrativas Escritas e Visuais da Nação Pós-Colonial (São Tomé e Príncipe, Cabo Verde e Guiné-Bissau) e o Projecto NNPC-Nação e Narrativa Pós-Colonial (Angola e Moçambique). Todavia, o projecto NILUS propõe abordar outras perspectivas teóricas e alargar o horizonte geográfico para a Ásia, incluindo Goa e Timor-Leste.

ASPECTOS TEÓRICOS

O projecto NILUS propõe-se articular os Estudos do Oceano Índico - *Indian Ocean Studies* - com os Estudos Literários, Visuais e Culturais Lusófonos, sendo objecto de estudo do projecto as narrativas literárias e visuais produzidas em Portugal, Moçambique, Timor-Leste e Goa desde o século XIX até a actualidade. A este propósito, verificamos que no contexto da língua portuguesa são escassos os estudos que articulam os *Indian Ocean Studies* e os Estudos Lusófonos. Pretende-se deste modo colmatar uma lacuna disciplinar significativa motivada pela quase total ausência de um diálogo crítico entre estas duas áreas de estudos, sobretudo nos contextos de língua portuguesa.

Observando a produção científica que se situa na área dos Estudos do Oceano Índico os estudos de natureza histórica, nas suas articulações políticas e antropológicas, sobressaem como os mais desenvolvidos, principalmente no que diz respeito ao período anterior à chegada dos europeus no Índico e à época pré-moderna, permanecendo menos aprofundados os períodos moderno e contemporâneo (Pearson, 2011). À luz destas considerações, julga-se que o diálogo disciplinar proposto por este Projecto proporciona um alargamento significativo das áreas de estudo em objecto.

A partir da selecção do vasto repertório literário e cinematográfico produzido em Portugal, Moçambique, Goa e Timor-Leste e com o apoio de um corpus teórico constituído por textos fundamentais para os Estudos sobre o Oceano Índico, propõe-se focar uma série de linhas de investigação centradas em três principais núcleos temáticos: a representação do espaço, a representação dos povos e a representação da cultura material. Tais núcleos temáticos são abordados de forma a privilegiar perspectivas que foquem sobretudo quer as realidades costeiras ou marítimas e o seu reflexo na produção cultural, quer as interligações oceânicas que contribuem para a criação de um imaginário multifacetado e por vezes contrastante do Oceano Índico e dos territórios que o perfilam, assim como das relações que através do Oceanos interligam tais territórios.

Desta forma, constatámos que se numa primeira fase o colonialismo inscreve no espaço do Oceano Índico um imaginário ligado à chegada dos portugueses e relativas explorações marcadas pelo drama da escravidão, pelo fluxo de mercadorias e outros bens materiais, mais recentemente existe uma elaboração deste espaço marítimo, que funciona agora como centro de abertura para outros mundos e elo de ligação com as outras margens do Oceano, agora como reelaboração crítica desse passado dramático.

Todavia, é de ressaltar que cada território representa um caso específico relativamente à relação que estabelece, em termos culturais, com o espaço oceânico. Na verdade, o imaginário cultural ligado ao Oceano pode ser bastante evidente e emergir sob múltiplas formas na produção cultural, enquanto há

territórios onde tal imaginário é mais subtil e a produção literária e cinematográfica é mais “virada” para imaginários geográficos “interiores” e não tanto para o horizonte marítimo. Apesar disso, é indiscutível a ligação através do Oceano Índico entre esses territórios, sendo os fluxos de pessoas e bens materiais apenas um dos aspectos mais “visíveis” do trânsito oceânico pluridireccional. Então, tendo em conta esse último aspecto, é nossa intenção repensar o Oceano Índico de um ponto de vista transnacional.

Nesse sentido, interessa-nos não apenas as dimensões históricas, culturais e identitárias de um ponto de vista “territorial” no contexto do espaço lusófono, mas também as interligações e os fluxos de pessoas, ideias e de elementos representativos da cultura material, entre outros aspectos, que interligam os vários territórios do Oceano Índico em múltiplas direcções, sendo representativa a esse respeito a metáfora da monção como algo que, ao unir o elemento aquático e aéreo, toca várias geografias criando uma conectividade entre diferentes territórios (Gupta, 2012). Para além disso, considerada a existência de uma “geografia transnacional do imaginário” (Gosh & Muecke, 2007), pretendemos repensar as narrativas literárias e visuais produzidas em diferentes contextos geográficos.

Os Estudos sobre o Oceano Índico fornecem uma ferramenta teórica indispensável para o enquadramento epistemológico das narrativas escritas e visuais. Na realidade, os IOS representam um campo teórico pluridisciplinar que oferece novos modelos epistemológicos e novas perspectivas de análise das relações históricas e culturais geradas no espaço do Oceano Índico. Se, por um lado, os modelos teóricos dos IOS permitem repensar os debates culturais e identitários de carácter nacional sob uma outra perspectiva analítica, por outro lado, as produções nacionais contribuem para a criação de um imaginário transnacional nos moldes do Oceano Índico. Assim, são fundamentais no âmbito dos *Indian Ocean Studies*, os estudos históricos de Michael Pearson (1998 e 2003), de Edward Alpers (2014), Richard Hall (1996) e Milo Kearney (2004), os estudos culturais (Moorthy & Ashraf, 2010; Bose, 2006), os estudos literários (Hofmeyr, 2007; Samuelson, 2017) e os estudos centrados nas travessias e cruzamentos identitários, culturais e materiais no Oceano Índico (Ghosh &

Muecke; 2007; Gupta, 2010; Meneses, 2009, Perez 1998), para além de estudos que se inscrevem, mais no específico, no contexto literário, cultural e histórico lusófono, como é o caso de Capela (2002); Henriques (2004); Santos (2001), Almeida (2000), para citar apenas alguns dos textos teóricos mais significativos.

Constatámos a esse respeito a escassez de estudos que articulam os *Indian Ocean Studies* com os Estudos Lusófonos. Para além disso, verificamos também a escassez de textos teóricos em língua portuguesa que se inscrevam no âmbito dos IOS, o que pode dificultar esse tipo de abordagem no campo dos Estudos Lusófonos. Por essa razão, por exemplo, optou-se por traduzir para o português o texto de Isabel Hofmeyr “The Black Atlantic Meets the Indian Ocean: Forging New Paradigms of Transnationalism for the Global South – Literary and Cultural Perspectives” (2007), que foi publicado no Dossiê da Revista *Remate de Males*, “Espaços transnacionais: narrativas do Oceano Índico” (v.38, n.1, 2018), organizado por Ana Mafalda Leite, Jessica Falconi e Elena Brugioni (que integra também o projecto A Estética do Índico, FAPESP, Ref. 2016/26098-5).

O dossiê “Espaços transnacionais: narrativas do Oceano Índico” divulga os primeiros resultados do projeto NILUS, reunindo artigos de membros da equipa e de outros investigadores que aceitaram o desafio de refletir sobre o Oceano Índico enquanto espaço de narrativas e identidades múltiplas.

Partindo da tradução para português do artigo seminal de Isabel Hofmeyr “The Black Atlantic meets the Indian Ocean: Forging New Paradigms of Transnationalism for the Global South – Literary and Cultural Perspectives”, o dossiê procura articular as reflexões teóricas produzidas no domínio dos Estudos do Oceano Índico, e as narrativas escritas e visuais de Moçambique, Goa, Timor Leste, mas também das ilhas francófonas do Índico, abordadas pelo artigo “O ‘Black Ocean’ azul” de Ute Fendler.

Olhando pelo conjunto dos artigos, diversos e complementares ao mesmo tempo, sobressai de forma evidente e inequívoca dimensão diferencial que o Índico institui e significa, desdobrando-se em vários âmbitos e, em última

instância, configurando perspectivas espaciais, imaginários e conceitos que não podem ser descritos por nenhuma teoria e abordagem de cariz totalizante. De facto, as narrativas escritas e visuais abordadas pelos autores dos artigos, constituem um corpus transnacional capaz de reconstruir as múltiplas e possíveis imagens de um Oceano Índico em constante mudança e movimento.

Em suma, um dos objectivos deste projecto é o de contribuir para o desenvolvimento dos Estudos do Oceano Índico e dos Estudos Literários, Visuais e Culturais lusófonos, quer de um ponto de vista epistemológico, estabelecendo relações entre os dois campos teóricos, quer do ponto de vista da produção literária e visual, identificando um corpus de obras. Por essa razão, está a ser organizada uma base de dados bibliográfica que é disponibilizada para todos os investigadores e o público em geral no arquivo do website do projecto.

De facto, como veremos a seguir, um dos resultados previstos no âmbito do NILUS é a criação de um arquivo que sistematize as produções literárias e visuais relacionadas com o imaginário do Oceano Índico e disponibilize também uma ferramenta de pesquisa para os textos teóricos e críticos mais relevantes no âmbito dos *Indian Ocean Studies* e dos estudos literários, culturais e cinematográficos lusófonos que se inscrevam nos territórios abrangidos pela nossa pesquisa.

O WEBSITE E O ARQUIVO BIBLIOGRÁFICO

Com o objectivo de disponibilizar para todos os investigadores uma base de dados pesquisável foi criado um website do projecto (ainda não concluído) com um arquivo bibliográfico em fase de actualização. O website apresenta-se como a interface digital do projecto, permitindo divulgar informações relevantes sobre o projecto: uma apresentação sintética dos objectivos do projecto, apoios e parcerias, a lista dos membros e consultores, as publicações dos membros e outras actividades relevantes.

Para além disso, o website disponibiliza informações sobre os anteriores projectos coordenados pela Professora Ana Mafalda Leite, divulgando assim

os resultados obtidos e as publicações realizadas. Existe também uma página com as ligações relevantes, oferecendo múltiplas ferramentas de pesquisas (links para catálogos online, bibliotecas, fundações, etc.) e informações sobre outros projectos semelhantes.

O arquivo bibliográfico é constituído por uma base de dados pesquisável (por palavra-chave, tipo de texto, território, ano, nome do autor, assunto, etc.) que reúne a bibliografia teórica e crítica, bem como o corpus visual e literário, essa bibliografia foca as narrativas escritas e visuais de língua portuguesa (serão incluídas algumas obras em outras línguas) produzidas nos territórios que são objecto de análise do projecto NILUS.

A bibliografia teórica inclui os textos considerados fundamentais para o estudo do Oceano Índico nas suas múltiplas vertentes linguísticas, culturais e históricas. No geral, verificou-se uma preponderância de estudos sobre Portugal, Moçambique e Goa e, em medida menor, sobre Timor-Leste. Enquanto do ponto de vista da crítica e teoria cinematográfica, constatou-se uma preponderância dos estudos centrados nas produções portuguesas e moçambicanas.

Como já dito, no que se refere à teoria e crítica literária existem até o momento poucos textos que cruzam os estudos literários lusófonos com os *Indian Ocean Studies*, sendo um dos objectivos do projecto colmatar essa lacuna disciplinar.

Do ponto de vista do corpus visual e literário, estão a ser recolhidas e actualizadas as narrativas visuais e literárias que se inscrevem no âmbito dos três principais núcleos de análise que foram sinteticamente supramencionados (representação do espaço; representação dos povos e das suas experiências de migração e deslocamento; representação da cultura material e do consumo). Apesar do projecto privilegiar as produções de língua portuguesa, considerado o actual contexto linguístico e a actual produção literária e cinematográfica em Goa e em Timor-Leste, serão integrados algum textos e obras em outras línguas, que se achem significativos no âmbito da nossa investigação.

Para além disso, importa ressaltar o facto de que, apesar de priorizar os territórios que constituem o objecto de análise do projecto, serão também inclu-

idos alguns estudos críticos e teóricos ou produções literárias e cinematográficas referentes a outros contextos geográficos e linguísticos, que estão de certa forma interligados com a nossa análise, como é o caso, por exemplo, de alguns arquipélagos e ilhas do Oceano Índico.

METODOLOGIA

Numa primeira fase, a investigação baseia-se numa aprofundada pesquisa nos catálogos das bibliotecas em Portugal, Goa, Timor-Leste e Moçambique. Por outro lado, especialmente durante o trabalho de campo, será privilegiado o contacto com intelectuais, escritores, cineastas e artistas locais. Outras informações relevantes quanto à metodologia da pesquisa serão divulgadas no website do projecto, sendo imprescindível neste momento preservar vários aspectos metodológicos deste projecto de investigação.

QUESTÕES EM ABERTO

Os *IOS* representam um campo teórico de carácter pluridisciplinar que pode interessar os estudos históricos, geográficos, económicos, sociológicos, antropológicos ou políticos, entre outros, quer no âmbito do Espaço Lusófono quer em outros países do Oceano Índico, promovendo um diálogo com outros contextos linguísticos. A questão da literatura produzida em outras línguas em outros países do Oceano Índico será abordada parcialmente no projecto, como é o caso, por exemplo, das produções literárias em língua francesa e inglesa que por vezes estabelecem uma relação cultural, histórica e crítica com os contextos de língua portuguesa. Nesse sentido perfilam-se vários aspectos que poderiam ser aprofundados, nomeadamente numa abordagem plurilinguística que permitiria alargar enormemente o foco da análise.

Tendo em conta estes aspectos, verificamos também que o projecto NILUS deixa em aberto outros possíveis percursos de investigação de carácter interdisciplinar, como é o caso, por exemplo, das interações entre os estudos

literários e os estudos históricos ou os estudos de desenvolvimento. Da mesma forma, poderiam ser aprofundadas temáticas transversais a várias disciplinas, como é o caso, por exemplo, de alguns aspectos que marcam os entrecruzamentos culturais, as migrações e o comércio de mercadorias no espaço do Oceano Índico.

Para além disso, considerando que o projecto abrange uma vasta área geográfica, da Ásia até à Europa, e tendo em conta o recorte cronológico, há campos de pesquisa que poderão ser aprofundados em futuras investigações, como é o caso das produções coloniais, quer literárias quer cinematográficas, que permitem abrir o campo de investigação sob vários aspectos.

Por último, poderiam ser exploradas outros percursos de investigação a partir da articulação entre o Atlântico, Portugal e o Índico, representando este projecto um ponto de partida para a construção de outras possíveis pesquisas académicas.

Em conclusão, podemos dizer que o projecto NILUS, se por um lado é fruto da experiência adquirida com os anteriores projectos de investigação (NEVIS e NNPC), esperemos que permita também abrir novos caminhos para futuros projectos de investigação.

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#8

A THEORETICAL VIEW OF THE EU'S RESPONSES TO THE EUROZONE CRISIS

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A THEORETICAL VIEW OF THE EU'S RESPONSES TO THE EUROZONE CRISIS*

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ABSTRACT

This presentation aims to understand the dynamics and the EU's institutional response to the Euro crisis, through the lens of different theoretical perspectives: liberal intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism, historical institutionalism, rational-choice institutionalism, and domestic politics.

The integration process that resulted from the main responses to the crisis can be seen as a paradox since most of the intergovernmental arrangements (i.e. ESM and the Fiscal Compact) led to a significant increase of the EU's activity, namely the empowerment of the European Commission.

Only an eclectic combination of integration theories, governance perspectives and domestic politics provide a satisfactory explanation of the process leading to the Euro area's responses to the crisis.

KEYWORDS: Crisis; Economic governance; Institutional change; integration theories; governance approaches

**Note: This paper was firstly presented at the International Conference held by CEsA/CSG/ISEG - The Political Economy of the Crisis & Economic Restructuring: History, Dynamics, Implications & Lessons, in 13 October 2017.*

INTRODUCTION

Since the early 2000s, the European Commission had already drawn EU member states' attention to the weak design of the Economic and Monetary Union. However, only the trigger of a potential Greek's default on its sovereign debt in early 2010, led to a consensus among national governments on the need to reform EU's economic governance and reaffirm Governments' commitments to the Stability and Growth Pact. As such, the first EU's responses to the sovereign debt crisis were driven by two main goals: strengthening the EU's ability to prevent future crisis and the creation of a financial crisis management tool. In the end, the Eurozone reforms strengthened both fiscal and financial integration.

Since 2010, the EU has embarked on to a number of different responses to the Euro crisis to build an integrated surveillance framework:

- (1) the implementation of crisis management tools – European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism Treaty (ESM), to ensure financial stabilization;
- (2) the implementation of fiscal policies under the Stability and Growth Pact to strengthen economic governance and to ensure budgetary

discipline – the so-called Six-Pack, the Two-Pack, and the Fiscal Compact;

- (3) the implementation of structural reforms – Euro Plus Pact and
- (4) the implementation of the – Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) – towards an integrated financial framework.

This presentation aims to explain these integration processes, firstly through the lenses of the two key integration theories –neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. However, these theoretical approaches cannot solely describe the institutional reforms brought about by the EU responses to the crisis, mainly in a complex governance area such as the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). New institutionalism accounts (i.e. governance approaches) are then more suitable to explain, among other questions raised, why intergovernmental bargaining empowered supranational institutions such as the Commission and the European Court of Justice and why the new created institutions were so similar to the typical EU institutional structure. New institutionalism helps us to understand the role of EU institutions in the process of integration, highlighting different parts of the integration process. Finally, and drawing on comparative political economy, domestic politics helps to understand how government preferences in the Euro crisis have tended to reflect national interests.

Decision-making processes in EMU constrained the EU's responses to the Euro crisis. As such, the institutional approach must also be viewed in terms of the responses' legislative outputs. While some of the measures agreed to tackle the crisis, like the new financial supervision bodies, the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM), and the EU Regulations to reform economic governance (the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack) fall within the Union's field of competence and were legally adopted under the Community method, others fell outside the Union's sphere and had to be devised as intergovernmental arrangements (the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the European Stability Mechanism Treaty (ESM), the Europe-Plus Pact and the Fiscal Compact).

The structure of this paper is the following: the next section reviews integration theories and new institutionalism approaches. Secondly, in order to clarify the concepts of intergovernmentalism *versus* supranationalism, decision-making processes in the EU - in particular in the EMU- are looked into. Thirdly, and before conclusions, some of the responses to the crisis are explained through the lenses of neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism and domestic politics theory, as well as rational choice and historical institutionalism approaches. They focus on the aspect of the integration process that the respective approach discusses best.

INTEGRATION AND GOVERNANCE THEORIES – THE NEW INSTITUTIONALISM APPROACHES

In the late 1960s European integration theories aimed to explain why integration happened in Europe and who the main actors of the process were. Two theories stood out: neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. The dependent variable of these theories was integration itself and the debate was about 'more or less integration' with the dichotomy between the supranational and the national level.

In the late 1980s, after a period in which European integration seemed to have come to a halt in the 1970s, governance theories developed. The focus was no longer the process of integration but rather the way the European Community functioned as a system of governance. The core argument laid down by the new institutionalism was that EU institutions were the main actor shaping European integration.

Developed in the late 1950s and 1960s, neofunctionalism tries to explain how and why states voluntarily give up parts of their sovereignty in order to participate in international cooperation with other states, while minimizing the possibilities of conflicts between them. Building on the work of Mitrany and Monnet, neofunctionalism main concern is the process of integration and its central focus is the relationship between economic and political integration, based on the logic of the 'spillover effect'.

In the 1970s the slowing down of the integration process suggested that the neofunctionalist prediction of a gradual intensification of political integration had failed. Already in the 80s, neofunctionalist theories tried to rediscover neofunctionalism enhancing, among others, the entrepreneurial role of the Commission leading to the Single European Act (1987).¹

From an intergovernmentalist perspective, the European Community was essentially a forum for interstate bargaining, where member states remained the only important actors at the European level (Hoffmann, 1966). Nevertheless, it might be in the states' interests to pool their sovereignty and delegate certain powers to the European institutions, like the European Court of Justice and the European Commission so as to enable these institutions to work more effectively and give them greater credibility.

Sparked by the new dynamics in the European Community and building on Hoffmann's work, Moravcsik developed a subsequent version of the intergovernmental explanation of the integration process, which he termed 'liberal intergovernmentalism'. Like Hoffmann, Moravcsik starts from a critique of neofunctionalism, stating that European integration was tightly constrained by member states and was a result of state bargaining: 'the primary source of integration lies in the interests of the states themselves and the relative power each brings to Brussels' (Moravcsik, 1991:56). Criticisms point to the fact that liberal intergovernmentalism was unable to address the problems that delegation might generate. In fact problems can arise in situations where supranational institutions' preferences diverge from those of the member states (Kassim and Menon, 2003).

Neofunctionalist demands associating integration with transfers of competences to supranational institutions were put into question in the Maastricht period. In fact, since the Treaty of Maastricht, EU member states' support for the European project has been accompanied by their reluctance to further transfers of decision-making power to the supranational level. As Bickerton et al (2015:706) argue 'in the past two decades Haas's heirs have struggled to explain the tendency towards integration without supranationalization in the post-Maastricht period'. The authors have termed this form of integration without supranationalization, as the "new intergovernmentalism".

In fact, by the early 1980s many scholars were claiming that the European Community had become an intergovernmental organization, where the most prominent issues were discussed among member states in the European Council and agenda setting was thus shared with the European Commission, which represented a deviation from the Community method.

From the 1980s onwards, the study of EU politics focus on governance theories - the New Institutionalism - an alternative to classical integration theory, in such a way as to complement them by analysing how the EU and its institutions work - the so-called 'institutionalist turn' - (Aspinwall and Schneider, 2000; Hix, 1998).

These institutional processes gave rise to the governance approaches, namely rational choice, historical and sociological institutionalism, and the decline of the integration theories.

Rational choice institutionalism shows some similarities with Moravcsik's liberal intergovernmentalism as it posits that member states act rationally on behalf of their preferences. However, and unlike liberal intergovernmentalism, rational choice institutionalism stresses the significance of EU's supranational institutions, namely the supranational decision-making processes of the EU (Hix, 1994; Pollack, 1997).

Historical institutionalism is critical of the intergovernmentalist approach to integration. As Pierson (1996) argues, even though member states design European institutions after their own interests, these will thereafter not always meet their expectations as 'gaps' may emerge between the initial intentions of institutional designers and the long-term unexpected consequences of institutional outcomes.

Pierson describes these gaps as divergences evolving between the institutional and policy preferences of member states and the actual functioning and practices of the European institutions. In fact, 'gaps in control' may occur due to (i) the autonomous actions of supranational institutions, namely the Commission's agenda setting power; (ii) the restricted time horizons of political decision-makers, which tend to privilege short-term decisions for electoral reasons; (iii) asymmetrical access to information that favours agents like the Commission and (iv) shifts in governments' preferences.

This stickiness of institutional design and the reassessment of control over the institutions by member states are, according to Pierson, difficult to reverse due to, among others, institutional barriers to reform the institutional framework (i.e. a treaty revision and veto powers).

According to the historical institutionalism view, a path-dependent process also characterizes political institutions and public policies. Early decisions not only shape current institutional and policy choices but also constrain and limit institutional change. As such, although member states' bargaining may decide the European institutional architecture, institutions may take a life of their own.

Some differences between these two approaches are worth noticing: (1) while rational choice perspectives see member state's preferences as an exogenous variable, historical institutionalism considers them as endogenous variables (meaning that institutions may affect them); (2) while rational choice institutionalism places great importance on events prior to the moment of decision-making (in particular on agenda-setting), historical institutionalism places greater importance on the subsequent consequences of decision-making; (3) while rational choice institutionalism only considers institutional change in times of external shocks, for historical institutionalism scholars institutional change is a continuous process.

DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN THE EU: SUPRANATIONAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL DECISION-MAKING

The basic difference between the two decision-making logics operating in the EU - the supranational and the intergovernmental one - resides in the role played by member state's governments in the EU framework.

Supranational decision-making is typically framed by the Community method.² Up to the present (and evolving along many Treaty revisions and successive enlargements in the number of member states) the Community method has demonstrated a strong resilience despite repeated allegations of its obsolescence. In fact, in the 90s there was a governance turn as the Community

method was complemented by the so called 'New Modes of Governance' such as benchmarking, peer review and the 'Open Method of Coordination'. These new methods can be seen as soft forms of decision-making that allow member states to coordinate their policies without creating a new common European policy. Contrary to the Community method these new modes of governance do not produce legislative acts but rather recommendations. Although policy initiation pertains mostly to the European Council, reducing in this way the Commission's monopoly of policy initiation, for the latter, this new governance method represents a way to expand EU activities into further policy areas.

In fact, the Maastricht Treaty (1992) with its pillar structure and the reassertion of the European Council's role formalized these two different logics of decision-making: an intergovernmental and a supranational one (Fabbrini, 2012).

While the first pillar (considered as 'low politics') envisaged uncontroversial economic and technical issues like the single market program and EU social and environmental regulation, sensitive areas such as foreign policy, security and justice (considered as 'high politics') in the second and third pillars would remain in the more traditional intergovernmental framework, which meant allowing cooperation to develop outside the control of supranational institutions.

The pillar structure implied a departure from the Community method.³ The Commission lost its traditional monopoly over policy initiation in the second and third pillars and member states were given the right to make formal proposals to the Commission for the first time. As such, the Community method ceased to be the default method of decision-making and the European Commission lost substantial ground.

The Economic and Monetary Union governance is a complex process of decision-making, which combines a centralized monetary policy with decentralized rules-based fiscal policies and macroeconomic coordination. It encompasses a range of methods (e.g. information exchange, discussion of best practices, policy dialogue and peer review) that operate alongside the Community method. In fact, it is acknowledged the reluctance of member states to use the Community method in areas considered to be of national sovereignty such as

economic policy coordination. As Bauer and Backer (2014) argue, there is no clear intergovernmental or supranational model characterizing EU economic governance.

As such, until 2011 economic policy coordination was mainly based on consensus, without legally enforceable rules, except for the fiscal framework within the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The fact was that Economic and Monetary Union's governance proved to be weak in the face of a crisis that challenged to turn obsolete the all EU project.

A new type of working method has emerged with the Euro crisis, being the European Council 'the new centre of political gravity' in EU decision-making. Puetter (2012) refers to this new form of decision-making as 'deliberative intergovernmentalism'. Instead of legislative decision-making, there is a top level intergovernmental policy-coordination on a regular basis. The implementation of policies is also guaranteed by the European Council which supervises the workings of Ecofin and the Eurogroup. These two formations of finance ministers operate as forums for policy debate and prepare the EMU agenda for the European Council, which gives the final approval.

Even on issues which involve the classical Community method as the decision-making procedure - such as the case of the Stability and Growth Pact's reform and the reform of banking supervision - agenda-setting has been shared by the European Council and the Commission.

NEOFUNCTIONALIST APPROACH TO THE EURO CRISIS RESPONSES

The incrementalism that characterized the EU's responses to the crisis resembles the process described by neofunctionalists of a gradual transfer of competences from member states to the EU. In fact, the incomplete design of the Economic and Monetary Union created at Maastricht gradually exposed the need to expand to other functionally linked policy areas.

According to Niemann and Ioannou (2015), the Six-Pack, the Two-Pack and the Fiscal Compact, while ensuring a tighter fiscal and economic framework, were the result of those 'functional dissonances'. Also the crisis manage-

ment tools such as the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism Treaty (ESM) were the response to the lack of fire-wall mechanisms and the 'no-bailout' clause. Finally, the banking union was a reflection of the EMU's negative financial integration, which resulted in the absence of EU mechanisms which could break the link between bank bailouts debt and sovereign indebtedness.

In fact, the establishment of the banking union and its new institutions – Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) – to enforce banking stability is the most transformative institutional response to the crisis, where a functional dissonance reflected the difficult transmission mechanism from monetary policy to the real economy. The banking union can be seen as the only response that confirms the neofunctionalist premises of functional spillover.

Already, as Yesilada and Wood (2010) noticed in their Single European Act analysis, the Six-Pack, the Two-Pack and the Fiscal Compact cannot be fully considered a neofunctionalist functional spillover from one policy domain to another as they only reinforced the existent fiscal framework (though there was a spillover to new areas such as the public debt, the development of national expenditures and macroeconomic imbalances).

As regards the neofunctionalist concept of cultivated spillover and the role of supranational institutions in fostering integration, the Commission seems to have had a rather discrete role, notwithstanding the fact that the 'economic part of EMU' is a rather intergovernmental policy area leaving little room for the Commission to act as policy entrepreneur. Also, crisis management mechanisms such as the EFSF and the ESM were intergovernmental agreements leaving little room for the Commission to have a say. Finally, the limited EU budget, the urgency and the novelty that surrounded the crisis, and the lack of experience in the field of financial stability support may explain why the Commission refrained itself from presenting bold integration proposals. In the end, an initial institutional response to the crisis through the Community method could have meant a too prolonged response for such an urgent immediate action.

It may be argued that, despite the Commission's primary role as agen-

agenda setter or policy entrepreneur has been weakened (Hodson, 2013; Puetter, 2012), the Commission continues to play a powerful role in EU economic governance, where many of the decisions in economic governance are dependent on the Commission to make them work (Bauer and Becker, 2013). As the authors note, criticisms about the weak visibility of the Commission in advancing responses to the crisis, namely its role as agenda setter, has to be counterbalanced by the Commission's role in monitoring, supervision and evaluation of economic policies, which has *de facto* increased.

The new instruments of economic governance allow the Commission to cover a wider scope of policies and have a stronger role in economic governance, namely through the Six-Pack, which has confirmed and strengthened the European Commission's role in budgetary and economic policy coordination.

The European Parliament, contrary to the enhanced Commission's operational role, and besides a right to being informed through the 'Economic Dialogue', saw no effective political participation in the reform of economic governance, despite the Parliament's continuous criticisms to have a say in the development of agreements outside the EU framework. European Parliament's criticisms showed a 'concern that the European Parliament has been constantly marginalised in the main economic decisions resulting from the crisis, and considers that it must be involved in order to increase the legitimacy of decisions, which affect all citizens'.⁴

However, as co-legislator in the Six-Pack legislative procedure, the European Parliament was able to act as policy entrepreneur, to enhance the Commission's powers in some key steps and run counter some of the Council's preferences (see Valle-Flor, 2015).

In the end, one may feel inclined to question whether the Euro crisis responses led to further supranationalism or not. In fact, opinions diverge. While Schimmelfennig (2014:323) considers that the 'the financial crisis has produced all ingredients for a 'postfunctionalist moment' in European integration' resulting in 'a major leap of supranational and technocratic integration in fiscal and financial policy', Bickerton et al (2015) have a different perspective: they consider that in the two key intergovernmental treaties - the Fiscal Treaty

and the European Stability Mechanism Treaty (ESM) - only the former empowered the European Commission to a certain degree. As regards the banking union, the authors consider that only the ECB has been empowered with new competences.

As Majone (2002) notes, an increase of the Commission's competences does not necessarily imply increased powers of the Commission. In fact, and since Maastricht, the Commission started to share its competences with other EU institutions. As such, the 'quality' of competences has decreased as the new policy areas are not the Commission's exclusive competence. In which refers the EMU, the Commission has only 'special competences' (article 4 of the TFEU), which means that the EU can only take measures to ensure that EU countries coordinate their economic, social and employment policies at EU level.

The above analysis puts into question the European Commissioner Maros Sefcovic's statement that 'the Commission in its history never had more power than it has now'.⁵ EU's responses did not add any new competences to the Commission. Only its range of involvement, power of decision and recommendation has strongly increased in the areas of economic policy surveillance (i.e. Six-Pack, Two-Pack, and Fiscal Compact) and coordination of national policies (i.e. Europe Plus pact) (see Valle-Flor, 2015). Also the Commission's prominent role in the 'Troika' has expanded its activity to a new field – financial stability support - by way of proposing decisions on granting financial assistance, negotiating and monitoring agreements with member states involved in the financial rescues.

INTERGOVERNMENTALIST APPROACH TO THE EURO CRISIS RESPONSES

The liberal intergovernmentalist view of the EU as 'a successful intergovernmental regime designated to manage economic interdependence through policy-coordination' (Moravcsik, 1993:474) still characterizes the workings of the Economic and Monetary Union and its response to the crisis, where final decisions ended up in the European Council.

Many agree that the active European Council's role in the crisis management was a consequence of the very nature of the crisis, which required political leadership rather than a technocratic approach. Some scholars consider that there was no alternative to the European Council, in terms of status and authority, taking the lead of the initial responses, as the policy instruments to tackle the crisis needed the coordination at national level and the endorsement of EU decisions by national parliaments (Corbett, 2012; Dinan, 2011; Puetter, 2012).

Since the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010 the main claim among observers was that the crisis greatly undermined the institutional balance inside the EU, bringing a 'new era of intergovernmentalism' powered by the multiplication of French and German bilateral initiatives. As Crespy and Schmidt (2012:352) note, 'Franco-German initiatives appear to have remained the basic dynamic of integration'.

Since the early days of European monetary integration, France and Germany have always played a decisive part in defining the institutional framework of the EU, although showing divergent assessments and approaches. Similar divergences can be found not only in the interpretation of the sovereign debt crisis, which in German's view was more a consequence of fiscal profligacy than the underlying problems of competitiveness and macro-economic imbalances pointed out by the French, but also in the manner to address EU's responses to the crisis. While Germany supported a rules-based approach as a continuation of the German ordoliberal tradition, France preferred a policy discretion approach by prescribing neo-keynesian stimulus, with the European Council and Euro summits acting as the economic government of the euro area; while the German discourse to justify bailouts to Greece centred on 'stability', French would mention 'solidarity'. As Dinan (2012:88) notes, 'with Germany contributing most to the bail-out funds, German politicians, including Merkel, were not shy about advancing German interests'.

However, at different junctures, German preferences had to 'adapt' to French demands, so that both countries could set the agenda. Despite Germany's key role, it ended up following some French demands and policy solutions

(Crespy and Schmidt, 2012).⁶

Notwithstanding, and since 2010, German and French joint letters to the presidents of the European Council and the European Commission paved the way to the reinforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact, the establishment of a 'robust framework for crisis resolution', as well as the 'Euro-Plus Pact'. It is worth mentioning that in the Six-Pack case Germany and France were able to define, at almost all stages of the process, their domestic preferences thus shaping the Six-Pack outcomes.

On 17 August 2011, in another joint letter to the European Council President Van Rompuy, France and Germany demanded closer economic policy coordination in the euro area as a prerequisite for further EU-wide financial support measures as well as the introduction, at the constitutional level, of binding upper limits for the level that the structural deficit may reach annually (debt brake). As a result, on 15 November 2011 the Commission presented the Two-Pack proposals (two months after the Six-Pack was approved), on 9 December 2011 the European Council decided to draft a new intergovernmental Treaty-The Fiscal Compact- and on 2 February 2012 a new version of the European Stability Mechanism was signed linking financial support to the ratification by member states of the Fiscal Compact.

According to the official rhetoric in Germany, excessive public spending in a few euro zone countries was the primary cause of the crisis. If ratified, the Fiscal Compact would enforce the required budgetary austerity and reinforce the unfulfilled compromises under the Stability and Growth Pact. In fact, once the Fiscal Compact highlights all the German demands on fiscal discipline, it reflects the unambiguous German power in the EU (Soares, 2012).

Schild (2013) refers to the Franco-German bilateralism as a form of 'compromises by proxy', in the sense that the urgency of the crisis led to the acceptance of these compromises by the other EU Member States, although they did not reflect converging preferences.

In the end, the European Council became the prime decision-setter and major decision-making body, which also testifies to the liberal intergovernmentalist premise of the 'secondary' role of the Commission. In fact, the European Commission seemed to act as an agent receiving delegated tasks and new

powers from the intergovernmental bodies (the European Council and the Council) through a 'new informal coordination procedure and working method' in the form of the European Council's conclusions (Puetter, 2012:169). Puetter calls this working method 'deliberative intergovernmentalism'; a method of coordination in which final decisions end up in the European Council, after being dominated by Ecofin formal meetings and the Eurogroup informal meetings.

DOMESTIC POLITICS APPROACH TO THE EURO CRISIS RESPONSES

Developments at the EU level have had profound impacts on national governments: overthrow of governments, popular unrest, and the raise of Euro scepticism. The fact is that government preferences in the euro crisis have had a tendency to reflect national interests creating this way a dynamic, and sometimes unstable, relationship with their domestic constituencies and institutions. Notwithstanding, public support for economic integration has remained stable within the euro area (Hobolt and Wratil, 2015).

Throughout the crisis, European citizens had been increasingly identifying the Heads of State and Government as their legitimised representatives as media cover brought an increased focus on European Council meetings, giving them a collective responsibility to decide upon the best instruments to tackle the crisis. Also, prominent domestic actors like the German Constitutional Court, the *Bundesbank* and the *Bundestag*, were able to ascertain political pressure on the responses' final designs.

The first pressure of domestic institutions shaping member states' preferences can be found in the design of the financial rescue mechanisms. In early 2010, the Commission presented two proposals to assist euro area countries in financial distress. The first one, involving the 27 member states, provided for a facility of €60bn, which (in fact) was adopted as the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM). The second proposal envisaged a certain amount

of money to be provided in accordance to article 352 TFEU.⁷ According to Ludlow (2010) this proposal was not approved, as Jean-Claude Piris (the Council's legal adviser) considered that article 352 TFEU could not be used in reference to a sub-group of member states. However, another reason had a more political nature as Chancellor Merkel 'was more inclined towards an ad hoc intergovernmental initiative, firstly because the Karlsruhe Court's 2009 ruling on the Lisbon Treaty required the German government to obtain the approval of the *Bundestag* before approving any significant new EU initiative and secondly because she did not want the Commission to have a central role in the management of the additional money' (Ludlow, 2010:36).

Also a number of legal challenges to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) were filed with the German Federal Constitutional Court and the Irish Court (the Pringle case). In the latter, the Irish Court sought to ascertain whether the promulgation and ratification of the European Stability Mechanism was compatible with numerous provisions of European law, including the 'no bailout' clause contained in Article 125 TFEU (according to Beukers (2012) article 125 TFEU does not prohibits member states from granting each other loans, with conditionality).

Under Chancellor Merkel's insistence and in order to circumvent potential domestic legal challenges to a *de facto* bailout mechanism, the European Stability Mechanism involved an amendment to the Lisbon Treaty in the form of a new sub-paragraph to Article 136 TFEU.⁸ However, it may seem conflicting that the European Stability Mechanism Treaty involves an EU procedure-the simplified revision procedure- to create a mechanism not within the EU framework but through an international agreement.⁹

Finally, and regarding the supranationalisation of rules like the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), Lombardi and Moschella (2016) find that different characteristics of domestic supervisory frameworks explain the support or opposition to the SSM. The authors argue that the German regulators' opposition – which may coincide or differ from those of domestic policymakers - can be explained by the desire to protect the interests of public banks which are undercapitalised.

As Heipertz and Verdun (2005:995) note, 'the degree to which a do-

mestic issue becomes important at the European level seems to be a function of the (relative) power of the country and the domestic salience of the issue'.

RATIONAL CHOICE INSTITUTIONALISM APPROACH TO THE EURO CRISIS RESPONSES

Although literature focusing in the Commission as a political entrepreneur was interpreted as neofunctionalist, rational choice studies, in the form of the principal-agent analysis, have been focussing on issues such as delegation and agency.

According to Pollack (1997), member states have delegated to the Commission the powers theorized by the Principal-Agent model, as is the case for setting the legislative agenda; monitoring and enforcement of member states compliance with European law, and implementation and regulation of EU policies in certain areas, such as competition policy. The reasons for such delegation are, according to Majone (2002), the need to reduce decision-making costs by taking advantage of the Commission's policy-relevant expertise and information and to enhance the credibility of policy commitments.

The Commission's ability to set the agenda and its influence on policy outcomes has decreased with the introduction of the co-decision procedure by the Maastricht Treaty (renamed Ordinary Legislative Procedure- by the Treaty of Lisbon), being its influence more dependent on informal channels where the Commission can act as a deal-broker in virtue of its expertise and asymmetries of information (Tsebelis and Garrett, 2000). In fact, codecision has put the Commission in a situation of institutional disadvantage with the other legislative actors- the Council and the European Parliament- as compared to previous decision-making procedures where it had a larger room of manoeuvre.

In contrast to the liberal intergovernmentalist view that underestimates the Commission's ability to act as a policy entrepreneur, different empirical studies, focusing mainly on the agenda setting stage, have demonstrated that the Commission has been able to show political leadership and act as a policy entrepreneur. In this literature the Commission is portrayed as having an important margin of autonomy to influence policy outcomes.

Notwithstanding the different perspectives of the agenda-setting theories, agenda-setting is a highly political process as it not only determines which issues for decision-making are to be considered on the agenda (and in what terms) but also those that are kept off the agenda (Princen, 2007).¹⁰ Although the Commission still enjoys the exclusive right to initiate legislation, its role as political initiator in the integration process has been, since 2010, largely taken over by the European Council or just a few key governments, leaving the Commission to focus on its subordinate although important technical role (Grant, 2013).

In fact, as noted before, the European Council started including in its European Council conclusions policy 'requests' for the Commission, a practice that was never formalized in the Treaty and led to a broad consensus that the European Council was taking the role of an informal pre-initiator of legislation. The most comprehensive case refers to the fiscal and economic reforms dubbed the Six-Pack. Although these proposals on economic reform were decided upon under the Community method (under the codecision procedure), the Commission's formal role as agenda setter was shared with a Task Force with representatives of the member states, the rotating Presidency and the European Central Bank and presided by the President of the European Council Van Rompuy. While this Task Force was set up and six meetings between 21 May and 27 September 2010 were held, the Commission presented two communications on 12 May¹¹ and 30 June 2010¹² addressing the same need to reinforce economic policy coordination.

In the end, in an attempt to regain its position as agenda setter, the Commission presented the Six-Pack proposals in September 2010, a month before the Task Force's report was released. Although the latter was broader in scope as it included a proposal for the creation of a permanent stability mechanism, both proposals were very similar regarding fiscal policy and macroeconomic surveillance. Although the Task Force was set-up with cooperation from the Commission, its proposals seem to have served as a rough draft for the Van Rompuy Task Force's proposals.

The pre-legislative phase of the Six-Pack, from a Principal-Agent perspective, can be viewed as a contract where multiple principals -member states

acting in the European Council- delegate functions to their agents - the Commission and the Task Force- to propose economic and budgetary reforms. The set-up of the Task Force, besides removing the information asymmetry (in favour of the Commission) should be understood as a 'police patrol' ensuring that the other agent does not shirk, which means that it does not deviate from the principal's preferences.

In processes of agenda setting it may be difficult to assert which actor influenced the original Commission's proposal. As Princen (2007) argues, it is generally impossible to identify one ultimate source of a proposal, as the Commission cannot ignore member states' preferences. In fact, some of the key elements envisaged both in the Task Force report and in the Commission's proposals were longstanding calls of the latter and perceived as necessary by Member States.

Nonetheless, the European Council did not limit itself to pointing out economic governance reform general guidelines; rather, it was able to offer detailed guidance through the set-up of the Task Force. Furthermore, the constant intervention of member states' representatives, namely from Germany and France, does not exactly help to conform the image of an impartial Commission.

Another perspective to help explain the crisis responses through the lens of rational choice institutionalism is to understand the reason why member states delegate powers to supranational institutions. In fact, the delegation of powers to the European institutions, such as monitoring and enforcement of member states compliance with European law, holds in the present crisis as supranational institutions were attributed a central role even when the responses were found within intergovernmental arrangements.

The lack of enforcement mechanisms to guarantee the respect for rules arranged within voluntary intergovernmental agreements is one of the dilemmas faced by intergovernmentalism as a mechanism for voluntary policy coordination (Fabbrini, 2012).

To circumvent situations such as Germany and France breaching the Stability and Growth Pact's rules in 2003 as well as the manipulation of Greek's statistics to join the euro area, the Fiscal Compact tries to deal with the non-

compliance problem endorsing the European Court of Justice (article 8.1) with the power to intervene in case of non-compliance with the agreed rules, although it may raise political disputes. As for the European Stability Mechanism Treaty, article 37(3) states that in the event of a dispute between an ESM Member and the European Stability Mechanism, 'the dispute shall be submitted to the Court of Justice of the European Union'.

The fact is that the use of a European institution such as the Court of Justice by other intergovernmental bodies has been the subject of much debate. As such, the main criticisms made to the Fiscal Compact concern not only its contents but also the flexibility that it leaves, whether it is lawful to attribute new competences to EU institutions,¹³ the poor enforcement mechanisms¹⁴ and the fact that while restating most of the provisions included in the Six-Pack, it adds almost nothing new to economic governance.

The non-compliance problem is also questioned by Verhofstadt (2011), referring to the Euro-Plus Pact as an example of an intergovernmental model of peer pressure, which has already proven, more than once, to be ineffective as it lacks enforcement mechanisms and impartial judgments, as member states are instinctively reluctant to sanction each other.

A second dilemma relates to the lack of legitimacy of the decision-making process and its outcomes. The existence of a deteriorating economic environment and financial market pressures put member states on a dilemma between quick resolutions (such as the two month negotiation of the Fiscal Compact) and more or less lengthy negotiations solutions through codecision. Notwithstanding, the main decisions were taken in the Council without a previous discussion in the European Parliament, the institution representing the European citizens, who have strongly shown their discontent in very different occasions.¹⁵

In fact, the lack of accountability is present in the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Pursuant to article 32(3) of the ESM Treaty, it 'shall enjoy immunity from every form of judicial process except to the extent that the ESM expressly waives its immunity'. Furthermore, this lack of accountability is more pressing as the conditionality attached to the programs of financial assistance directly impact upon the economic and social rights of the European citizens.

These dilemmas contributed to the empowerment of supranational institutions like the European Commission and the European Court of Justice.

HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM

From an historical institutionalist perspective, the path-dependence and the functional spillover that characterizes the institutional design of the Economic and Monetary Union, constrained and limited institutional change in face of the crisis. EU's decision-making was therefore influenced by factors such as the Economic and Monetary Union's original institutional set-up and policy tools, the lack of crisis resolution mechanisms, diverging national preferences, and the unanimity vote required to make new Treaties.

The design of some of the new institutions created to cope with the crisis such as the Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the European Stability Mechanism Treaty ESM, the Six-Pack, the Two-Pack and the Fiscal Compact was indeed restrained by these factors. Furthermore, the 2010 sovereign debt crisis that followed the financial crisis can be seen as a critical juncture, that is to say, a period of transition caused by an external shock, leading to different options having to be considered.

Streek and Thelen (2005) described four ideal types of institutional change – 'layering' (i.e. add a new institutional element to existing ones), 'displacement' (i.e. one institutional element becomes more salient), 'redirection' (i.e. an institution is redirected to new goals), 'drift' (i.e. institutions are subject to erosion) and 'conversion'. However, Verdun (2015) in her earlier analysis of institutional change, adds a new type -'copying'- to describe the creation of the new institutions. As such, the EFSF has been copied from the European Investment Bank (EIB) structure and the European Monetary Institute (the predecessor of the ECB, which was also a temporary institution and directed only to EA countries). On the other hand the ESM was a 'copy' of the EFSF. Regarding the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack, both are 'layered' from the previous structure and logic of the Stability and Growth Pack (SGP). The most relevant elements added to the SGP by the Six-Pack(,) were the introduction of the macroeconomic imbalances, the Reverse Qualified Majority Voting (RQMV) and the

European Semester (see Valle-Flor, 2015). The greater focus on the debt criteria and the earlier application of sanctions brought about by the Six-Pack fit the concept of 'redirection'. Finally, the Fiscal Compact is 'copying' the Six-Pack and the Two-Pack.¹⁶

As far as the ECB is concerned, this supranational institution 'redirected' some of its instruments such as its advisory role as liquidity manager (e.g. Troika involvement) and country-specific surveillance (under the ESM Treaty and the provisions of the Six-Pack). The launch of the Security Market Programme in 2010, the Open Market Operations in 2012 and the Quantitative Easing programme in 2015 to assure financial stability are also 'redirections' of the ECB's primary mandate of price stability. However, the ECB has never had a 'treaty-based' mandate to buy securities in the Euro area sovereign debt markets. As such, the ECB is now facing a legal challenge over its quantitative easing programme by Germany's highest court, which states that the measures may violate EU law (Jones, 2017).

Another constraint to find possible solutions to the Euro crisis had to do with member state preferences. According to Schimmelfenning (2014), these have been shaped by structural financial and economic positions. While the solvent countries led by Germany limited the expansion of rescue mechanisms, opposed collective liability schemes and pushed for fiscal discipline and sanctions, the indebted countries, led by France, pushed for the expansion of rescue funds, the issuing of Euro bonds and more Keynesian instruments to promote economic growth, instead of austerity policies.

In the end, the bargaining situation resulted in a concession from both parts -the bailing out of the debtors and more fiscal discipline- for which the use of the European Stability Mechanism funds was made dependent on the Fiscal Compact implementation.

The economic interdependencies between Euro area member states were such that maintaining the status quo could have meant the collapse of the Euro. As such, member state divergences were overlapped by a path dependency translated in a common preference – the survival of the Euro and the Euro zone.

Finally, and regarding the institutional barriers to reform, the unanimous

vote needed to make new EU treaties (or amend the current ones), which would have led to more EMU's integration, was bypassed by two intergovernmental treaties (outside the EU legal framework), the European Stability Mechanism and the Fiscal Compact. None of them required the ratification of the then 17 Eurozone countries. As Fabbrini (2012:120) notes, regarding the Fiscal Compact 'it is the first time (in the European integration experience) that unanimity has been eliminated as a barrier for activating an intergovernmental treaty'.

In fact, the unanimity vote needed to reach an intergovernmental agreement in the European Council led, through the entire crisis, to the need of finding new solutions wherever a member state's veto was envisaged.

CONCLUSION

The sovereign debt crisis in 2010 has made the process of European integration salient across Europe and has helped to revive the interest in integration theories, as a way to better understand the EU's responses to the crisis. Although different theoretical approaches may differ in their purposes, main propositions and scope, there is no clear-cut between them. However, most scholars agree that the Euro crisis led to an important increase of European integration.

The purpose of this contribution was to use five different theoretical lenses to better understand the institutional responses to the crisis and the following reforms to deepen integration.

Since Maastricht, the EU member states have shown a lack of will to transfer more sovereignty to the EU and more competences to supranational institutions. However, and since 2010, this resilience to centralize more powers in the EU was overstepped by the building of the banking union (and its first two pillars). Also, a recurring method of intergovernmentalism agreements 'using' EU institutions ended up empowering supranational institutions like the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the European Court of Justice.

Using a neofunctionalist perspective, the EU responses to the crisis suggest that the Commission's primary role is changing from a policy entrepreneur

to a policy manager.

The fact is that the crisis catalysed the European Council to the centre of decision-making and the complex system of economic governance still rests on the basis of the intergovernmental logic, with the Commission being allowed to play a technical role in monitoring member states economic performance. However, while economic governance reform led to the Commission's agenda setting power being decreased, its political discretion in supervising and steering policy implementation has been considerably strengthened, not only as a result of the responses found under the Community method, but also those under intergovernmental agreements.

Either meeting in the European Council formation, Euro area summits, or bipartite meetings led by France and Germany, member states setting the tone for the search of joint solutions are likely to hold the premises of the intergovernmentalist view as the most powerful decision-makers. Divergent national preferences, which dominated interstate bargaining, should be framed within a common will to save the euro and the Eurozone. This endogenous preference, originating from the integration path which followed Maastricht and the construction of the Economic and Monetary Union, ultimately outweighed member states' individual national preferences. Wrapping up the intergovernmentalist analysis, one sees that the responses found outside the EU framework underline the importance of the relative power of the member states, showing how their preferences shaped the outcome. The intergovernmentalist propositions that member states remain the most powerful decision-makers are likely to hold, namely through the relevance of Germany and France who set the pace and the tone for the search of joint solutions.

From an historical institutionalist perspective, the path-dependence and the functional spillover that characterizes the institutional design of the Economic and Monetary Union constrained and limited institutional change in face of the crisis. EU's decision-making was therefore influenced by factors such as the Economic and Monetary Union's original institutional setup, the lack of crisis resolution mechanisms, the non-bailout clause (article 125 TFEU), and diverging national preferences. All these factors, along with the predominance of the European Council acting as an economic government, reinforced the intergov-

ernmental dimension of the Union's functioning, downplaying the Community institutions' role in the crisis management. Also an historical institutionalism approach shows that some of the responses to the crisis were built on previous EU structures. For its part, rational choice institutionalism, focusing on delegation, highlighted the reasons why supranational institutions were empowered.

The eclectic combination of integration theories contributed to a more comprehensive understanding of the recent integration process. While neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism focused on the dynamics of integration and the pressure exerted by national institutions; historical and rational choice institutionalisms focused on the particular shape of the institutional choices that were made.

In the end, the EU's responses to the crisis were an outcome of path dependency and functional spillover from a centralized monetary policy to a formerly decentralized fiscal and financial policy. Although member states preferences might be discordant, the will to save the euro was prevalent and decisive.

NOTES

1. Criticisms to the neofunctionalist view, argue that the functional spillover from one policy domain to another was absent once the Single European Act aimed to complete an existing policy area- the single market (Yesilada et al, 2010).
2. There is not a precise definition of the Community method and some misunderstandings remain regarding its main characteristics as the Treaties provide for several different ways for the EU to operate. As such, and drawing on Monar (2011) designation of the method, a comprehensive description that goes beyond its legislative character, includes six primary elements: (i) the definition of common objectives in the Treaties, as a way to deepen cooperation or even 'common policies'; (ii) the transfer of legislative powers to the EU as primary instruments to achieve these common objectives, namely the use of codecision; (iii) qualified majority voting in the Council; (iv) the binding effect of such legislation once adopted through the Treaty-defined procedures; (v) the conferral of supranational powers on the Commission -namely the exclusive right of initiative, the 'guardian of the treaties' function and delegated implementation powers-; and (vi) the European Court of Justice empowered with binding enforcement procedures.
3. Although the Lisbon Treaty abolished the pillar's structure, it maintained the inter-governmental and supranational logics of decision-making (Fabbrini, 2013).
4. European Parliament Report (2012:11) 'The European Semester for Economic Policy Coordination: Implementation of 2012 priorities'.
5. EUObserver (30.05.13) 'France says Brussels 'cannot dictate' economic policy'.

Available at <http://euobserver.com/economic/120311>

6. Some of the policy solutions were in fact French demands, with a reluctant Germany ultimately following. Such was the case of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the 'economic government'. At a press conference on September 2010, Chancellor Merkel opposed the extension of the EFSF to a permanent fund. By December 2010 she already endorsed it. Previously a critic of concepts like 'economic government' and 'ins' and 'outs' of the euro area, Chancellor Merkel ended up endorsing them: in a bilateral compromise with President Sarkozy in June 2011, it was agreed to give the European Council a central role and on 26 October 2011 Euro summits were institutionalized.
7. Article 352(1) TFEU states that 'If action by the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of the policies defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures'.
8. Before entering into force, the European Stability Mechanism Treaty was subject to the favourable opinion of the German Constitutional Court regarding its constitutional congruence with the German basic law.
9. The European Council adopted Decision 2011/199/EU to amend article 136 TFEU stating that 'member states whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro as a whole'. The Treaty amendment, with no previous need for an Intergovernmental Government Conference or Convention, was made possible by the Treaty of Lisbon with the introduction of article 48(6) TFEU- a simplified revision procedure-which vests power in the European Council to adopt a decision by unanimity to amend 'all or part of the provisions of part three of the TFEU'.
10. The terms 'on' and 'off' the agenda are still used to denote the distinction between those issues that receive 'considerable' or 'serious' attention and those that receive only little attention.
11. European Commission IP/10/561, 'Reinforcing Economic Policy Coordination', 12 May 2010.
12. European Commission (IP/10/859) 'Enhancing Economic Policy Coordination for Stability, Growth and Jobs-Tools for stronger EU Economic Governance', 30 June 2010.
13. The legal basis to justify the intervention of the European Court, while taking into account the Maastricht *acquis*, was found in article 273 TFEU.
14. Being an international treaty, the Fiscal Compact neither enjoys the primacy of EU law (although it has to respect it) nor has direct effect in the national legal orders.
15. The European Parliament is not mentioned in the European Stability Mechanism Treaty and sidelined in the Fiscal Compact Treaty. According to article 12(5) of the Fiscal Treaty 'the President of the European Parliament may be invited to be heard. The President of the Euro Summit shall present a report to the European Parliament after each of the meetings of the Euro Summits'.
16. The only novelty of the Fiscal Treaty is that article 3(2) demands that the 'balanced budget' rule, requiring national budgets to be 'balanced or in surplus' be enshrined in national law 'through provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional'

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#9

AN ESSAY ON POPULISM

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ABSTRACT

What is Populism? The answer to this question can be, by itself, a political statement. Deciding who is (or who is not) a populist leader is a matter of choice and interpretation of reality, reason why consensus is so difficult to reach at this level. It's not just a matter of historical or regional differences, but also of ideological and cultural perspectives about what's an acceptable or intolerable way of defending ideals.

Since authors have been struggling to find a definition of Populism, this article is focused on trying to understand why. The phenomena will be analyzed especially from the standpoint of the political sciences. At the end, however, text opens other doors, as a field of exacerbated emotions, by trying to identify relations between Populism and economic crisis, sports or the Media.

KEYWORDS: Populism, Democracy, Economic Crisis, Sports, the Media.

RESUMO

O que é o Populismo? A resposta a essa questão pode ser, em si, uma afirmação política. Decidir quem é (ou não é) um líder populista é uma questão de escolha e uma interpretação da realidade, pelo que é difícil reunir consenso a este nível. Não é apenas por diferenças históricas ou regionais, mas também ideológicas e culturais sobre a forma aceitável ou intolerável de defender ideais.

Uma vez que os autores têm dificuldades na definição de Populismo, este artigo tenta compreender porquê. O fenómeno será analisado sobretudo da perspectiva da Ciência Política, mas enquanto dimensão de emoções exacerbadas, o texto abre outras portas ao tentar identificar relações entre Populismo e a crise económica, o desporto ou os meios de comunicação.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: Populismo, Democracia, Crise Económica, Desporto, Meios de Comunicação.

INTRODUCTION

The text is divided in chapters. The first examines the relationship between Democracy and Populism. Questions if Populism is as a democratic phenomenon, a symptom of the lack of Democracy, or a distinct political regime all together.

The second is about the specific concept of Populism. Enquiries authors about the possibility of reaching a unanimous definition that may be applied everywhere in the world.

The third is focused on who is *the people* that Populism speaks about.

The fourth tries to explain who the populists are. If their identification is a matter of opinion.

The fifth studies the characteristics of three approaches to Populism research: as an ideology, a discursive style or a political strategy.

The sixth tries to understand if it is a political phenomenon. If it can be

studied in different fields.

The annexes have complementary information for further analysis. The first set of ideas offers insights about populism from different perspectives. The second includes characteristics of populism in two continents, Europe and Latin America, allowing comparison among the two.

This project is considered useful in today's world, where Populism seems to be a growing public concern and a phenomenon more and more studied by the social sciences.

POPULISM AND DEMOCRACY

Populism may be a democratic phenomenon, a symptom of the lack of Democracy, or a different political regime?(1) This is the first big question that needs an answer.

Democracy is a Greek word that comes from *Demos* (the people) and *Kratos* (power), meaning the *power of the people*(2). Citizens are given the right to decide who rules them(3) or what they want to do (referendums). That implies they are responsible for their choices. In spite of (or because of) that, when frustrated, they get together spontaneously or mobilized by a leader claiming their truths and, if necessary, all urge against the system.

«*Demokratia*, which emerged as a regime-type with the historical self-assertion of a demos in a moment of revolution, refers to a demos' collective capacity to do things in the public realm, to make things happen. If this is right, *demokratia* does not refer in the first instance to the demos' monopolistic control of pre-existing constitutional authority.» (Ober, 2007: 5) Therefore, without rule of law and mature citizens, Democracy can be unstable, and lead to violence, uprisings or even revolution, that may open the door to a less people friendly regime (4). Elections are a blessing, considering the opportunities they may bring. In the other hand, they frequently over-stimulate competitiveness and conflict in society(5).

Democracy can be determined by the *will of the majority*(6), but not rarely is dominated by lobbies. In other words, the *common people* can be ruled by an elite (social or political, in sports or in business). Perceptions of injustice

can lead to violence. If the mob thinks resources are being unfairly distributed, doesn't accept a vertical type of organization and fights for an horizontal one(7), doubts a system based on equal rights rather than absolute equality (and wants more than it can get), if it is being deprived or has higher unfulfilled expectations, doesn't identify with the culture (set of social values) or has no respect for its leaders, than there's a decline of confidence in the political regime that undermines its legitimacy(8). Consequently, Democracy depends on how it works and on what it delivers(9), which means it has to guarantee (or give a general perception of) safety, justice and social cohesion.

When the population starts feeling ignored(10) by a political regime that supposedly represents them and it's organized to protect their well-being, they riot and law enforcement may not be enough to maintain peace and harmony. This is when populism comes forward(11).

Populism has everything to do with revolt against the *status quo*. A significant number of their supporters don't want to end with Democracy, and mostly want a more *people friendly* way of Government, which means Populism is instrumental to them(12). The problem is that, in order to get what they want, excesses may be committed. Those who use all means to achieve an outcome (like more safety, less taxes or more jobs), may end up destroying the political regime itself if they elect (or somehow give power to) a leader that implements dictatorship, for instance.

Populism is not a paradox of Democracy(13). It is intrinsic to this type of political regime(14). It doesn't have an "ambiguous relationship with Democracy"(15), but with the rule of Law, which is not the same thing. It's an extreme version of the *power of the people*. It's when the mob or its front-runners are no longer complying with present circumstances(16), and are willing to go beyond social norms or legal limits to change the situation. That's why populism is extremist.

Populism it's anti-systemic and opportunistic if its leaders, not having the population's best interests in mind, once in power, end up implementing a political regime that is not a Democracy(17). The rhetoric is dramatically against the *status quo*, but the mob usually wants some adjustments, not a change of political regime, but that may be implied from the start.

“Soft term limits may exacerbate, rather than reduce, the populist bias of policies”. Nevertheless, Populism doesn’t have to be a “specter haunting Democracy”(19). It can be controlled and prevented. But checks and balances should work both ways. It’s not just about supervising riots, it’s mostly about good governance. People tend to respect institutions and elected leaders that promote the well-being of society. Nothing seems to please everybody, but a healthy system can prevail more easily than when it’s sick to its core. But the interpretation of reality also has influence in what is found acceptable or not according to History, cultural patterns or political ideologies. See Annex 1.

WHAT IS POPULISM?

If Populism is an extreme version of Democracy, or something that may rise in an unbalanced society where the rule of law is undermined, or people are no longer feeling represented by its institutions, than the next question is about its specific concept. Because without knowing exactly what it is, it’s difficult to identify and measure.

Authors have struggle with a definition of Populism. They claim it’s a “cat-dog problem”(20). That that there is a “myopic focus on specific instances”(21). Others say that, even “if a clear definition is provided, conceptual problems arise”(22). What seems to be the issue? Apparently, the definition “varies across country, context and historical time periods”(23). But it’s more than that. If populism is a political phenomenon, than the answer to this question is hardly neutral, because choosing who is and who is not a populist is, in itself, a political statement (Sousa Galito, 2017: 23). See Annex 2.

Some caution is needed. Social scientists should not jump to conclusions about the subject and be aware of underlying interests possibly blurring their judgement, based on personal political preferences or ideologies. This is important, because it may have strongly effect on the outcome.

Discourses, features and components can be misleading. Perhaps it’s more important to identify patterns than capital letters or what’s just noise, to see if ideas sustain for an “extended period of time” and movements really mean what they say. See Table 1.

Table 1: What Populism is not?

When a case only shows some of the (necessary and jointly sufficient) components of populism (e.g. when a party merely presents itself as a radical outsider).
Not a lasting constituent feature of the political party or movement
Discourse not voiced consistently by actors for an extended period of time.

So, the first two conclusions are the following: Populism is an extremist version of what can happen in Democracy (especially when justice isn’t working or the perception of it), as well as anti-systemic and opportunistic. It’s a phenomenon that must be a lasting feature, a strong pattern of a party or political leader.

What else? «I define populism as a form of political mobilization and government where a strong *personalistic leader*, to establish and then maintain mass support, hails “the people” conceived as a *non-elite* category and for adversarial political purpose, and appeals to “the people” by ways of the concrete practices and forms of speech that culturally demarcate the local popular classes.» (Ostiguy, 2001: 16) Is this true? Is Populism a form of antagonism between *the people* and *the elite* fomented by a charismatic front-runner?

WHO ARE THE PEOPLE

Ancient romans spoke about *the plebs*. *Il popolo minuto* of medieval towns(24), the *populace* of the French Revolution, the peasants in agricultural societies or the blue-collar workers in industrial spheres are other traditional definitions of *the people*. But in modern Democracies, especially when there is rule of law, citizens are supposed to have same civic rights and responsibilities (25). This is not the same as Feudalism that had hierarchy among nobles, clergy and people. Nowadays, many countries have a Constitution guaranteeing

equality under the law, which means everybody is *people*. The population holds the power and institutions are supposed to defend *everybody's* best interest. Still some are richer or privileged than others. If population obeys the law and respects its institutions, some kind of equilibrium can be maintained. If not, problems become an issue and Populism grows from that, because it identifies victims and oppressors. The first group is formed by the poor, the good folks, the excluded, the irreproachable, the pure and sincere people like *us*. The *others*(26) are the elite(27), the rich and included in the corrupted system, which are obviously guilty and bad, politically correct but fake, and *we* want nothing to do with *them*. See Table 2. This is an antagonistic, anti-establishment and anti-elitist discourse(28).

Populism is the rebellion of the excluded. But not just that. It's an ex-

Table 2: Populism – Antagonistic Political Discourse

People	Elite
Poor	Rich
Good	Bad
Pure	Corrupted
We/ Us	Them/ Others
Excluded	Included (in the corrupted system)
Irreproachable	Guilty
Sincere	Politically correct but fake
Victim	Oppressor

tremist movement of people that feels *left out* but with expectations of belonging to the system. That's why they are willing to do anything to get what they want. If they live in a Democracy and they are part of the *Demos*, than they want the *Kratos*. If others have more, all should have more if resources are better distributed. Since normal ways are not accomplishing that goal anymore, new assemblies are formed. Large number of citizens manifest in the streets. Some use violence. Populism is claiming power by all means in a society who is not equal or fair.

Populism blames the "intermediary institutions"(29), especially when they are considered corrupted or there's general perception of it. This implies

that a Democracy tends to be a horizontal society? A pure or theoretical system, maybe. But vertical forms of political organization won't necessarily be threaten by Populism if culture is based on merit or wisdom, teaching or experience, and is willing to give more to who work harder or has higher skills than others. It all depends of the set of values of *the people*. It's a matter of choice and preference living in an egalitarian (cooperative) or competitive society. One thing is for sure, social, economic or even religious outcomes are different.

Populists represent the *victims of the system* and typically give a discursive elaboration of what *the people* means and wants. They do that because the political party must embody the claims of the larger group(30). In order to feel stronger, the leader exacerbates a sense of all being numerically significant or even homogenous(31), but this only works in nations or in units. If not, the crowd will disintegrate sooner or later.

Populism and Nationalism are two different things. "Banal Populism" is about mythology of *the people*(32). Nations may become stronger when a command in chief pull them together in a certain direction, even in situations of crisis, when the State (institutions) and Nation (population with a unique set of values) is an equivalent force. But when countries have different Nations, or Nations are divided by political frontiers or, especially, inside Confederations or Federations or Regional Blocks, Nationalism is considered a threat to the top (supranational institutions) and for that reason, sometimes by all means, attacked or restricted.

Populism is also different from Fascism(33). The latter is a totalitarian attempt to organize the State that doesn't give *the people* much space to breath. The former glorifies the sovereignty of the population, offers all the liberty they want, at least in the beginning. In fact, populism can empower an opportunistic leader or a political party that may implement all sorts of new political regimes, including Fascism; but later on, after betraying the trust of its followers, because the message used to gather support was probably based on freedom.

WHO ARE THE POPULISTS?

Identifying populists is a matter of opinion. It depends of political interests behind the claim, from one side and the other, because some may think extremes are acceptable when defending one thing, but intolerable when pushing for something else.

Populists claim to represent directly(34) the interest of *the people* and to be one of them(35). They ride the wave of polarization (of a divided society) or discrimination (rivalry between groups that cannot stand each other or are incapable of negotiating a harmonious way of living together). When there is crisis and general discontent about it, they offer solutions, but frequently radical or sufficiently abstract and idealistic to convince the mob that a better future is possible under their rule. See Table 3.

Table 3: What Populists offer and rage against

Populists:	
Ride the wave of:	Offer:
Polarization or Discrimination	Justice
General discontent	Radical solutions
Crisis	Better future

Leaders need to be *popular*, in a Democracy, if they want to be elected, but will only become populists if they cross the line. Hence, being *popular* means to be protective and transparent (informative and not corrupted); to keeping promises or offering realistic and moderate answers to problems, based on concrete measures. Their public policies have predictable outcomes, and may be applied without putting in question the rule of law and the democratic order. These leaders won't punish public opinion for constructive reproach, because they know the system needs to prevail, and they must be part of the solution not the problem. See Table 4.

Populists are unpredictable or capable of anything. They may be idealistic, paternalistic or extremist when mobilizing the mob. They offer an abstract

plan of what the future can be, and promise what they necessarily can't or won't keep. They are unpredictable (or unstable) and they may punish criticism, be vindictive and destructive. They are considered courageous by its supporters, but they are ultimately dangerous to the system, to their enemies, some of them turn against their allies after the match is over or become cult figures(36) (and therefore, unreachable).

Table 4: Differences between Popular and Populist

Popular	Populist
Systemic	Anti-Systemic
Democratic order (rule of Law)	Democratic disorder
Moderate	Extremist
Concrete measures	Abstract plan
Keep promises	Doesn't keep promises
Protector	Paternalistic
Predictable	Unpredictable
Realistic	Idealistic
Constructive reproach	Destructive reproach
Safe	Dangerous
Leads informed and mature citizens	Leading the mob

Populists need people(37), more than the other way around. Since mobilizing crowds are not easy, they need to be good speakers or, at the very least, entertaining. Spotlights are on them, so they may be exciting, fascinating, mesmerizing, frightening or mysterious (not all the mobs have the same needs and wants). They may be outstanding orators, but not all of them have experience in the political sphere, for sometimes they are famous lawyers and activists, even actors and TV presenters, or other kind of charismatic leaders(38).

Populists won't reach their goal only by words, but they certainly need to please their audience. They may be opportunistic from the very beginning (39), but not all are pragmatic or cynical. Some truly believe in what they are defending and doing. If idealistic, after elections or once power is conquered, they will be forced to deal with reality (and molded by the harsh truth) or substi-

tuted by someone else.

POPULISM IS AN IDEOLOGY, A DISCURSIVE STYLE OR A POLITICAL STRATEGY?

There is not much consensus about what Populism, but it's mostly studied from one of these perspectives (or all together): as an ideology, a discursive style, or a political strategy(40). See Table 5.

Table 5: Characteristics of three approaches to Populism research

Main Subject	Approaches	Definition of Populism	Unit of Analysis	Relevant Methods
Thinking	Political ideology	Ideas about the nature of politics and society	Parties Party leaders	Qualitative or automated texts analysis (mostly of partisan literature).
Speaking	Political Discursive Style	Claims about politics Characteristics of discourse.	Texts Speeches Public discourse about politics	Interpretive textual analysis.
Doing	Political Strategy	A form of mobilization and organization	Parties (focus on structures), social movements, leaders	Comparative historical Analysis. Case studies.

Considering this perspective, empirical studies center their analysis on parties and party leaders, in qualitative or automated texts(41).

As an ideology, Populism has a monolithic conception of the *people*, possibly synonym of the *common men and women*, the *little guys*, the *exploited*, the *poor*. Claims to defend the “general will” or something more complex like

the Nation (core values set on a specific territory). There is an antagonistic line of thought that implies the exclusion of the threatening or abusive group – the *others*, the *elite*. The *us* against *them* is the survival mode of the *virtuous* defending from the *corrupted*. See Table 6.

Table 6: Populism as a Political Ideology

Politics as an expression of the general will (the people as sovereign)
Monolithic conception of the people
The people/ the Nation/ the common men and women/ the little guys/ the poor/ the exploited/...
2 homogenous groups (people/elite, majority/minority, ...)
Antagonism (“we” against “them”). Exclusion of the “others”
The people betrayed by those in charge
Exaltation of the “people” (pure, virtuous) and denigration of the “elite” (corrupted)

As a set of ideas is not much. As a line of thought(42) is mostly impractical and too abstract. As an ideology is considered thin-centered for being vague, but instrumental in its core values, which means more people can be convinced that it's what they are looking for(43).

Ultimately, «(...) populism is neither left nor right, neither progressive nor conservative. Populism can be combined with many different ‘host ideologies’ (...)» (Bakker, Rooduijn and Schumacher, 2015: 4) If this is true, than Populism is not so much an ideology but an umbrella, an instrumental way of getting what *the people* want (or more specifically its leaders). This is the main reason why some authors considered it the weakest interpretation of the phenomenon(44).

Aslanidis (2015) suggests that Populism is better characterized as a discourse rather than an ideology(45) and that frame analysis can encourage

comparative work(46). The author claims that its chameleonic nature adapts to circumstances and attaches to established systems of ideas (like socialism or liberalism) but never truly becomes one for lack of coherence(47).

In other words, Populism is a type of message, getting across as strong and powerful. One that is anti-establishment(48). It doesn't respect norms and institutions(49) that don't represent the "general will" (or the perception of it) based on speeches, party manifestos and press releases.

Populism is the "language of politics when there can be no politics as usual"(50) and individuals seem more prone to it than political parties(51) (especially when already established or part of the system, contrarily to new ones that may be unpredictable). Leaders are perhaps more volatile, for being manipulative (*who's not with me is a traitor*)(52) or a target, since they are easily criticized by its enemies or more vulnerable to criticism from its peers.

If "the other side of populism's *depoliticization* of the political is the hyper-politicization of social relations"(53), can Populism be a political strategy? If so, has three variants based on forms of mobilization, political choices or political organization(54).

Populism may be considered an extreme way to get elected. The analysis of *vote choice* rises questions like artificial dichotomization and bias. Not all supporters of populist leaders vote in the same party or defend the same political ideology, which means it's important to "separate populism from features that might regularly occur together with it, but are not part of it"(55).

Populism as political strategy, rather than an ideology, is taken as a form of mobilization(57). Dangers of mob behavior became an issue, not much for populists but for legal institutions. At this level, some differences may be

Table 7: Populism as Political Strategy

Specific way of competing for and exercising political power
Support from the masses
Masses as a large number of mostly unorganized followers
Power based on direct, unmediated, noninstitutionalized support
Populist – charismatic type (Rooted in personal qualities. Involves asymmetry between leaders and followers, but also directness and great passion).
Populist – personalistic leader
Populist is an outsider (a new challenger), who incarnates the demands of "the people"

identified between left-wing and right-wing groups(58). See Table 8. In fact, according to Kriesi (2015), social movements are challengers mobilizing in non-electoral channels; interest groups are mainstream actors mobilizing in non-electoral channels;

Table 8: Forms of Political Mobilization

	Channel of Mobilization	
	Non-electoral	Electoral
Challenger	Social Movement	Movement Party
Mainstream	Interest Group	Political Party

movement parties (political activists rising from social movements) are challengers mobilizing in electoral channels; and political parties are mainstream actors mobilizing in electoral channels.

POPULISM IS A POLITICAL PHENOMENON

As long as there are people, they may go over the top. If Populism, as an extremist expression of Democracy, it may be also be found in periods of economic crisis, social instability or religious extremism. But, in the overall, it never stops being a political phenomenon if we consider that politicians (not just the professional ones) of the *polis* are the citizens of the city. According to this idea, it always has some sort of political implication or consequence. Not all may agree with this idea, but it's a possible one. See Annex 1.

An economic crisis may open the door to Populism, but usually is not enough(59). General perception that economic hardship(60) is coming may also

be a key issue, because the *people* may feel forced to fight the Government to prevent austerity measures that restrict job opportunities or lead to high unemployment rates and high taxes. Probably the field is already mined by lack of trust in the “opaqueness of the political institutions”(61). Or an engrained lack of representation. Or high income inequality(62) or social heterogeneity that enables the “rich elite (or a subset thereof) to have a disproportionate influence on politics”(63). Then *the poor* or unfortunate become more outraged against *the rich* and privileged, and the snowball begins(64).

Populism is often a way to openly or deceptively fight hard for natural resources that represent important sources of income like oil and natural gas, drinking water or forests (wood).

Journalists(65) should inform *the people* about those things, but they deliver something else entirely. The TV and the Radio are forms of mass communication and, therefore, are vulnerable to Populism too, especially when ratings are the driving force of a multibillion dollars’ business(66). Internet is another dimension, virtual and more dangerous for being less controlled, navigating any sort of propaganda that, one day, may rise real riots or other extreme behavior in the streets(67).

Populism can also be found in sports, especially in soccer(68) (with local, national or worldly impact). In some countries this is more evident than others(69). And it’s been instrumental in the present(70) as it was in the past(71).

Populism is a group phenomenon and people are social creatures(72). As an extremist form of Democracy, is not rarely experienced in stadiums, where leaders are in close proximity with people of strong emotions. Being fed by rivalry among opponents(73), this time of environment can spread hooliganism and violence.

Sports are linked to extreme emotional experiences that may instigate rivalry and violence from hooligans and club leaders. This may be interpreted by Psychology or Sociology.

Based on elective affinity, there is a link between the believe system and the elector’s psychological disposition. In fact, People vote in people or messages that seem to match their personality, which implies projection(74). Fearful individuals tend to be more vigilant and angry people are more likely to

blame others(75). Populism is more linked to rage and indignation(76) and often sells an illusion(77).

Science is usually focused on logic rather than emotions. The political sociology tends to marginalize them(78). The field of the Political Sociology of Emotions allows the political phenomena to be analyzed from an emotional perspective, which seems more efficient than reducing the situation, from a monistic standpoint, to emotions and feelings like the Emotive Political Sociology does. See Table 9.

Populism breeds emotions and its leaders, in History, have been able to trigger political change(79) and religious overtones(80). But there is also a great deal of rationality in the motivations of both leaders and followers in populist politics(81).

CONCLUSION

Populism may be a political phenomenon and an extreme version of the *power of the people* in action, in full force. It’s all about anger and frustration against a system that excludes groups who claim to belong, or have expectation to get more than they do at the moment. It may be controlled, soft term limits can actually exacerbate populist bias if the Government or public institutions can’t provide things like Security, Peace, Prosperity or Social Cohesion.

Populism is extremist, anti-systemic, and opportunistic. It verifies for an extended period of time, it’s not a simple emotional speech or a big manifestation in the streets, it’s a social movement.

Populism is hardly an ideology (at the very most is thin-centered). It’s usually a vague line of thought and a chameleonic way to adapt to frustrated people that feel the need to do something out of the ordinary; that are searching for a way out, and are capable of interpreting it as a solution to its problems.

As a discursive style may be the language of politics when there cannot be politics as usual. When the *status quo* is considered intolerable to a mob that wants to express itself and it’s willing to pay attention to leaders that can read minds and tell them what they want to listen.

As a political strategy is a form of political organization, mobilization or a

political choice. At this level, all means can be used to reach a goal, particularly if agents aren't scrupulous.

Populists may be charismatic leaders capable to consistently mobilize the masses. In a modern Democracy, especially in a rule of law, all citizens (of a certain area) may be considered members of *the people* and, therefore, at least in theory, all are vulnerable to propaganda of this kind.

Nevertheless, *the people* is usually not homogenous. Different groups may not identify necessarily with the same themes or perspectives. Some will be more vulnerable to left-wing set of values, others to right-wing rhetoric. Some may be vulnerable to religious fundamentalism, hooliganism in sports, excesses in the Media, or other forms of dangerous behavior that lead to democratic disorder. People with strong emotional drive may find themselves, one day, if not careful, at the hands of extremists who may lead them (and everybody for that matter) to an uncertain future.

NOTES

1. «Clarifying the concept of populism thus involve answering a still more basic question: whether populist “regimes” should be understood --and classified-- as a *distinct* type of political regime or not.» (Ostiguy, 2001: 1)
2. «Democracy is a word that has come to mean very different things to different people. In origin it is, of course, Greek, a composite of *demos* and *kratos*. Since *demos* can be translated as “the people” (qua “native adult male residents of a polis”) and *kratos* as “power,” democracy has a root meaning of “the power of the people.» (Ober, 2007: 2)
3. «The ultimate source of authority in democratic governance is centered on the category of the people. In essence, representative politics represents the interests and wishes of the population – to embody and realize the popular will. Talking in the name of the people, usually described as the trademark of populism, is essential for all political parties trying to maximize voting support. » (Hellström, 2014: 4)
4. «The Greek vocabulary for political regimes tended to focus in the first instance on the empowered or ruling body, which might be an a single person (one), or a limited number of persons (the few), or a large and inclusive body (the many). While the Greek vocabulary for regime-types is extensive, the three key terms for the rule of the one, few, and many are *monarchia*, *oligarchia*, and *demokratia*. » (Ober, 2007: 2)
5. «Democratization may introduce many paradoxes, dilemmas and problematic choices. Often the immediate effect of open competitive politics accentuates social differences. In some instances elections seem to contribute to—or even stimulate—violent conflict (...).» (Large and Sisk, 2006: 3)
6. «In modernity, democracy is often construed as being concerned, in the first instance, with a voting rule for determining the will of the majority. The power of the people is thus the authority to decide matters by majority rule. » (Ober, 2007: 2)
7. «The situation becomes even more troublesome in democratic formulations that, disillusioned with and hence critical of the representative path, attempt to challenge vertical organizational forms deemed ‘insufficiently democratic’, seeking to replace them with allegedly more egalitarian and flexible structures. The aim of these horizontal forms is to encourage grassroots participation rather than reliance on individuals or elites so that the people would have more control over political outcomes. » (Piramo, 2009: 3)
8. «The subject of ‘democracy’, so celebrated after the fall of the Berlin Wall, now receives a more mixed press. Signs of a loss of confidence in and a decline in the legitimacy of democratic systems, as measured by public opinion surveys, are emerging in many parts of the world. Symptoms include a crisis in representation, poor voter turnout at elections, a loss of trust due to poor performance by political parties, corruption scandals, severe alienation among young people, and the need for innovative responses. » (Large and Sisk, 2006: 1)
9. «The credibility of democracy as a political system increasingly depends both on *how* it works – practice – and on *what* (whether) it delivers. In other words, it is crucial that democracy be able to move beyond the formal realm of electoral politics to the substantive one of enabling human rights, physical well-being and human development. In this sense, the current emphasis on democratic elections may strengthen certain kinds of political regimes and the competition between political parties, but it does not guarantee state responses to collective needs, the participation of civil society in decision-making processes, or the social and political accountability of the ruling classes in developing and transitional societies. » (*Id. Ibid*: 2)
10. «Sometimes spasmodically, sometimes for longer periods, large numbers of people possess an intense and shared feeling that their common interests are being ignored by rulers and politicians or addressed too slowly out of respect for traditional or complex legal procedures. » (Crick, 2017: 627)
11. «(...) two faces of democracy many tensions exist, tensions which can give rise to populism. First, if the redemptive face’s promise of a better and more just world cannot be kept, populism emerges and the populists will purport to be able to keep that promise. Second, if the will of the ‘people’ is not or cannot be implemented, populists seek to replace current elites (and at the same time they create the opportunity for other populists to step in if they themselves cannot keep their promises). Third, characteristic for the redemptive face is a dislike of institutions that come between the ‘people’ and the expression of their will, which should be unmediated. These contradictions between the redemptive and pragmatic faces of democracy open up room for populism.» (Deiwiks, 2009: 4)
12. «The belief in the redemptive capacity of democracy serves to empower the government and contributes to its legitimacy. By contrast, where the citizens have doubts about whether the acts of the government express their will, where they perceive the government as lacking the power or the willingness to act in the name of their collective interest, the government will lose democratic legitimacy. If the belief in the redemptive capacity of democracy is undermined, populists get their chance.» (Kriesi, 2015: 11-12)
13. «(...) the relationship between populism and representative democracy is highly paradox. On the one hand, it is characterized by antagonism, noticeable in populists’ stance against parties and institutions. On the other hand, populism is inevitably connected with representative democracy: populism only works in opposition to the ‘other’; with regard to representative democracy, populists claim to, and sometimes in fact also do, uncover political ills and instances of system malfunctioning. And, as we have seen, populism may even be an inevitable product of the democratic process.» (Deiwiks, 2009: 5)
14. «Populist attitudes are intrinsic to democracy. Thus, the abundance of successful populist movements in many countries of the developing world is not the result of a

- stronger set of attitudes among the public, but a reflection of a political context that makes populist appeals more sensible and more likely to be picked up by political entrepreneurs. » (Hawkins and Riding and Mudde, 2012: 24)
15. «Populism has had ambiguous relationships with democracy. On the one hand, it is a form of protest and resistance to modernization projects that in the name of supposedly universalistic and rationalist projects have excluded the poor and the non-whites, who have been portrayed as the incarnation of barbarism. Against exclusionary projects, populism has vindicated the worth of the poor and the excluded. Instead of being considered obstacles to progress, they are constructed as the essence of the nation.» (Torre, 2007: 394)
 16. «The surge of populism is a sign that a democratically elected regime is seen to be unresponsive to the demands of a certain segment of the population.» (Kessel, 2013: 2)
 17. «It no longer accommodates the system and does not measure efforts to achieve objectives that its agents have already lost hope of achieving. Therefore, populism is extremist and anti-systemic. To this extent it differs from what is simply popular and generally accepted by the population. A popular agent is moderate. A populist is a fundamentalist and capable of everything to achieve the objectives outlined – emphasis is on the excesses that are practiced. » (Sousa Galito, 2018: 58)
 18. «This populist bias of policy is greater when the value of remaining in office is higher for the politician; when there is greater polarization between the policy preferences of the median voter and right-wing special interests; when politicians are perceived as more likely to be corrupt; when there is an intermediate amount of noise in the information that voters receive; when politicians are more forward-looking; and when there is greater uncertainty about the type of the incumbent. We also show that soft term limits may exacerbate, rather than reduce, the populist bias of policies.» (Acemoglu and Egorov and Sonin, 2013: 771)
 19. «Populism is indeed a specter haunting democracy from which it is hard, perhaps impossible, to escape entirely in modern conditions of a consumption-driven society and a populist free press. Democracy itself, as Tocqueville realized, can have two aspects: individual liberties for all and equality before the law but also the ability of the state to mobilize and control the people *en masse*. But populism needs to be, and can be, kept in check by leaders earning public respect for the political processes of compromise by being willing and able to explain and justify them publicly, in reasonable and reasoning terms, and not, as so often, by practicing a glib, cynical and usually quite transparent populism.» (Crick, 2017: 632)
 20. «Conceptual confusion often stems from a lack of a sound definition. Yet, as this paper has argued, also when the term is defined more carefully, a ‘cat-dog problem’ remains. Many political actors are associated with populism, but not all of those seem to fit into the same category. An important reason for this is that populism can be used to refer to a particular discourse which can be expressed by any political actor as well as an ideological core feature of a delineated set of political parties. Observers are often not explicit about this distinction, and making this distinction becomes harder as political actors may also use populist rhetoric to different degrees (over time).» (Kessel, 2013: 24)
 21. «For too long, scholars working on the topic had retained a myopic focus on specific instances of populist politics, leading to overly broad and insufficiently substantiated generalizations about populism’s universal features. It is only recently that the phenomenon has come to be theorized more richly based on the aggregate of case-specific studies.» (Gidron and Bonikowski, 2013: 32)
 22. «Unfortunately, even if a clear definition is provided, conceptual problems arise when the concept of populism is applied to describe the characteristics of political actors, and political parties in particular. » (Kessel, 2013: 2)
 23. «Populism is a concept that is notoriously difficult to define, because its application varies widely across different countries, contexts, and historical time periods. The particular ideologies, strategies, and organizational structures of populist movements do not conform to a single mold or model. Indeed, what characterizes most populist movements is that their appeals are not necessarily programmatic, coherent, or consistent, but rather all-encompassing. » (Howard, 2000: 19)
 24. «As a social category the people were identified as *the plebs, el vulgo, the populace*, that is, as the lowest sectors of society defined in terms of their intellectual, cultural and socio-economic inferiority in relation to civilized society. This multitude, akin to *il popolo minuto* of medieval Italian towns, was constituted by the inhabitants of the urban slums, craftsmen, those performing menial jobs, the unemployed and those engaged in petty crime. With no formal education or political rights, this underclass erupted into political life as actors in sporadic uprisings and brutal and often unpredictable riots. Characteristically, these uprisings were perceived as events in which emotions and passions threatened not just public order but also the rationality and manners of civilized society that underpinned order. » (Panizza, 2005: 14-15)
 25. «With the democratization of political life there was a fundamental shift in the imagining of the people. Under democracy, the people came to be identified as the holders of sovereignty and the term became coextensive with the citizen. However, traces of the original image of the people as dangerous and irrational plebs still resonate in late modern politics, in an uneasy articulation with that of holders of democratic rights. Thus, the people of the populist imaginary can be both dangerous and noble. » (*Id. Ibid.*: 15)
 26. «The second core aspect of populism in the literature concerns the ‘people’s’ posture towards a perceived ‘other.’ This ‘other’ can be individual government representatives or the whole political elite, high finance and big business as well as immigrant workers from poor countries, etc. Sometimes the ‘other’ serves as reference point for the constitution of the ‘people’; the latter is then defined primarily in terms of what it is not. » (Deiwiks, 2009: 3)
 27. «(...) populism is conceived of as a Manichean view that sees politics as the struggle between the worthy people’s commonsense and the harmful, self-serving power elite—a view that is deeply suspicious of any constitutional restraints to the democratic principle and hence advocates for the absolute primacy of popular sovereignty.» (Anduiza and Rico, 2016: 2)
 28. «The anti-establishment, anti-elitist and nationalistic nature of populist discourse not only articulates a critique of a system that is in crisis or even in a state of moral panic, but also promises social regeneration, political integrity and egalitarian justice as solutions to inadequate political practices; all this under the auspices of a devoted, messianic and innovative leader, who will, above all, offer hope and dignity to the masses. » (Piramo, 2009: 17)
 29. «Such an attempt usually blames intermediary institutions for frustrating the will of the people. At various times, and, in various places, these intermediary and divisive institutions have appeared as the landlords, the bankers, the bureaucrats, the priests, the elite, the immigrants and, most popular of all for populists to denounce, the politicians.» (Crick, 2017: 626)
 30. «(...) because “the people” is a discursive elaboration of politicians, it is important to analyze who is included and who is excluded in these constructs. The category of “the people” is constructed by leaders who claim to embody it. This authoritarian appropriation the people and their values has had contradictory meanings. On the one hand populism has restored and valued the cultural worth of common people. But on the other, leaders have appropriated the meanings of the popular and tried to impose their versions of popular authenticity. » (Torre, 2007: 394)
 31. «Populists referring to the ‘people’ have two complementary objectives. First, they attempt to create a homogeneous, essentially undifferentiated community which deliberately excludes those not belonging, the ‘other’. The ‘people’s’ purported ho-

- mogeneity as well as that of the rejected group nevertheless stand in great contrast to the reality of more or less heterogeneous groups in society. » (Deiwiks, 2009: 2)
32. «Political representatives who say to talk in the name of the people in order to reclaim power to the people against the ruling elites (e.g. the king, the government), rely on myths about popular authority. (...) This is what I refer to as banal populism; the mythology of the people is constitutive for the everyday political communication between the representative elites and the people. » (Hellström, 2013: 5)
 33. «(...) populism and fascism can be seen as mutually exclusive ideologies. Fascists envision a totalitarian, hierarchically organized and organic state in which the people serve as mere parts of a larger whole. Populism, on the other hand, glorifies the ordinary people within the community, and not the state apparatus as such. Fascism, like other forms of right-wing extremism, is also anti-democratic. Populists, on the other hand, explicitly stress the desire for popular sovereignty and claim that the will of the people should be the ultimate source of legitimacy» (Kessel, 2014: 14)
 34. «Populist politics encourages direct channels for popular participation. The charismatic leader embodies the popular will in his or her persona. In this regard, the populist politician mobilizes voters along feelings of resentment, aiming to represent the common sense of the ordinary people vis-à-vis the political institutions and the established (indirect) ways of doing politics. The populist leader is both one of the people and their leader. » (Hellström, 2013: 9)
 35. «As a political figure who seeks to be at the same time one of the people and their leader, the populist leader appears as an ordinary person with extraordinary attributes. Successes in business or other private pursuits are used to legitimize the leader's political persona by showing that his or her qualities are both different to and more valuable than those of ordinary politicians. As an outsider who has 'made it', the leader's journey to political leadership is not different to that of ordinary people who, through their efforts and endeavors, made it to the top of society. » (Panizza, 2005: 21)
 36. «What holds true for all the different guises that populist leadership may take is that access to the political system is often gained in times of change or crisis, for these leaders are an expedient and transient political solution, able to either mobilize or appease the people. Once in power, they transform the political system to varying degrees and, if charismatic, become cult figures who inspire the masses.» (Piramo, 2009: 24)
 37. «For there to be a populist leader, there has to be a people – a widespread belief that at the social base of society there is a collective will and not simply a variety of individuals, interests or fragmented indifference. This is what, in the eighteenth century, Jean Jacques Rousseau believed, and also those members of the Jacobin club who put his bust upon their table. In the modern world populist orators commonly couple the sacred names of 'nation' and 'people'. Populists are impatient of procedures. The one procedure today that populists favor and demand is referendum, even when there is no constitutional provision or established precedent for such.» (Crick, 2017: 626)
 38. « The charismatic populist leader fascinates, mystifies and excites. Populist leaders etch their mark deeply and indelibly on the canvas of national and global history; often colorful and flamboyant, they are successful at forging a bond with their followers that rarely fails to include moral or religious overtones. Populist leaders affirm to be speaking for and with the people» (Piramo, 2009: 1)
 39. «(...) the populist politician is presented as an opportunist that suggests simple solutions to complex political issues. Populism is a term of abuse, used by its antagonists to present their own politics as genuine and long-term oriented. In this argumentative logic populist is something that mainstream politics is not. (...) The so-called populists share with the mainstream political culture the conviction that the legitimacy of democratic governance lies in the sovereign people. » (Hellström, 2013: 4)
 40. «(...) the three dominant approaches to populism scholarship: populism as a thin-centered ideology, as a form of political discourse, and as a political strategy. Whatever the substantive disagreements between these three theoretical camps, we strongly believe that their respective agendas could be furthered considerably by engaging in a more sustained study of the variation in populist politics. Using a variety of data sources and methods – whether qualitative or quantitative – future studies should strive to gain a better understanding of how and when the Manichean binary categories that form the core of populist claims-making are constructed by political actors.» (Gidron and Bonikowski, 2013: 32)
 41. «Defining populism as an ideology has particular implications for the way in which research on the topic is carried out. If populism is seen first and foremost as a bundle of ideas, it follows that empirical studies should primarily direct their attention to the programmatic statements made by political actors, treating the latter as the primary units of analysis. Most research in this tradition therefore focuses on party literature, either in the form of public manifestoes or internal party publications, in order to then classify the political actors who produce the literature (i.e., the parties or their leaders) as either populist or not.» (Gidron and Bonikowski, 2013: 7)
 42. «In theory, populism is an independent ideology, unattached to any particular other ideology. In practice, populism is almost always combined with one or more other ideological features. Which ideological features attach to populism depend upon the socio-political context within which the populist actors mobilize. Seen in this light, the rise and consolidation of populism is highly determined by national, regional, and historical circumstances, since the latter influence the shape of political ideologies, particularly when it comes to addressing "the people" living in a given territory in a particular point of time.» (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2011: 2)
 43. «The ideological ubiquity of populist discourse allows it to be embraced by angry voters regardless of their political orientation. As a thin ideology lacking any true programmatic content, populism necessarily appears attached to full-fledged host ideologies from any side on the left–right ideological spectrum. The core ideas of populism – the people, the elite, the general will – are vague enough to accommodate significantly different interpretations (...)» (Rico, Guinjoan and Anduiza, 2017: 449)
 44. «The characterization of populism as an ideology deserves attention. If by 'ideology' we mean a package of values that integrates the social, economic and political realm, then this is perhaps the weakest and the least popular interpretation of populism in the literature, given the widespread perception that the phenomenon in question almost lacks an ideology or that it is ideologically eclectic, imprecise or amorphous.» (Piramo, 2009: 15)
 45. «I have raised concerns regarding the justification of assigning populism's genus to ideology. (...) it is suggested that populism is better conceptualized as a discourse. » (Aslanidis, 2015: 14)
 46. «Frame analysis can reinvigorate populism theory into a quantitative direction in the same way it has fostered research in other scientific subdisciplines. A research program that operationalizes populism as a discursive frame can encourage comparative work, facilitate cooperation with neighboring fields, shed light on borderline cases of populism and enable the construction of large datasets to analyze systematically the impact of populism as an independent variable. Besides, the majority of existing quantitative approaches to populism already implicitly analyze populism as a discursive phenomenon, remaining indifferent towards ideological or other implications, as explained previously. Employing the populist frame as a coding unit in text analysis projects provides an improved analytical ground for empirical applications and enhances reliability and validity in measuring populism. » (*Id. Ibid.*: 13)
 47. Cf. *Id. Ibid.*: 1-2.

48. Cf. Bakker, Rooduijn and Schumacher, 2015: 5.
49. «Even though populist discourse and representation can have authoritarian elements, populism is lived as profoundly democratic. Populism mobilizes passions and incorporates those previously excluded. However, populist mobilization does not always respect the norms and institutions of liberal democracy because its norms and procedures are seen as impediments to the expression of the authentic and homogenous will of the people, which is in fact none other than that of the leader.» (Torre, 2007: 394)
50. «Populist practices emerge out of the failure of existing social and political institutions to confine and regulate political subjects into a relatively stable social order. It is the language of politics when there can be no politics as usual: a mode of identification characteristic of times of unsettlement and de-alignment, involving the radical redrawing of social borders along lines other than those that had previously structured society. It is a political appeal that seeks to change the terms of political discourse, articulate new social relations, redefine political frontiers and constitute new identities.» (Panizza, 2005: 9)
51. «(...) parties use populist discourse only to a certain degree or because populism is a feature of their leader's rhetoric but not so much of the party as a whole. A different, but potentially related, issue is that populism is not necessarily a key feature of political actors throughout time.» (Kessel, 2014: 13-14)
52. «'The politics of the future', said Napoleon Bonaparte, 'will be the art of stirring the masses.' He himself did quite well at that at the time. For he was the first ruler able to trust the common people with guns, and could therefore for the first time institute universal rather than selective military conscription, the *leve'e en masse*. He could do so because he could still invoke – dictator and then Emperor though he became – the spirit of the French Revolution, and use and augment the intense and popular nationalism it had created. 'A patriot', Robespierre had said, 'supports the Republic en masse; he who fights about details is a traitor. Everything that is not respect for the people and you [the Jacobin Convention or Assembly] is a traitor.' The Jacobins claimed to embody the will of the people.» (Crick, 2017: 627)
53. «It has been claimed that populist leaders manipulate their followers, blinding them to their true interests by a mixture of propaganda and charisma. And yet manipulation and ignorance are often in the eyes of the critic. As was suggested above, the other side of populism's depoliticization of the political is the hyper-politicization of social relations. Populism blurs the public-private dividing line and brings into the political realm both individual and collective desires that previously had no place in public life.» (Panizza, 2005: 24)
54. Is populism a political strategy? «In contrast to ideational and discursive approaches, some scholars advocate for an understanding of populism as a mode of political strategy. This approach, which is particularly prevalent among sociologists and political scientists working on Latin America, comprises three variants that focus on different aspects of political strategy: policy choices, political organization, and forms of mobilization. (...) Some have criticized this approach, arguing that policy-based definitions of populism cannot account for historical variation, as evidenced in the Latin American case (...) What matters here then is not the content of policies or the style of discourse employed by political actors, but rather the relationship of those actors toward their constituents.» (Gidron and Bonikowski, 2013: 10-11)
55. «Most of the existing research on the origins of populism as a mass phenomenon uses vote choice as the dependent variable, taking as a starting point some categorization of parties as populist and non-populist. Leaving aside the debates on how to classify parties as populists, individual populism in the analysis of vote choice is equated with support for populist parties. (...) First, the focus on party support forces an artificial dichotomization that leaves out differences of degree in the levels of populism in both the discourse of parties and the attitudes of their voters. (...) Second, by emphasizing vote choice the focus is placed on the analysis to electoral mobilization (...) However populist attitudes can manifest themselves in different ways, not restricted to support for populist parties (...) Third, given the chameleonic nature of populism, placing the focus on support for parties adopting so diverse ideological stances makes even more difficult the task to "separate populism from features that might regularly occur together with it, but are not part of it" (...) Ultimately, research on support for populist parties and research on populist attitudes address quite different questions, so one cannot serve as a surrogate for the other. By having populism as a defining characteristic of a given party, it is assumed that this component likely contributes to explain its electoral performance. Research on support for the populist radical right, for example, has often had populist attitudes (or some related construct, such as political trust) as an independent variable.» (Anduiza and Rico, 2016: 3-4)
56. «Contrary to populism as political strategy, populism as ideology is not clearly associated with a particular form of mobilization. While the personalistic leaders of the populist right also tend to adopt populism as an ideology, the ideological version of populism is not restricted to this type of political mobilization.» (Kriesi, 2015: 10)
57. «(...) when I quoted Beatrice Webb: 'Democracy is not the multiplication of ignorant opinions.' I got dozens of angry e-mails denouncing me as 'elitist', although almost an equal number praising me for courage. Not being a politician, it had not occurred to me that it was particularly courageous to draw a distinction between opinion and knowledge. Nor does it seem courageous to suggest that even 'democracy' needs some qualification or limitation, especially at a time when political leaders tend to speak in emotive 'sound bites' or slogans on a level seemingly set by the great diseducator of our times (certainly in Britain and the United States), the populist tabloid press.» (Crick, 2017: 628)
58. «While movements from the left may institutionalize in the form of parties (e.g. socialist, communist and ecologist parties) and interest groups (e.g. labor unions or environmental associations), movements from the right tend to take the form of parties from the very outset (...)» to differentiate themselves from the ones who they consider "incompatible with their traditional value-orientations". (Kriesi, 2015: 9-10)
59. «Political and economic crises do not necessarily lead to populist politics. (...) Populism is more than just a response to a political breakdown: it is an ingrained feature of the way in which politics is conducted, derived from the gap that exists between leaders and the led and the difficulties encountered by political organizations in mediating between them effectively. However, crises of representation open up the possibility of the emergence of modes of identification that seek to bridge the gap between representatives and the represented in the name of the people.» (Panizza, 2005: 14)
60. «Our analyses have shown that economic hardship matters for populist attitudes. While vulnerability and deprivation have modest effects, not present in all countries, sociotropic perceptions of the economy have important effects in all countries analyzed. Our results support the idea that it is not so much the objective economic situation that matters for the development of populist attitudes, but rather the perceptions that there is indeed a critical economic situation. Using an instrumental variable identification strategy we are able to show that there seems to be indeed a causal relationship between sociotropic perceptions and populist attitudes.» (Anduiza and Rico, 2016: 3-4)
61. «In the literature, there are many conditions said to promote the emergence of populism. I will discuss three aspects; first, poor socioeconomic conditions or other crises, which are recurring themes, especially concerning Latin America. Second, the opaqueness of political institutions is thought to be related to or even cause the emergence of populism. Third, charismatic leaders adopting a certain style and rhetoric seem to be characteristic for populist movements.» (Deiwiks, 2009: 3)

62. «Populist regimes have historically tried to deal with income inequality problems through the use of overly expansive macroeconomic policies. These policies, which have relied on deficit financing, generalized controls, and a disregard for basic economic equilibria, have almost unavoidably resulted in major macroeconomic crises that have ended up hurting the poorer segments of society.» (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1991: 1)
63. «(...) the economies in question feature high levels of inequality and sufficiently weak political institutions. These enable the rich elite (or a subset thereof) to have a disproportionate influence on politics. In fact, in many of these societies political corruption and political betrayal, where politicians use redistributive rhetoric but still end up choosing policies in line with the interests of the elite, are quite common.» (Acemoglu and Egorov and Sonin, 2013: 773)
64. «When voters fear that politicians may be influenced or corrupted by the rich elite, signals of integrity are valuable. As a consequence, an honest politician seeking reelection chooses “populist” policies – that is, policies to the left of the median voter – as a way of signaling that he is not beholden to the interests of the right. Politicians that are influenced by right-wing special interests respond by choosing moderate or even left-of-center policies.» (*Id. Ibid.:* 771)
65. «(...) populism is not to be understood as a quality confined to a precise set of allegedly populist parties. Rather, populist rhetoric can be adopted in different degrees by any actor, not only political parties and leaders but also journalists and voters – provided that their discourse complies with the minimal definition.» (Anduiza and Rico, 2016: 2)
66. «(...) populist politics are also linked to the emergence of forms of political representation outside traditional political institutions. The emergence of the radio as a form of mass communication was associated with the first wave of populist leaders in Latin America and elsewhere.» (Panizza, 2005: 13)
67. «The internet allows more freedom of expression than the politically correct daily life advocated by EU institutions or state institutions at national, regional or local levels. When citizens fear giving their opinion in a professional environment, they stop participating in demonstrations or fail to vote, they may seem harmless and go unnoticed by traditional polls. But if the revolt is installed, it spreads among individuals with common interests on social networks (Facebook, Instagram, Badoo, Google+, LinkedIn, My Space, Twitter, Tumblr, etc.) or through themed blogs.⁵¹ It is a type of passive resistance that can break at any moment, especially when a leader emerges strong enough to open the way to what the masses want, to defend them in the open. It is then that streets fill with enthusiasts and the system suddenly changes.» (Sousa Galito, 2018: 63)
68. «Association football is undoubtedly the leading spectator sport in the world and this role is confirmed throughout most of Latin America. (...) football culture varies markedly according to the economic, social, political and historical characteristics of a society. What is distinctive about Argentina is that sport and politics are inextricably linked. *Fútbol* is an extension of politics; it is part of the political system and anything that begins as a sports issue rapidly becomes politicized. Historically, there are grounds to claim that *fútbol* is the social model around which the political system has been constructed.» (Duke and Crolley, 2001: 93)
69. «In order to understand the causes of hooliganism as they manifest themselves in different national contexts, it is necessary to examine the social, political, and historical specificities of any given country. Contrary to other cases, hooliganism in Argentina is politically motivated. By examining the causes of hooliganism in Italy and Holland, it will become apparent that soccer-related violence in these countries remains apolitical.» (Paradiso, 2009: 68)
70. «It is ironic that the democratic organization of *fútbol* in Argentina is helping to perpetuate violence.» (Duke and Crolley, 2001: 115)
71. «Hitler also took advantage of the social and political role of sport. The strong, healthy, and athletic bodies of sportsmen were promoted by the Nazi propaganda system (...)» (Paradiso, 2009: 66)
72. «(...) humans tend to participate in group phenomena. They let themselves be dragged by the torrent, under the pressure of their friends or because they feel an affinity for a certain view of the world. Once organized, individuals form waves of discontent that, later, can turn into political tsunamis.» (Sousa Galito, 2018: 61-62)
73. «It is common practice during presidential elections at football clubs, for rival political opponents to stand as candidates and run campaigns against one another, thereby merging the structures of football and politics. In the past many businesses have decided to become involved in *fútbol*, not only for its potential for advertising but also so that businessmen (and the system involves exclusively men) could use *fútbol* as a stepping-stone to a political career. This remains true today. Involvement in the local club provided a positive image, shrewd politicians like to appear in touch with the people this way.» (Duke and Crolley, 2001: 101)
74. «With the anti-establishment message as a central characteristic of populist parties we expect that for populist party supporters the content, structure or symbols of this anti-establishment message should resonate with some personality trait.» (Bakker, Rooduijn and Schumacher, 2015: 5-6)
75. «(...) the sense of uncertainty that governs states of fear usually translates into increased vigilance, information search, and more attentive, systematic processing in judgment making, all in an effort to avoid harm and reduce uncertainty. Fearful individuals tend to favor conciliation, prevention, protection, and other risk-averse behaviors. (...) People who feel angry are thus more likely to attribute blame to others and judge others' actions as being unfair, while people who feel afraid are more likely to perceive negative events as being unpredictable and determined by circumstances beyond anyone's control. In that light, discrete emotions can color judgment. Therein lies the key to understanding their role in the activation of populist attitudes.» (Rico, Guinjoan and Anduiza, 2017: 447)
76. «(...) in its Manichean inclination to split society into two antagonistic camps, populism is inherently adversarial and polarizing, thereby providing a perfect fit for the action tendency of anger.» (*Id. Ibid.:* 449)
77. «It has been proven that emotions have an impact on elections. Political propaganda sells an illusion. (...) Populism creates a parallel reality, based on exaggerations and exacerbated emotions that infantilize and confuse the reader in order to influence their deliberation; not due to experience and logical reasoning, but to impulsiveness, instinct, pathological fear or chimera capable of reaching the impossible.» (Sousa Galito, 2018: 61-62)
78. «The marginalization of emotions and feelings in political sociology up to now is in a large degree the result of: (a) the stripping of the dimension of passion from the political because it was associated with romantic and utopian conceptions unrelated to the modern public sphere as well as because of the more or less instrumental and neutral-procedural conception of politics (...); (b) the supremacy of 'interest' as opposed to 'passion' as an explaining factor of political action (...) (c) (...) the context of which emotions are either conceived as irrational elements or taken as objective traits which do not affect the actor's, by definition, 'rational thinking' (...) (d) the mistreatment of emotions even in the political culture paradigm (...) due to the prevalence of quantitative methodologies according to which the effective dimension has been shrunken into a numeric item or variable.» (Demertzis, 2006: 103-104)
79. «The other side of the coin is that to the radical democrat, the ability and the willingness of the people to lead themselves and each other is a given fact, an assumption that is rarely questioned. History does not in practice support these premises, for horizontal forms of political organizations have not been prevalent in nation-states. Similarly, political philosophy from Aristotle and Plato to Freud and le Bon has not

placed much faith in the ability of 'the masses' to do without individual leadership. Moreover, there is substantial evidence of the pivotal role played by specific individuals who, at crucial historical moments, have been able to invigorate the people and trigger political change. » (Piramo, 2009: 30)

80. « The dichotomy of 'pueblo versus oligarchy' is often radicalized to 'good versus evil' resulting in a moral crusade with strong religious overtones, yet one that offers little faith in the likelihood of negotiation with the opposition. » (*Id. Ibid.*: 17)
81. « Despite the irrational and emotive elements that are undoubtedly present, there is also a great deal of rationality in the motivations of both leaders and followers in populist politics, if I may simplistically define rationality as thought or action motivated by the use of reason and logic. From the point of view of the follower, other than material rewards there are intangible offerings such as national (and possibly also personal) salvation, a sense of political identity, vindication of suffering at the hands of an exploitative ruling class, and self-esteem for being a participant rather than a victim of the political process.» (*Id. Ibid.*: 18)

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ANNEX 1

Populism: extremes committed in the name of the people or by the people. But what do *people* stand for?

Populism and Politics

Who are the enemies of the people?

It's a power struggle. But is it an Ideology?

Right wing: belligerent in the name of the people. Frontiers to defend Nation/State.

Left wing: people's revolt. How to be happy and a citizen of the world. No frontiers.

Populism and Economy

Rich *versus* poor people. Prodigality and public deficit.

Extreme positions about the market. In economy, what's useful and what's not?

Right wing: less State, more market to improve economy and increase number of jobs.

Left wing: less market and more State to employ and guarantee people's rights.

Populism and Labor Market

Activists fight for social justice and a fair distribution of resources.

Right wing: labor unions demand too much and don't let companies breathe.

Left wing: financial elite exploits people and labor unions are needed.

Populism and Sports

Hooliganism and overindulgence. Anything goes and winning at all costs?

The extremes of the game and a drive that can move millions of people.

Right wing: security first.

Left wing: freedom first.

Populism and Psychology

Leadership and passions.

How much can we push? The power of emotions and its extremes.

Right wing: too much emotions are dangerous and must be punished.

Lefts wing: emotions should be understood and may be adjusted.

Populism and Philosophy

Social expectations, corruption and betrayal.

What means to live in Society? What's right and what's wrong according to its leaders.

Right wing: focus on people's responsibilities.

Left wing: focus on people's rights.

Populism and Religion

Pure people against the impious.

Fundamentalism. Who is good and who is bad, according to God or Science.

Right wing: extremists defending themselves from evil (no faith or other religion).

Left wing: atheist extremists defending people from religion (evil).

ANNEX 2

CASE STUDY: POPULISM IN EUROPE VS. LATIN AMERICA

Authors conclude that comparing regions is a hard thing to do(1).

Based on their empirical studies and interpretations of reality, the resurface of Populism isn't explained by only one driving force in Europe and Latin America (2). In different continents and countries, the agenda may be different or the main appointed reasons explaining the phenomenon(3).

First of all, the *State of the Art* in Europe is led by political scientists or sociologists, while in Latin America is more focused on the works of historians and economists(4). If this is true, than the starting point is not common.

In Latin America, the populist speech can defend the native-Americans, but *the people* is usually equivalent to the "working class". The elite is represented by the "industrialists" or a foreign enemy (like the US, for instance).

In Europe the unsatisfied can be different groups like the "working class", the "peasants" or the "petit-bourgeois"(5). European populism has an anti-immigrant agenda(6) and has grown in periods of economic crisis.(7)

There is left-wing and wright-wing populism in both continents. But scholars seem to agree that left-wing populism is predominant in Latin America(8) and that wright-wing is stronger in Europe(9).

According to some authors, Populism in Latin America fights for inclusion (of the unsatisfied in society). In Europe is a way to exclude the unwanted (to protect the unsatisfied from invasion or outside forces)(10) and may be recent(11) or growing for circumstantial reasons (like terrorist attacks or mass migration/refugees).

Who are the populists of Latin America? The answer to this question may be a political statement. Still, there is some agreement, among specialists, over some names, like former President of Venezuela Hugo Chávez(12) or Alberto Fujimori in Peru(13). What about Europe? The French *Front National* is probably the most identified at this level. Also the Austrian *Freedom Party*, the Belgian *Flemish Interest* and the Italian *Lega Nord*(14). Sometimes, leaders are considered populists but not necessarily the party they represent (15) (or the political plan effectively implemented after elections).

NOTES

1. « Despite an ever-growing body of academic and nonacademic studies of populist leaders and movements in individual countries, much of this work is still limited to a small number of usual suspects (e.g., Peronism in Argentina, the Populist Party in the USA, or the National Front in France). Hence, even regional comparisons often suffer from significant blank spots, being overly influenced by developments in a few countries. At the same time, it is often hard to find regional patterns, given the many disparities among European and Latin American countries. For instance, despite the plethora of articles and books on populism in Europe, giving the impression that it is the dominant ideology throughout the continent, populist parties are relevant in only a minority of European countries. Moreover, European and Latin American countries differ from each other on so many levels – economic, political, social – that a cross-regional comparison is often seen as comparing apples and oranges.» (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2011: 1)
2. «Consequently, it seems impossible to reduce the debate about the (re) emergence of populism to one single driving force. Moreover, given that populism is widespread both in Europe and Latin America, it is plausible to think that its rise depends upon a set of different factors, some of which might be more influential in one regional context than in the other one.» (Kaltwasser, 2010: 19)
3. «The current efforts in the field of Latin American politics to define populism in strictly political terms, in contrast to the previous and broader conceptualization that included and emphasized the socioeconomic dimension, do little to clarify populism's political relationship to liberal democracy. The Western European, and particularly French, conceptualization of populism, which is also a strictly political one, contrasts populism with republicanism and its institutions. Therefore, while it is explicit in its negative normative assessment of populism's relation to democracy, it seems largely driven by a normative political agenda that analytically clouds the specifically representational aspect of populism.» (Ostiguy, 2001: 16)
4. « It is important to note that the literature on populism in Latin America is much older and more diverse than that on Europe; for example, it includes major works by economists and historians, whereas European work is almost exclusively by political scientists and, though less, sociologists. (...) Populism in Europe did not become a major concern of academic research until the 1990s; whether or not this is a reflection of the more recent emergence of (mass) populism in Europe is a matter in dispute. Within the past two decades the literature on European populism has exploded, easily overtaking that on populism in North and South America.» (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2011: 2)
5. «(...) the 'people' may indeed refer to a certain class or social base, which tends to be the case in left-wing populism. Peronists in Latin America defined the 'people' as the working class as opposed to the industrialists. Other examples include peasants in Russia or the 'petit-bourgeois' of the Poujadist movement in France. Developments in the recent past, however, made clear that not only left-wing but also right-wing populism draws on distinct social bases. (...) the Front National – as an example of the new radical right – was so successful in generating support from the working class (...) One can see clearly that the meaning of the term 'people' changes depending on the context. This is a reason why it is hard to define populism and it probably contributes to the difficulty in pinpointing commonalities between different instances of populism.» (Deiwiks, 2009: 2)
6. «Over the past decade, Western Europe has experienced a dramatic rise in anti-immigrant populism. Broadly speaking, there are three distinct indicators of this rise: (1) latent xenophobia and racism; (2) hostile or violent actions against foreigners; and (3) electoral mobilization. » (Howard, 2000: 20)
7. «Three factors are critical: the first is the increasing economic uncertainty in the new global economy; the second is the increasing influx of people from other countries and regions, especially after the war in the former Yugoslavia, and the possibility of even more immigrants after EU expansion to the east; and the third is the gradual erosion of the elite consensus between the major parties on the center-left and center-right of the political spectrum to isolate and exclude extremist parties.» (Howard, 2000: 21)
8. «(...) there is a consensus among scholars working on Latin American populism that it is predominantly left wing. For instance, two reviews of the different waves of Latin American populisms demonstrated that most of them are characterized by their egalitarian stance and their support for a growing state intervention in the economy» (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2011: 21)
9. «(...) European populism is predominantly right wing as a consequence of its link to nativism, whereas Latin American populism is chiefly left wing because of its close connection to "Americanismo." Consequently, in Europe populism is more inward oriented, fighting primarily internal enemies (e.g., ethnic minorities and immigrants), while in Latin America populism is more outward-oriented, fighting predominantly external enemies (e.g., foreign powers) and their local agents (e.g., the oligarchy).» (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2011: 23)
10. «(...) while most literature on Latin America speaks about the inclusive capacities of populism and virtually all literature on Europe emphasizes the exclusive character of populism, few authors are very clear about the exact nature of the inclusion/exclusion.» (*Id. Ibid.*: 23)
11. «While the emphasis of the populist radical right in Europe on excluding Muslims is relatively recent, and strongly related to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the idea of including the indigenous population is also a fairly new development within Latin American populism.» (*Id. Ibid.*)
12. «In recent years populism has become a buzzword around the globe. In Western Europe the rise of right-wing populist parties like the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) and the French National Front (FN) have led to a plethora of academic articles and books. In Latin America both neoliberal populists such as Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori, at the end of the 20th century, and the more recent socialist populists such as Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez, at the beginning of the 21st century, have given new impetus to

the study of populism in this region. Finally, in the United States the Tea Party movement and reactions to the economic recession have brought populism back to the center of political debate. » (*Id. Ibid.:* 30)

13. «(...) the party's expected lifespan is seen as dependent on the political lifespan of its founder-leader and organization at the local level is neither constantly manifest nor permanent. Berlusconi's Forza Italia is a case in point, as are the parties led by Alberto Fujimori in Peru, Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela or Thaksin Shinawatra in Thailand.

However, not all populist leaders have created their own personal parties. In the European context, some of these populist parties (e.g. the Lega or the SVP) are not personal, but rather 'personalized' parties – parties, where the leader plays an important role, but which are also highly organized at the grassroots level. » (Kriesi, 2015: 7)

14. Kessel, 2014: 10.

15. «While it can already be difficult to apply the concept of populism to political parties when they are perceived as unitary actors, it may become even

#10

COMER E PODER A ECONOMIA DA CULTURA EM MACAU

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RESUMO

Praticamente decorridas duas décadas desde a entrega de Macau à soberania da República Popular da China e do estabelecimento da Região Administrativa Especial (RAEM), o território apresenta-se na atualidade como um Centro Mundial de Turismo e Lazer. Toda a cidade pode ser entendida como um laboratório *biopolítico de consumo*, onde estará a ser testada a política oficial da China que alicerça a próxima etapa do crescimento económico nacional no consumo interno. Macau naturaliza assim um imaginário urbano correspondente ao do consumidor pós-socialista que procura o não-utilitário, como circuitos e bens de

luxo, e o público-alvo por excelência na concretização dos objetivos macroeconómicos nacionais e de sustentabilidade do capitalismo global.

Este projeto propõe, através de uma abordagem socio-antropológica, a articulação da comida enquanto património, com o turismo, a economia da cultura e a construção de identidades inseridas em processos políticos e económicos complexos, simultaneamente locais e globais, no espaço social e cultural de Macau. Recorrendo à etnografia institucional, pretende-se ainda investigar como as políticas e práticas contemporâneas de patrimonialização das artes culinárias se relacionam com a problemática mais geral da promoção turística direcionada para o consumo interno e com os projetos de carácter político, económico e ideológico em construção na RAEM.

PALAVRAS CHAVE Macau, China; patrimonialização; turismo; gastronomia; consumo; etnografia institucional.

INTRODUÇÃO

APRESENTAÇÃO DO ESTUDO DE CASO

Localizado no sul da China, no delta do rio das Pérolas, existe um lugar com características históricas, políticas, culturais e sociais singulares no mundo. Trata-se de Macau, um território administrado por Portugal desde o século XVI até 20 de dezembro de 1999, altura em que foi reintegrado na República Popular da China (RPC) e instituída a Região Administrativa Especial de Macau. A RAEM é um espaço autónomo, com órgãos de governo locais e leis próprias. Deverão manter-se independentes e inalterados, pelos 50 anos subsequentes, os sistemas legislativo, executivo e judicial, assim como, o social, o cultural e o económico em vigor durante a administração portuguesa. Este estatuto, à semelhança da vizinha Região Especial de Hong Kong, assenta no princípio de Deng Xiaoping “um país, dois sistemas”, segundo o qual foi elaborada a Lei Básica de Macau com carácter constitucional. Quando comparadas com outras

unidades administrativas da China, estas regiões especiais representam cidades com microeconomias e microsociedades com um importante papel a desempenhar na história contemporânea do país, sobretudo na concretização dos projetos do governo chinês de expansão e cooperação internacionais.

Macau apresenta, contudo, particularidades que a distinguem de Hong Kong nomeadamente, um sistema jurídico com uma longa tradição histórica, a manutenção do português – a par com o mandarim – como uma das suas línguas oficiais e a sua representação enquanto plataforma de serviços para a cooperação económica, comercial e cultural entre a China e os países lusófonos formalizada com a criação em 2003 do Fórum Macau que tem a missão de assessorar a ampliação dos laços comerciais e de investimento da China naqueles países. A maior das suas características distintivas será mesmo o facto de tratar-se do único lugar na China onde o jogo sempre foi legal durante a administração portuguesa e assim se manteve com a nova tomada de poder pelo governo local. Foi, no entanto, já com o novo regime em plenas funções que em 2002 foi decretada a liberalização deste mercado, atraindo para a região os gigantes de Las Vegas que ali fizeram erguer, por vários anos consecutivos a esta parte, a mais lucrativa indústria de jogo à escala global que já lhe valeu o título de capital mundial do jogo.

Toda a cidade pode hoje ser entendida como um “laboratório biopolítico de consumo” (Simpson 2014), onde está a ser testada a política oficial da China que alicerça a próxima etapa do crescimento económico nacional no consumo interno. Num território de pequenas dimensões, com fronteiras que controlam quem entra e quem sai, sendo a esmagadora maioria dos turistas proveniente da China continental e já previamente selecionada pela triagem do governo central que autoriza a atribuição de vistos individuais de viagem apenas aos residentes das províncias mais prósperas, fez nascer subitamente uma cidade protótipo de economia capitalista e de estética pós-moderna, internacional e sofisticada que a havia de transformar definitivamente na sua configuração física e social (Chu 2015). Para oferecer aos seus visitantes, Macau tem ainda um património cultural híbrido único em ambas as dimensões material e imaterial reconhecido pela UNESCO, em 2005 como Património da Humanidade e no

final de 2017, como Cidade Criativa da Gastronomia. Esta certificação internacional veio reforçar os discursos oficiais sobre a importância de Macau na bem-sucedida integração das culturas oriental e ocidental (Clayton 2009) e na promoção da região como um destino turístico de excelência e um lugar ideal para novas experiências em termos de mercado cultural.

Macau naturaliza assim um imaginário urbano correspondente ao do consumidor pós-socialista que procura o não-utilitário, como os circuitos e os bens de luxo, e o público-alvo por excelência na concretização dos objetivos macroeconómicos da RPC e da sustentabilidade do capitalismo global (e.g. Harvey 1989; Miller 1987, 1995, 2008; Zelizer 2013). Contudo e devido à preocupação de uma excessiva dependência da economia local nas receitas do jogo ambos os sectores, público e privado, têm procurado posicionar no mercado a marca “*Macau*” como um destino turístico mundial de cultura e de lazer (McKercher e Du Cros 2002). Incute-se ainda o forte estímulo ao “orgulho de pertença” junto da população local, intimamente associado a projetos de classificação do património imaterial de Macau, de modo a (re)inventar e a legitimar uma identidade para a ainda recente RAEM.

ESTADO DA ARTE

Os estudos da comida e dos hábitos alimentares constituem, desde há muito, objecto de interesse para as ciências sociais e, em particular, para a antropologia. Sem recuar muito no tempo, Lévi-Strauss (1965) e Douglas (1978 [1966]) deram importantes contribuições para uma abordagem estruturalista da alimentação ao postular que esta constitui um código através do qual se expressa o padrão das relações sociais. Por sua vez, Goody (1998a, 1998b) e Mintz (1985) estudaram a alimentação e a cozinha como parte integrante de sistemas económicos, sociais e culturais complexos.

Desde então, estes estudos passaram por um processo de ama-

durecimento ao longo do qual vieram a englobar uma diversidade enorme de problemáticas (para revisão da literatura sobre “Antropologia da Alimentação e da Cozinha” ver Mintz e Du Bois 2002). No seio destas problemáticas destacam-se as que relacionam o papel social e simbólico dos alimentos e da cozinha com a estruturação e reprodução das identidades de grupo (Belasco 2008, Pilcher 2006, Scholliers 2001), incluindo a sua memória colectiva (Sutton 2001). Como Anderson (2005) demonstrou, os sistemas de alimentação e a cozinha desempenham um papel crucial na criação de laços sociais e na reivindicação de pertença a determinados grupos – sejam eles castas, classes, religiões, etnias ou nações.

Como observa Poulain (2005 [2002]), a culinária e a alimentação são percorridas nas últimas décadas por dois movimentos: um, de “relocalização”, caracterizado pela valorização dos produtos locais; outro, de “deslocalização” ligado à globalização e à produção industrial de preparados. A comida, apesar de profundamente enraizada numa cultura local, está sujeita a mudanças rápidas na sua produção, distribuição e consumo que podem levar à alienação da sua origem popular, pelo que autores como Inglis e Gimlin (2009) preferem usar o termo “globalizações dos alimentos” para realçar estas dinâmicas.

Atualmente, tem sido dada especial atenção à construção sociopolítica da alimentação, principalmente em duas dimensões. Por um lado, investigam-se os processos através dos quais uma dada cozinha é identificada com uma colectividade cultural e se transforma em algo que é consubstancial à sua própria identidade. Por outro lado, assiste-se a um interesse político crescente, de inspiração nacionalista ou regionalista, pela cozinha, codificando-a, promovendo-a como mercadoria importante – em particular, no domínio da economia do turismo – e concebendo-a como património cultural. Como outros itens, práticas culiná-

rias antigas são transformadas num património que não só se quer preservar, mas promover enquanto conjunto de valores partilhados e de memórias colectivas que aumentam o potencial de identificação no presente.

O desenvolvimento transnacional das políticas de património é um processo antigo e está imbricado com o do nacionalismo e com as transformações associadas à industrialização, tidas como acarretando perdas irreversíveis para a humanidade (Lowenthal 1998). O processo de “codificação e revivalismo” de tradições e de consagração do passado conheceu o seu apogeu com a atividade reguladora da UNESCO, que dirige a construção universalista de um património cultural mundial, material e imaterial (Arizpe e Amescua 2013). O potencial do património cultural para atrair visitantes, gerando rendimento, reforçando as reivindicações políticas e incutindo autoestima nas comunidades é hoje cada vez mais reconhecido, não só a nível local ou nacional, mas também à escala global, sendo em grande medida influenciado por agências internacionais como a UNESCO.

Assiste-se hoje, em número crescente, ao reconhecimento institucional da UNESCO de “novas” categorias como as chamadas “tradições culinárias” em património cultural intangível da humanidade em vários países na Europa, Médio Oriente, América Latina e Ásia Oriental (Brulotte e Di Giovine 2014). Em paralelo com este fenómeno, verifica-se desenvolvimento exponencial de um outro mercado de bens de consumo mais sofisticado e cosmopolita, o do turismo gastronómico. O crescimento deste segmento de turismo provocou o aparecimento de novos destinos gastronómicos por todo o mundo – entre eles encontram-se os asiáticos, diversificou a oferta de produtos e criou um marketing estratégico para cada cozinha regional (Richards 2015).

OBJETIVOS DA INVESTIGAÇÃO

É objetivo deste projeto elaborar uma análise sócio-antropológica sobre as políticas públicas de património e a sua implementação institucional em Macau (e.g. Bortolotto 2013, Brumann e Berliner 2016), tais como a aplicação da recentemente aprovada e primeira lei para a classificação e salvaguarda do património cultural de Macau (Lei n.º 11/2013) e a criação do Conselho do Património Cultural; em articulação com as atividades promocionais para transformar Macau num Centro Mundial de Turismo e Lazer rumo a um desenvolvimento diversificado, concretamente no âmbito da gastronomia. Para tal, pretendo debruçar-me tanto sobre o papel das instituições e dos profissionais do património, como sobre o das associações locais enquanto entidades de salvaguarda da cozinha macaense e representantes das “comunidades patrimoniais” (Adell *et al.* 2015). Desta forma, vou procurar entender como estes atores sociais se relacionam com a economia política do património cultural de Macau – sobretudo com a sua faceta mais visível, a do turismo cultural moderno que será “uma forma de turismo assente na procura de um destino detentor de um património cultural e o transforma em produtos que podem ser consumidos pelos turistas” (McKercher e du Cros 2002: 6).

O presente programa de trabalhos pretende ainda investigar como os modos e as práticas contemporâneas de patrimonialização se relacionam com a problemática mais geral do património e com os projetos de carácter político, económico e ideológico de construção de uma identidade para a recente RAEM, serão eles: a *diferenciação* de Macau no âmbito da configuração mais ampla da República Popular da China em que se integra; as estratégias da promoção turística direcionada para o consumo interno; a sustentação e reinvenção social de comunidades patrimoniais, tal como a macaense.

METODOLOGIA

Como metodologia da investigação proponho a etnografia ao nível institucional (Smith 2005), ou seja, junto das entidades e dos profissionais responsáveis pela implementação das políticas públicas de turismo e património em Macau, assim como junto das entidades de salvaguarda do património, de modo a analisar como a linguagem e o conhecimento especializados ali produzidos vão sendo incorporados nas vidas sociais diárias dos indivíduos.

Sendo que conheço bem o terreno, devido às minhas pesquisas anteriores para a tese de doutoramento, e disponho de uma rede alargada de informantes-chave, será o momento para reativar estes contactos e através deles, chegar a outros informantes privilegiados dentro das instituições alvo para pesquisa empírica. Serão elas o Turismo de Macau, o Instituto Cultural e o Instituto de Formação Turística, no que diz respeito às instituições do governo de Macau que controlam os assuntos culturais, do turismo e respetiva educação e formação. Ao nível da estrutura associativa macaense, procurarei acompanhar o plano de atividades para a salvaguarda do património gastronómico junto da Confraria da Gastronomia Macaense e da Associação dos Macaenses. O plano de trabalhos deverá ser revisto e atualizado de modo a garantir maior detalhe em função da informação recolhida, da consulta ao material publicado nos sítios oficiais na internet e na imprensa social. A pesquisa bibliográfica em *continuum*, procurará fornecer uma definição e legitimação mais rigorosa do campo de análise e a formulação aprofundada das questões/hipóteses de trabalho e do enquadramento teórico do estudo de caso.

Os momentos de permanência em Macau para pesquisa etnográfica dividem-se três em períodos, o primeiro de 3 meses para um levantamento de dados e recolha documental exaustivos e os seguintes

de 1 a 2 meses cada para apuramento, revalidação dos dados e consolidação de conhecimentos. A investigação será desenvolvida sob a forma de trabalho de campo intensivo com observação participante, entrevistas aprofundadas e semidiretivas a 30 informantes-chave e recolha documental, tendo em vista a elaboração de diários de campo detalhados e outros registos de recolha e sistematização dos dados contendo informação empírica relevante.

A cada regresso ao SOCIUS/ISEG, trabalharei na análise e tratamento dos dados recolhidos, tendo em vista a preparação dos outputs do projeto (sob a forma de publicação de artigos científicos, volumes editados e livros). Como resultados esperados, ao nível das atividades académicas, para além da disseminação do trabalho em eventos científicos, pretendo ainda organizar um seminário internacional sobre a temática geral da política económica do património cultural.

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#11

MAPPING GENDER IN RESEARCH: THE CASE OF PORTUGAL CASE STUDY PLOTINA PROJECT

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Promoting gender balance and inclusion in research, innovation and training

ABSTRACT

The European Union's Horizon 2020 Project PLOTINA (Promoting gender balance and inclusion in research, innovation and training) envisages building an inclusive, diversified and supportive workplace where women and men can conduct excellent research. The overall objective of PLOTINA is to enable the implementation and assessment of self-tailored Gender Equality Plans (GEPs) in the Research Performing Organizations (RPOs) and its program has three objectives: preventing underutilization of qualified female researchers, improving decision making by addressing gender imbalances and incorporating the sex/ gender dimension variable in research.

The research "Mapping Gender in Research: the case of Portugal" is the Case Study developed by ISEG under the PLOTINA project. The goal of this Case Study is to map, by gender, the research in all scientific domains in Portugal during the last decade. The main databases and sources are: Web of Science, WoS; Portuguese Science Foundation (Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia FCT); Quadros de Pessoal (GEP-MTSS); European Union Research Projects (CORDIS - EU research projects under FP7 (2007-2013) and EU H2020 Projects). In most of these sources of data the detailed information by women and men is not available directly or indirectly. For example, the bibliographic database Web of Science Data (WoS), includes for the period 2006-2016, a total of 108,882 articles in English published by researchers affiliated to Portuguese Research Performing Organisations (RPOs) but no information of authors' gender. In order to accurately allocate the gender of authors an algorithm is applied under the current Case Study. Focusing on gender, the ongoing study will characterize in detail and for the first time in Portugal the research done (e.g. by RPOs, scientific areas, quality, dynamics, collaborative work). A new database will be built and made available for the research community. The modelling of scientific production and impact by male and female authors will provide new information about women in research and, also, contribute to put an end to some stereotypes about it.

KEYWORDS Gender; Research; Bibliometrics; Portugal; European Union.

INTRODUCTION

The goal of this ongoing Case Study under PLOTINA project, *Mapping Gender in Research: the case of Portugal* is to map, by gender, the research in all scientific domains in Portugal during the last decade. This research will contribute to:

- identify the real contribution of women in research and put an end to some stereotypes about it;
- increase the visibility of the research made by women incentivizing the attractiveness of new generations of women for research;
- show the collaborative patterns and networks established by women in the scientific communities in the different fields of research;
- provide a new open dataset about the research made in Portugal by women and men, to be used in the future by all the scientific community;
- provide Research Performing Organizations (RPOs) in Portugal of a new information source, namely the Universidade de Lisboa, the biggest University in Portugal, where ISEG belongs to;
- call the attention for the lack of information about gender in some crucial domains, the negative impact of it, and the urgent necessity to solve that absence of data.

The study of the Portuguese scientific production by gender is particularly relevant because:

- Portugal, compared with 11 other countries/regions(1) for the period 2011-2015 has the highest share of women as inventors (26%) and in the research population (49%) (Elsevier, 2017);
- Portugal compared with 11 other countries/regions(2) in 20 of 27 subjects (3) has the highest share of women among researchers(4), even in scientific domains where women are generally underrepresented (e.g. in Earth & Planetary Sciences 43% of the researchers are women); is the only country to have more than 60% of women among researchers in fields other than Nursing and Psychology (e.g. Pharmacology, Toxicology, & Pharmaceutics with 63% women). (Elsevier, 2017, p. 22);
- Women have higher level of education in many fields (European Commission, 2016);
- The proportion of top positions in the academic staff (about 25% in grade A

positions) contrasts with the scientific performance (European Commission, 2016).

LITERATURE ON GENDER STUDIES IN BIBLIOMETRICS

Despite the critics of bibliometric studies (Hicks et al. 2015) they are relevant sources to map by gender the research. The literature on gender bibliometrics is published among others in journals oriented for bibliometrics and research policy and evaluation (e.g. Scientometrics, Journal of Informetrics, Research Policy). A search in Web of Science WoS database (using 'gender*' and 'bibliometric*' as search topic) shows the exponential increase (Figure 1). The number of articles published until now in 2018 is 51.


Fig. 1: Number of Bibliometric Articles about Gender (1997-2017)

[Source: Web of Science]



Bibliometric research includes gender issues in two main sets of studies: one has gender themes as the core of the research; the other uses gender vari-

Fig. 2: Authorship by Gender in Social Sciences Single Authors,
Portugal (2007-2016)



	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
Female	54	102	85	130	166	146	111	138	363	412
Male	88	126	99	157	193	159	141	169	442	454
missi info	14	24	42	45	24	26	36	38	29	36
TOTAL	156	252	226	332	383	331	288	345	834	902

ables combined with others (e.g. institutions, fields of science) to explain or describe the science production and dynamic.

The focus of the present research is in the first group of studies, organized into the following typology:

- *Research Production, Performance and Impact*, which includes: scientific production, Research Performance and Evaluation, Academic rankings and personal and Institution evaluations; Academic careers advancement; Research funding; Publication practices; Citation analysis; Mentorship; Supervision; Fellowship training; Gender homophily; Matthew effect; Matilda Effect.
 - *Cooperation in Research* that comprises: Co-authorship; Scientific collaboration; Research collaboration; Intergroup International; Scholarly communication Inter-Institution Collaboration; Relation Academy-Industry
- Data mining and gender disambiguation methodologies*

There is a gap in the literature using large scale studies about research production, performance and impact by gender. One reason that contributes for that is because the large bibliographic databases like Web of Science (former Web of Knowledge) or Scopus do not provide information about the gender of the authors (Araújo & Fontainha, 2018, 2017a and 2017b). Handling this lack of data there are some few studies developed at a large scale (e.g. Elsevier 2017, Larevière et al. 2013). **Table 1** summarizes some of those studies. Larevière et al. (2013), study gender disparities in science in 30 countries based on 5,483,841 scientific outputs (research papers and review articles) using Web of Science (WoS) bibliographic database as source. Their global and cross-disciplinary bibliometric analysis concludes that male authors dominate the global scientific production, and also most of the disciplines including humanities. By country the disparity between male and female is higher in Saudi Arabia, Iran, Japan, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Cameroon, Qatar and Uzbekistan.

The report *Gender in the Global Research Landscape* (Elsevier, 2017) an-

alyzing the publications over two decades (1996-2015), in 12 countries and in 27 subject scientific areas has some similar conclusions of those found by Larevière et al. (2013) however others are different. These divergences illustrate how can results be affected by database source, gender disambiguation method, scientific field and period considered among other aspects. For example, for one country, Japan, the results are inverses: in Elsevier (2017) results women tend to author more papers on average than men, however, based on (Larevière et al. 2013) the disparity between male and female in terms of publication, being males in the predominant position, is one of the highest in the world. The two studies use author gender disambiguation methods based on first name of the author well documented in the supplementary materials. However, the database used by Elsevier (2017) is Scopus and Larevière et al. (2013) is based on WoS.

Paul-Hus et al (2015) analysing 1,059,939 scientific outputs indexed in Web of Science (WoS) data from Science, Social Science and Art and Humanities and published between 1973 and 2012 by authors affiliated to Russian institutions, conclude that in that country, where Mathematics and Physics correspond to a large part of research, female academics are underrepresented. Because the characteristics of Russian surnames, which contain gender-specific suffixes the authors' gender is directly possible to assign.

Abramo and co-authors, not represented in **Table 1**, using Italian large scale databases, have a large and consistent body of research by gender about scientific performance and productivity (Abramo et al 2015a, Abramo et al. 2009), research collaboration (Abramo et al. 2013) and academic career (Abramo et al. 2015b). The gender identification is made by them, matching the bibliometric databases with a list of researchers where the field gender is available.

SOME PRELIMINARY RESULTS

The study of the Portuguese case is based on WoS bibliographic database. In Social Sciences field the number of publications has an exponential increase as shown at **Appendix 1**. The cooperation among disciplines by gender was studied by Araújo and Fontainha (2017a) and different patterns were found.

Table 1: Large Bibliometric Studies and Gender Disambiguation

	Main Database	Sample Size	Period	Scientific Areas	Countries	Methodology Identification
Elsevier (2017)	Scopus		1996-2015 (1996-2000; 2011 –2015)	27 Subject Areas	12 countries/ regions	First name gender disambiguation
Larivière et al. (2013)	Web of Science WoS	5,483,841 scientific outputs	2008 and 2012	Several Scientific Domains	30 countries	First name gender disambiguation
Naldi,Luzi, Valente, & Parenti (2004)	WoS and other				Italy	First name gender disambiguation
Paul-Hus et al. (2015)	Web of Science WoS	1,059,939 Scientific outputs	1973-2012	Science, Social Science, Arts & Humanities	Russia	Russian Surnames differ by gender
Zhang et al. (2018)	Web of Science (WoS)	44,770 authors	1956–2014	Information Retrieval (subdomain in Computer Science)	na	

The preliminary descriptive results for articles with a single author show, for the period 2007-2016, similar evolution and level of scientific production by gender (Figure 2). Future research, for all scientific areas and all kind of authorship (multiple authorship) will be done.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND DISCLAIMER

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NOTES

1. Other countries and regions included in the analysis of Elsevier (2017): EU28, EUA, UK, Canada, Australia, France, Brazil, Japan, Denmark, Mexico and Chile.
2. *idem*.
3. The 27 Subjects belong to Life Sciences, Physical Sciences, Health Sciences, and Social Sciences & Humanities.
4. Researchers are defined based on the authorship of a scientific output.

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
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
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APPENDIX 1



	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
1 author	156	252	226	332	383	331	288	345	834	902
2 authors	163	353	333	516	556	593	606	587	878	1082
3 authors	107	250	263	378	490	594	656	701	1004	1228
4+ authors	169	312	380	544	633	830	1019	1216	1895	2210
Total	595	1167	1202	1770	2062	2348	2569	2849	4611	5422



#12

SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS AS A RESEARCH TECHNIQUE FOR THE STUDY OF A COMMUNITY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT-BASED MODEL: THE CASE OF SANTO ANTÃO ISLAND, CABO VERDE

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ABSTRACT

The impact of social structure and relations on economic actions and outcomes have already been emphasised long ago. Moreover, several authors also have highlighted the importance of social networks e.g., in the diffusion of sustainable agricultural practices, innovation's production, cluster's formation, natural resource governance, and in setting up rural livelihood strategies. However, only recently rural development has been regarded simultaneously as (1) being multi-sectoral and multi-agent, (2) embedded in specific local, regional and national contexts that cannot be ignored and (3) being a combination of mutually complementary top-down and bottom-up approaches. Consequently, this presentation follows the theoretical formulation that rural development is induced by a rural web composed by actors (individuals, institutions, enterprises, state agencies, social movements, etc.), resources (natural, human, and

immaterial e.g., as knowledge or markets), activities (of social, economic, political or cultural nature), and, most important, by the interrelations between them. Social Network Analysis (SNA) is a technique that allows (1) the analysis of social networks' structural properties and their impacts in social action, and (2) to understand what kind of flows (e.g., resources, economic transactions, information, knowledge) connect the different actors. Thus, using Santo Antão island as case-study, this presentation aims to show how SNA can be used to (1) understand the socioeconomic dynamics on the micro level that may be hampering and the ones that may foster, sustainable rural development in this island, (2) identify and characterize the local rural web, and (3) characterize a rural area's development path and its dynamic, i.e., how it is evolving, or regressing, and why.

KEYWORDS Rural development, rural web, social networks analysis (SNA), sustainable development, Cabo Verde

INTRODUCTION

With the arise of development economics as a discipline after the second World War, rural areas started to be perceived as having a subsidiary role in the development of less developed countries (Cardoso 1993;

Ellis & Biggs 2001; Meier 2005). At a time when the dominant development strategy consisted in giving priority to developing countries' industrialization (Chang 2008), rural areas' main role was to supply cheap labour, food, raw materials and to create a home market for domestically produced industrial products (Meier 2005; Kay 2010; OECD 2016). From the 1950s till the end of the 1960s - two decades characterized mainly by top-down planning strategies (Meier 2005) - rural development measures implemented to trigger economic development and social change, followed two different approaches: the improvement and the transformation approaches (Long 1977). While the former was focused in improving productivity within existing small farmers' production systems, the latter involved a radical break with existing systems, with the establishment of new settlement schemes, and new land tenure systems through

land reforms (*op. cit.*).

In the 1970s, the faith in a more equal, developed and prosperous world was strongly shaken mainly due to (1) the decreasing impact of industrialization on African countries' economic development since the previous decade, (2) an increase in poverty in poor countries with famines continuing to afflict rural populations, especially in Africa, and (3) development aid that was plummeting due to developed countries' economic crisis. Thus, the focus of international institutions, like the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and governments moved from income enhancement to tackling poverty, unemployment and inequality (OECD 2016).

Due to the persistence of poverty, hunger, and the anaemic economic development in developing countries, the 1980s brought back old insights to development policies with the neoclassical counter-revolution: globalization had gained a new impulse during the 1970s and free trade and global markets were pointed out as the solution for developing countries⁽¹⁾.

While in the 1990s and 2000s, developmental theories became more complex by trying to embrace issues like gender, empowerment, endogeneity, environmental concerns, quality of life, etc., in the 2000s rural development approaches promoted by the WB and IMF have been "manifestations of approaches implemented in previous decades" (*op. cit.*: 73).

In 2016, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) proposed a new paradigm aiming the sustainable development of developing countries' rural areas, which is based on real measures previously implemented in other countries – namely, the Republic of Korea, Côte d'Ivoire, Tanzania, Thailand, Vietnam and China -, previous approaches and theories on rural development, and the new rural paradigm for OECD countries presented in 2006. This new paradigm (1) being grounded in the linkages between rural and urban areas, (2) by recognizing women and governance capacity as, respectively, key players and principle in rural development, (3) being multi-sectoral and multi-agent, (4) by recognising the complementarity between top-

down and bottom-up approaches, and (5) by highlighting the importance of specific local, regional and national contexts (natural, economic, social, and institutional) was presented by the OECD as a fundamental tool to help reach the Sustainable Development Goals, promote an inclusive and sustainable economic growth, and, thus, improve overall welfare in developing countries (*op. cit.*).

However, this OECD's new paradigm resonates some of the ideas already presented in 2008 by a European multidisciplinary team of scholars. Their conclusion was that rural development cannot be driven solely through political intervention and its associated financial flows, but rather it is induced by a 'rural web' that is composed by actors, resources, activities (of social, economic, political or cultural nature), and, most important, by the interrelations between them. In other words, this rural web consists in a conglomeration of actor-networks (Ploeg & Marsden 2008).

It is important to stress here that many past studies had already highlighted the importance of actors' networks regarding socioeconomic development. For example, Mark Granovetter had long ago emphasised the impact of social structure and relations (in other words, 'networks') on economic actions and outcomes (Granovetter 1985). Moreover, several authors have already highlighted the importance of social networks e.g., in the diffusion of sustainable agricultural practices, innovation's production, cluster's formation, natural resource governance, and in setting up rural livelihood strategies (Murdoch 2000, Lugo-Morin 2011, Rockenbauch & Sakdapolrak 2017). And when specifically addressing rural development, Murdoch refers to networks as a third alternative that will allow to overcome dissatisfactions and limitations of previous strategies based on dichotomies such as 'state-market' and 'endogenous-exogenous' (Murdoch 2000).

Thus, the innovative character of the theoretical model of the 'rural web' does not rely in the recognition of social structures as the foundation from which all human practices immerse, or in the use of a network approach. Rather, its innovativeness resides in its holistic and dynamic view of rural spaces through

the identification of six interrelated dimensions that will allow to identify strengths, constraints, opportunities and challenges to, and the driving forces for local development. Local community networks constitute the backbone of this theoretical model.

Knowing that this theoretical model of the 'rural web' has already been applied in very different contexts such as Europe, Latin America and North Africa, this article explores its application to the specific case of Santo Antão island in the Republic of Cabo Verde. In fact, having in account (1) Cabo Verde's environmental constraints and fragility, (2) that poverty in Cabo Verde is mainly a rural phenomenon, and (3) the projection of a continuous and steady increase in country's population with its associated need of food availability, it is fundamental to understand the socioeconomic dynamics, and their associated networks on the micro level that may be hampering, and the ones that may foster sustainable rural development in Santo Antão island.

THE IMPORTANCE OF UNDERSTANDING NETWORKS

The study of networks has spread to many different sciences, e.g., computer science, communications, biology, sociology, and economics, each of them contributing with different insights of distinct networks (Dorogovtsev & Mendes 2013). More, the science of networks has become intrinsically interdisciplinary, thus using tools and techniques from these diverse disciplines (Jackson 2016). Not only the science of networks has been progressing rapidly but also many of the objects studied, i.e. "the real-world complex networks", not to mention the continuously growing of social networking services like Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram (Dorogovtsev & Mendes 2013: v).

The [Figure 1](#) shows the two different perspectives for the study of complex systems, namely the creation of structures or self-organization, and the unpredictability of complex systems' behaviour. The two colours help to illustrate the participation of the dominant perspective in the various disciplines, theories and models.

Arrows with double directions indicate reciprocal influences between related elements (Vianna de Araújo 2011). Although not recognized in a concise manner within economics, the mutual relationship between social networks and economics is included in [figure 1](#) and marked with red colour. From the perspective of sociology and economics, the importance of studying networks is due to the following three reasons (Jackson 2008): (1) many economic, political, and social interactions are shaped by the local structure of relationships, (2) all kinds of decisions people make (e.g., employment, voting, smoking, etc.) are embedded in their settings and are influenced by the social structure and, thus, understanding how networks are shaped and how they look like is very important to understand outcomes, and (3) pure interest in understanding social structure.

From the perspective of economics, one of the main reasons why studying networks is important is because human opinions and behaviours, which are shaped by social structure, generate positive and negative externalities (Jackson, Rogers & Zenou 2016). Generally, the welfare effects of externalities "on others are not fully taken into account by the decision maker, leading to choices that are inefficient for society", and, thus, for some actors in the network. Another "reason why understanding externalities is important is that they have consequences for policy" (Jackson, Rogers & Zenou 2016: 2-3). This process is briefly summarized in [figure 2](#).

The idea of network is behind another important concept, namely social capital concept. An important axiom of network research is that "a node's [\[actor's\]](#) position in a network determines in part the opportunities and constraints that it [she/he] encounters, and in this way plays an important role in a node's [\[actor's\]](#) outcomes" (Borgatti, Mehra, Brass & Labianca 2009: 894). Thus, an actor's willingness to invest in his own human capital or business is intimately related with her/his position in the network which directly influence the rate of return on investment. This extremely important relation between social capital and outcomes is represented in [figure 3](#).

Figure 1: The contribution of the different disciplines and theories to the study of networks under the scope of current research project.
 Source: Adapted from Vianna de Araújo 2011.




Figure 2: The relation between social structure, externalities and policy formulation.




Figure 3: The relation between social capital and outcomes.



However, it is important to mention here that until the 1990s the importance of social structure in economic activity was generally ignored by economists (Jackson, Rogers & Zenou 2016). The exponential interest on networks over the last two decades is due to three reasons (Jackson 2016: 1-2):

- As already mentioned, “to understand many economic behaviours (...) it is necessary to account for the patterns of interactions. Failing to include network structure can lead one to a deficient understanding of an observed behaviour and can lead to poor policy design”;
- The “increasingly well-understood features of networks” will allow a more accurate analysis of it and of their economic consequences;
 - The increasing availability of data and improvements in computer science to test and apply more sophisticated analytical models.

Network modelling and analysis in economics has already showed to be more than an ephemeral trend, thus it is expected that network analyses will continue to grow in economics (*op. cit.*).

SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS

Social network analysis (SNA) resulted from the interaction of many scholars from different disciplines (Prell 2015). The interest in studying social networks can be traced back to the 19th century when sociologists like Georg Simmel (1858-1918), Émile Durkheim (1858-1917), and Max Weber (1864-1920) “propagated the structural perspective in the study of human behaviour” (Yang, Keller & Zheng 2017: 22). Durkheim “argued that human societies were like biological systems in that they were made up of interrelated components”, and, thus, “the reasons for social regularities were to be found not in the intentions of individuals but in the structure of the social environments in which they were embedded” (Borgatti, Mehra, Brass & Labianca 2009: 892). However, the approach followed by Simmel contrasts deeply from the ones followed by Durkheim and Weber, by focusing his “attention on micro social interactions among individuals and small groups”, and “his work is still cited to-

day” (Prell 2015: 37-38). An economist that has influenced the study of SNA was Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923). In his book “Mind and Society”, Pareto “outlines a view of society that balanced the actions and abilities of individuals with opportunities and constraints of the larger class system” (*op. cit.*: 38).

However, the “scholar who is credited for laying the foundation for modern social network analysis is the psychiatrist Jacob Moreno” (Yang, Keller & Zheng 2017: 22) by making, in the 1930s, Durkheim’s “abstract social structure tangible” (Borgatti, Mehra, Brass & Labianca 2009: 892).

In the 1940s, the work on social networks started to incorporate the use of matrix algebra and graph theory, and in the following decade Manfred Kochen, a mathematician, and Sola Pool, a political scientist, “tackled what is known today as the small world problem”. Later in 1967 Stanley Milgram “tested their propositions empirically, leading to the now popular notion of six degrees of separation” (*op. cit.*: 892).

While in the 1960s the major contributions to SNA came from anthropology, in the next decade this tendency moved again to sociology. One of the seminal works produced in the 1970s belongs to Mark Granovetter by arguing that in strong ties the information exchanged between actors is redundant, while “weak ties (e.g., mere acquaintances) can easily be unconnected to the rest of one’s network, and therefore more likely to be sources of novel information” (*op. cit.*: 893).

SNA gain a new momentum in the 1990s with Robert D. Putnam’s work on social capital (Prell 2015). The concept of social capital also builds on the already mentioned *Strength of Weak Ties* theory developed by Granovetter, *i.e.*, “the idea that whom a person is connected to, and how these contacts are connected to each other, enable people to access resources that ultimately lead them to such things as better jobs and faster promotions” (Borgatti, Mehra, Brass & Labianca 2009: 893). The concepts of *bridging social capital* and *bonding social capital* introduced by Putnam “relates directly to particular network

Table 1: The seven components of territorial capital. Source: Milone & Ventura 2010.

Economic capital	Refers to the economic structure of a given territory and therefore includes activities and enterprises, infrastructure (economic infrastructure, such as transport infrastructure, and social infrastructure, such as hospitals), service supply network, and the financial resources available, within the territory, to economic actors.
Social capital	Covers all established social relationships that facilitate coordination and cooperation between individuals and collective parties and, therefore, represents the ability to act collectively. It also includes the bilateral and/or multilateral relationships that local actors have developed both inside and outside the territory, facilitated by a conducive atmosphere interaction, trust, sharing of behaviour models and values.
Cultural capital	It is the historical legacy, the presence of an artistic heritage, and historical and folk traditions.
Environmental capital	Is composed by all natural elements that exist in the territory, such as water, soil, flora, fauna, biodiversity, microclimates, etc. Through human action, these elements can be renewed, nourished, and enhanced but the opposite can also happen. Environmental capital also consists of the results of the interaction between man and nature, represented, for example, by farming areas and landscapes.
Human capital	Refers to the accumulated knowledge (contextual and consolidated), expertise, skills, values and techniques that form the basis of the territorial organization of production.
Institutional capital	Refers, (1) to the presence and a strong role of local institutions, a high level of interaction between local organizations and the development of synergies between them, (2) to the development of local negotiation and coalition models, and (3) the development of a mutual awareness within the local organizations that they are part of a common development project.
Symbolic capital	Can be defined as the group of symbols whose possession and use makes it possible to influence the action of other parties. Because each type of capital tends to manifest itself in the form of symbols, symbolic capital is formed by all the symbols produced by an entire society, in terms of both internal conception and external perception.

structures” presented for the first time by Granovetter: “bridging social capital constitutes weak ties and open network structures”, while “bonding social capital constitutes strong ties and dense network structures” (Prell 2015: 46).

Nowadays, SNA technique:

- “Comprises a broad approach to sociological analysis and a set of methodological techniques that aim to describe and explore patterns apparent in the social relationships that individuals and groups form with each other” (Scott 2017: 2);
- Permits the examination of social networks’ “structural properties and their implications for social action” (*op. cit.*: 2);
- Allows to understand what kind of flows (e.g., resources, economic transactions, political conflicts, information, knowledge) connect the different actors (Rockenbauch & Sakdapolrak 2017, Scott 2017).

Graph theory has served as mathematical foundation for many concepts in SNA, e.g., to identify and measure structural and relational properties of social networks. SNA allows different levels of analysis (Prell 2015):

- It looks to individual actors in complete networks, helping to answer questions such as “who is important to that network?”, “who makes things happen in the network?”, “who holds the network together in times of distress?”, or “why some actors have more advantages (e.g., resources or money) than others?”;
- Study the personal, immediate networks surrounding an actor, i.e., ego-networks;
- Dyad and triad levels. A dyad is composed by a pair of actors and the link between them. Dyad studies “look at how ties are initiated and continued as well as terminated; what kind of resources get exchanged between pairs of actors; reciprocity; and the strength of tie” (*op. cit.*, 134). A triad is composed by three actors and all the connections between them. Triads are “basically seen as being composed of different kinds of dyads” (*op. cit.*,

140);

- Subgroups level which consist in “an area of a network larger than a dyad or triad yet smaller than an entire network” (*op. cit.*: 151);
- Entire network.

THE THEORETICAL MODEL OF THE ‘RURAL WEB’

In 2008, aiming to answer to the need of a theoretical framework for rural development, a model was identified and characterized under the ETUDE (Enlarging The Understanding of rural Development in Europe) programme, conducted within the 6th Framework Programme of the European Union. A multidisciplinary team of scholars joined with the aim “to tie together the many recent and significant achievements in practice, theory and policy in order to outline a comprehensive theory on rural development” (Ploeg & Marsden 2008: 1). The theoretical model was built through an empirical multi-case study composed by 63 rural regions divided among sixteen different European countries(2). The theoretical model for the analysis of the ‘rural web’ is showed in figure 4 and emerges from the intersection of the six theoretical dimensions summarized in table 1.

More, the rural web’s characteristics can be summarized as follows: (1) because it consists of a conglomerate of actor-networks it is multi-layered, (2) it is multilevel, i.e. it spreads from the local to the regional and national levels and, thus, can influence its linkages with higher levels of aggregation, (3) it is multi-actor, because it involves many actors such as individuals, institutions, enterprises, state agencies and social movements, (4) it differs from one region to another, (5) it is dynamic, meaning that the rural web can evolve or regress over time, and (6) when supported with the right policies the rural web becomes a tool to increase competitiveness and the quality of life in the rural area.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Situated about 455 km offshore of Dakar, Senegal, the Republic of Cabo Verde is composed by 10 islands, of which 9 are inhabited, and 8 islets. Considered as “an island extension of the arid Sahel zone” (Costa 2016:19), the country belongs to the group of territories composing the world’s drylands, sharing with them the problems that characterize these regions: soil erosion and desertification; loss of fertile soil; and the increasing pressures that are being put on land and water resources due to climate change, population growth and changing consumption patterns (Costa 2016). Hence, climate, and soil and water scarcity, in conjunction with inadequate crops and processes of production, are responsible (1) for the high vulnerability of agricultural production which, in Cabo Verde, absolutely depends on rainfall regime (MAAP 2004a), and (2) for turning poverty(3) in a structural problem of Cape Verdean society (Baptista et al. 2015).

Of the nine inhabited islands, only five have favourable climatic characteristics for agricultural production: Santo Antão, São Nicolau, Santiago, Fogo and Brava (Langworthy & Finan 1997). Here, natural conditions, although deficient, allow levels of agricultural production capable to support the export of some agricultural products, such as coffee and wine produced on the steep slopes of Fogo’s volcano, and Santo Antão’s rum produced from local sugarcane. In the most arid islands, São Vicente, Boavista and Maio, farming is possible only along the few existing water lines (*ribieras*) forming, what has been called, “oasian agroecosystems” (Alexandre 2017: 196).

If mass tourism with its huge resorts located along white sandy beaches with warm transparent waters became recently the brand image of the country, this type of tourism exists only in two of Cabo Verde’s most arid and sandy islands, namely Sal and Boa Vista. In contrast, Santo Antão’s shore line is characterized by high steep slopes, with the deep and narrow valleys ending up in small coves paved with black sand. Thus, the island offers completely different tourist products: nature and culture-based tourism, adventure sports, and agri-

and rural tourism.

But the choice of Santo Antão for this study was based in more reasons, namely: (1) a diversified local economy based on agriculture, livestock, fisheries, forestry, mining, tourism and services; (2) Santo Antão is the country’s third island with the lowest GDP per capita; (3) the fact of being one of the few islands with favourable natural conditions to agricultural production in a country highly dependent on food imports; (4) its peripheral positioning within the archipelago; (5) the social and economic linkages with Mindelo, the second most important city in Cabo Verde, located in São Vicente, the nearest island to Santo Antão; (6) the fact that its population remains young; and (7) a high rate of literacy, particularly among the age group of 15-24.

The research methodology is divided in two phases:

The 1st phase will consist of Santo Antão’s characterization through the analysis of its territorial capital which is composed by seven components (Milone & Ventura 2010): economic, social, cultural, environmental, human, institutional and symbolic capitals. A definition of each of these seven types of capital is briefly described in [table 2](#).


Other relevant statistics and information for territory’s characterization will be used, such as:

- Demographic indicators, e.g., number of inhabitants; population density; age structure; ageing index; rate of net migration; demographic balance immigration-emigration;
- Mobility indicators, e.g., road networks; public transportation; maritime connections; number of vehicles by type; networks.
- Access to water, energy, sewage and solid waste public service.

A 2nd research phase will consist in using a SNA approach to identify and characterize:

- Urban-rural relationships at economic and social levels;
- Ego-networks, with a special emphasis to dyad and triad relations;

Figure 4: The theoretical model of the rural web. Source: Ploeg & Marsden 2008



- Subgroups of actors on rural, island and regional level.

CONCLUSIONS

Sustainable rural development is neither a process that needs to be invented nor an exogenous model to be implemented in rural areas. The implementation of socio-economic development of rural areas depends only on (1) the establishment of systematic socio-economic relations capable of mobilizing the available capital in the area concerned and of interconnecting the six dimensions of the rural network, and (2) the design and implementation of rural development policies that recognize, support and enhance these relations. The result of such approach of recognition, characterization, support and empowerment of these local systematic relationships will be the multidimensional sustainability of each specific rural area.

The use of this approach in Santo Antão's rural areas will help to (1) characterize the territorial capital in which rural communities are embedded in, (2) identify and characterize existing social and economic networks, i.e. who are the actors involved, how are they connected, what is the nature and strength of actors' relations, (3) identify relations of power and how agency is expressed, and (4) characterize connection patterns between places, and, particularly, rural-urban connections. This study will also allow to identify and understand the strengths and weaknesses of Santo Antão's rural areas, the factors that are hampering rural development, and how to foster this development.

NOTES

- 1.Chang argues that when promoting free trade and markets in developing countries, the international institutions (IMF and WB) were implementing a completely different set of developmental economic measures from those adopted by Western developed countries since the end of the eighteenth century till the first world war. Therefore, what the developed countries were doing was 'kicking away the ladder' of development from developing countries (Chang 2008).
- 2.Spain, UK, Italy, Germany, Sweden, The Netherlands, Finland; Norway, Switzerland, Slovakia, Hungary, Latvia, Czech Republic, Portugal, Estonia and Belgium.
- 3.Over the last decades, poverty in Cabo Verde, while registering a steady decrease, has been eminently a rural phenomenon (INE 2009, Cabo Verde Government 2012).

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#13

VALORES DOS ESTUDANTES DE ECONOMIA: UMA INVESTIGAÇÃO EM CURSO

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VALORES DOS ESTUDANTES DE ECONOMIA: UMA INVESTIGAÇÃO EM CURSO

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RESUMO

Esta apresentação visa identificar um grupo de especificidades dos valores, atitudes e comportamentos de diversos grupos sociais. Está baseada, de forma mais imediata, num inquérito efetuado em Dezembro de 2016, relativo a uma amostra de 600 indivíduos, adultos e habitando na Grande Lisboa, os quais se encontram estratificados por sexo, idade e habilitações literárias.

Os resultados atinentes a esta amostra foram depois confrontados com os que tinham sido anteriormente obtidos quanto a vários outros

grupos também inquiridos, nomeadamente estudantes universitários de economia (ISEG), população em geral e estudantes de outras disciplinas e outras escolas. Estes inquéritos anteriores referem-se aos anos de 2006, 2009 e 2012.

Mais recentemente, durante o ano letivo de 2016/7 o inquérito foi de novo lançado, quer entre os estudantes de economia (ISEG), quer em várias outras escolas, permitindo um acompanhamento da evolução da perceção pública duma vasta série de questões. Diversos aspetos específicos aos estudantes de economia são facilmente assinaláveis.

ANÁLISE

O primeiro traço a destacar é o da consistente inclinação dos estudantes de economia pela regulação económica através do mercado, por oposição sobretudo à regulação pelo estado. Em estudos anteriores este padrão, aliás já assinalado em vasta literatura internacional, tinha sido identificado por nós com clareza também quanto ao caso português, e considerando a população iseguiana, a qual foi tomada como genericamente representativa dos estudantes de economia (ver quanto a isto, Graça, Lopes e Correia, 2014 e 2016; Graça, Caiado e Correia, no prelo). Por comparação com os estudantes de economia, a população em geral ('civis' ou '*commoners*') tinha-se mostrado bem mais 'estatista'; mas mais 'estatistas' ainda se tinham revelado os estudantes de outros cursos e outras escolas.

Nos dados mais recentes, reconheça-se, este mapeamento geral permanece válido; mas deve notar-se também agora uma clara tendência convergente: os 'civis' estão algo menos estatistas, ao passo que os estudantes de economia se revelam muito menos entusiasticamente *free-marketeer*: as percentagens a favor de maior intervenção económica estatal descem ligeiramente de 52.3 (em 2006) para 49.8 (em 2016) entre os 'civis', mas sobem

entretanto de forma muito significativa, de 26.4 (2006) para 38.5 (2012) e 44.2 (2016/17), entre os estudantes de economia.

Por outro lado, adento dos 'outros estudantes' foram facilmente identificados padrões muito diversificados no estudo de 2016/17. De 60.3 por cento favoráveis a maior intervenção económica estatal em 2009 passámos a valores que continuam muito próximos dos 60 por cento para um grande bloco de cinco escolas onde se incluem: Arquitetura (58.6), Agronomia e Veterinária (58.8), Belas Artes (59.3) e Letras (62 por cento); mas observa-se entretanto um valor excepcionalmente elevado de 75 por cento para os estudantes de Tecnologias da Saúde (ESTESL).


Quanto à dimensão seguinte da análise, relativa à perceção de si próprio ao longo dum eixo esquerda-direita (desde 1, 'extrema-esquerda', até 9 para 'extrema direita'), continua a observar-se uma elevadíssima frequência nos valores do centro (sobretudo 5) no caso dos 'civis', os quais parecem genericamente estar agora ainda mais 'centrados', passando dum valor médio de 4.71 em 2006 para um outro de 4.97 em 2016.

Já os estudantes de economia continuam maioritariamente à direita, com valores de 5.3 em 2006, 5.51 em 2012 e muito perto de 5.35 em 2016/17. Todavia, e como ressalva importante a este mapeamento genérico, acrescenta-se que, se em geral os 'outros estudantes' permanecem maioritariamente à esquerda, o padrão dos economistas é entretanto agora praticamente o mesmo que o dos agrónomos e dos veterinários, com todos estes cursos de pendor 'tecnológico' a registarem valores entre 5.3 e 5.4.

Na verdade, os outros estudantes passam de 4.58 em 2009 para 4.77 em 2016/17. Por conseguinte, continuam em média ligeiramente à esquerda dos 'civis', mas convergindo com eles. Acima de tudo, porém, destaca-se a existência de grupos com atitudes muitíssimo diversas, consoantes as escolas.

Três grupos de escolas são facilmente identificáveis quanto a esta dimensão: Agronomia e Veterinária estão muito próximos do ISEG ou mesmo ligeiramente à direita deste, com um valor médio de 5.37; Arquitetura e Tecnologias da Saúde registam valores na vizinhança de 4.9/5.0, isto é, na prática muito perto dos valores observados também para os 'civis', ao passo que Le-

Figura 1




tras e Belas Artes, com um vincado pendor esquerdizante, têm marcas de 4.2/4.3. (ver Figura 5).

Quanto ao interesse pela política, tínhamos já antes registado que os estudantes de economia divergiam dos 'civis' no sentido de um maior interesse, ao passo que os 'outros estudantes' revelavam, em média, menos interesse que a população em geral. Para os 'civis' de 2006 tínhamos quanto a essa dimensão obtido uma média de 2.3 (numa escala de 1 a 5), ao passo que os 'outros estudantes' de 2009 registavam 1.98. Já os economistas aferiam 2.78 em 2006 e 2.88 em 2012.

Em 2016 temos, para os 'civis', um valor médio de 2.44; para os economistas 2.81; e para os 'outros estudantes', enfim, 2.47. Por conseguinte, os economistas continuam marcadamente mais interessados do que os restantes grupos (acima de 2.8 em todos os três anos em que foram inquiridos), mas entretanto os outros estudantes convergem obviamente com a população em geral.

Figura 2

Estudantes 2016/17




	Commoners 2006	Economics students 2006	Other students 2009	Economics students 2012	Total
More state	52.27%	26.35%	60.25%	38.50%	42.05%
More market	28.79%	63.17%	27.05%	54.58%	46.84%
More 3rd sector	18.94%	10.48%	12.70%	6.92%	11.11%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%

Pearson $\chi^2(6) = 135.31^*$

Tabela 1

Figura 3



Esta convergência dos 'outros estudantes' com os 'civis' fica aparentemente a dever-se em parte à inclusão no estudo de escolas com um valor médio de interesse pela política tão ou mais elevado do que o observável para os 'economistas'. Referimo-nos em particular à Faculdade de Letras, cuja população estudantil averba a marca mais elevada nesta matéria, acima mesmo da população iseguiiana.

Os valores médios, por escolas ou grupos de escolas, são os seguintes: Letras 2.97; ISEG 2.81; Belas Artes 2.5; ESTESL 2.33; Arquitetura 2.29; Agronomia e Veterinária 2.11 (ver Figura 7, infra).

Uma outra dimensão identificada na literatura anterior era a qual foi aferida através do seu grau declarado de tolerância para com as práticas de evasão fiscal, solicitação de benefícios sociais a que não se tem direito, suborno, uso de transportes públicos sem pagar bilhete, deitar lixo na rua, condução em excesso de velocidade e condução sob o efeito de álcool. Quanto a isso, os 'economistas' registavam valores médios de 1.61 em 2006 e 1.63 em 2012 (tolerância medida, de novo, numa escala de 1 a 5), ao passo que os 'civis' de 2006 marcavam 1.18 e os 'outros estudantes' de 2009 averbavam em média 1.46.

Estas variações na inclinação *free-riding* acompanhavam aliás de perto as variações também no interesse pela política: médio nos 'civis', com valor de 2.4 em 2006; menor entre os 'outros estudantes' com 1.98 em 2009; maior entre os 'economistas', com 2.78 em 2006 e 2.88 em 2012 (ver Figura 8, em particular o quadrado inferior direito, para os valores médios de propensão *free-riding*).

Adentro da genérica propensão *free-rider* foi distinguida por nós em estudos anteriores (Graça, Caiado e Correia, no prelo) uma inclinação para o *free-riding* 'público', ou seja, sem lesão direta a outrem, o que corresponde grosso modo às dimensões relativas a fraude fiscal, reclamação abusiva de benefícios e não-pagamento de transportes públicos, e uma outra de *free-riding* 'privado', onde essa lesão é explícita e direta, o que corresponde às 4 outras variáveis consideradas.

Quanto a isto, o grupo dos 'outros estudantes', que em geral registava uma propensão intermédia, aproximava-se dos 'civis' relativamente a *free-riding* 'privado', mas ficava mais perto dos economistas quanto a aspetos de *free-riding* 'público' (ver Figura 9).

Nos dados de 2016/17 há elementos novos de significativa importância, a inclinação *free-riding* dos vários grupos parecendo tender a convergir para um ponto intermédio, próximo dos 1.45: os 'economistas' descem de 1.61 e 1.63 para 1.49; os 'outros estudantes' passam de 1.46 para 1.43; os 'civis' sobem marcadamente de 1.18 para 1.44.

Os estudantes iseguianos continuam, portanto, à frente de todos os demais grupos em matéria de inclinação *free-rider*, mas a sua diferença específica esbateu-se de forma muito significativa, afigurando-se nos estar em decurso, também quanto a isto, um processo de convergência dos vários grupos para uma posição intermédia. De entre as 7 dimensões consideradas, os 'economistas' ocupam a primeira posição em 4 casos, mas só quanto ao aspeto da tolerância para com a ultrapassagem de limites de velocidade a sua atitude parece significativamente diferente da dos demais grupos (ver Figura 10). As razões destas tendências evolutivas constituem objeto para investigações subsequentes.




Figura 4

Figura 5




Figura 6





Figura 7






Figura 8

Figura 9





Figura 10



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#14

DOES PRIVATISATION AFFECT INDUSTRIES AND FIRMS' CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN EUROPE?

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DOES PRIVATISATION AFFECT INDUSTRIES AND FIRMS' CAPITAL STRUCTURE IN EUROPE?

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ABSTRACT

Over the past decades, there has been a trend towards privatisations in Europe. However, very little has been published in the literature on Finance on the effects of privatisation on industries and firms' capital structure. Using a large sample of privatised firms, this paper analyses the impact of privatisations on firms' capital structure. Our results suggest that there is no evidence that privatisation impacts on firms' capital structure, mainly because the level of leverage is similar a few years

after privatisation. These results remain unaltered even after controlling for characteristics of privatisations, such as the type (asset sale or share issue) and percentage of privatisation. However, additional tests reveal that industry specificities are relevant to explain capital structure variations following privatisations. When considering industry specific characteristics, we found substantial statistical evidence that firms in capital intensive industries have a greater level of leveraged after being privatised.

KEYWORDS Capital Structure; Industry; Privatisation

JEL CLASSIFICATION G32; L33

INTRODUCTION

Over the last decades, a trend of privatisations has emerged and has become consolidated across Europe. Privatisation corresponds to the process of transferring full or partial firm ownership from a government organisation to a privately-owned entity. In Europe, privatisations were carried out for three main reasons (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988): i) a contribution to reducing the public deficit through the income generated by the sale of the privatised firms; ii) the increased efficiency of privatised firms; iii) increased opportunities for the redistribution of income and wealth, as privatisation opened the way to an easier access to capital markets.

As the ownership of the company changes during the process of privatisation, there has been some research on the relationship between privatisation events and firms' capital structure. Most authors (e.g., Boubakri and Cosset, 1998; Arcas and Bachiller, 2008; Chahyadi, 2008) found that after privatisation, leverage ratios tend to decrease. Traditionally, state-owned firms (SOE) have higher levels of leverage because their only access to equity is through retained earnings and capital injections from the government (Ferreira, 2012).

As governments face fiscal constraints, the need for capital injections and investment in these firms creates the incentive for SOE to raise debt, rather than equity.

However, there is a lack of research on the effect of industry characteristics on firms' capital structure decisions following privatisation. Hall et al. (2000) studied the relationship between the determinants of capital structure for small and medium firms from the UK and industry effects, as well as how these determinants' effect on long and short-term debt differs across industries (MacKay et al., 2005). However, the authors did not analyse the impact of privatisations on such decisions.

Our paper analyses the impact of privatisation on firms' capital structure. We collected a panel data of 60 privatised firms from 18 European countries in 6 industries. These firms had been privatised from 2009 to 2013, and the financial data collected cover a period of 2006 to 2015, with a total of 529 observations. The list of privatised firms was taken from the Privatisation Barometer database.

In order to analyse whether privatisation affected the capital structure of these firms, we measured the leverage of the firm for each year of our sample (2006-2015). This cover, for each firm, the period before and after privatisation. In this way, using a difference-in-difference regression, we were able to examine whether privatisation changed the level of leverage and if there are differences at industry level, and we were also able to control for some potential endogeneity. Our Research Question therefore is: "How do different industry characteristics affect capital structure decisions, after privatisation"?

Following this research, we established four hypotheses:

- *Proposition 1: The level of leverage decreases after privatisation.*
- *Hypothesis 2: The decrease in the level of leverage after privatisation is higher for fully-privatised firms.*
- *Proposition 3: The decrease in the level of leverage after privatisation is less-significant for firms in industries in those industries that are more cor-*

related with business cycles - Construction and Trade (retail).

- *Proposition 4: The decrease in the level of leverage after privatisation is lower for firms in capital-intensive industries.*

We found little evidence that privatisation reduces the level of leverage of firms. These results persist, even after controlling for characteristics of privatisations, such as type (asset sale or share issue) and percentage of privatisation. However, there is some evidence that the effect of privatisation on leverage is different when we look at the level of industry, which suggests that the potential effect of privatisations on firms' level of leverage is industry-specific.

Furthermore, results suggest that capital intensity of these firms amplify the effect of privatisations on the level of leverage. That is to say, given the level of capital intensity, the effect on the firm's level of leverage in industries such as Finance, Transportation and Telecommunications are about two times higher than if their capital intensity is not considered.

This paper makes a contribution to the existing literature, in the sense that our findings suggest that the context in which a country is inserted regarding privatisations and industry specific characteristics may be important for firms to explain capital structure decisions that are purely derived from privatisation.

This paper is organised as follow: Section 2 presents the literature review of capital structure and privatisation. Data, Methodology, and Propositions are presented in Section 3. Results and discussion are presented in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes.

LITERATURE REVIEW: CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND PRIVATISATIONS

Privatisation can be described as the "act of reducing the role of government or increasing the role of the private institutions of society in satisfying people's needs" (Savas, 2000). There are various types of privatisation strategies, as suggested by Eaton (1989), however Megginson et al. (2004) state that most frequently governments choose between three forms: i) the asset sales meth-

od, where the government sells company assets (typically through an auction) to a small group of investors; ii) through a share issue, in which equity shares are sold on public stock markets; iii) through vouchers, which represent part-ownership of former state-owned firms, which are distributed to all citizens for free, or at a very low price. The authors added that privatisations through share issue are the largest and most economically important type of privatisation, although governments with less State control over the economy tend to carry out asset sales.

The majority of privatisation programmes of significant size start with partial privatisation, whereby only non-controlling shares of firms are sold on the stock market (Gupta, 2005). Sheshinski and López-Calva (1998) show evidence that, under the same conditions, fully-privatised firms perform better than partially privatised firms. Empirical studies, such as those of Harris et al. (2007), D' Souza and Megginson (1999), and Boubakri and Cosset (1998), found that privatised firms had significant increases in profitability, sales, operating efficiency, and dividend payments, as well as a substantial decrease in leverage ratios. Nevertheless, these papers do not consider how, and whether industry-specific factors affect outcomes differently.

Capital structure can be defined as being the way a company finances its operations. There are two main sources from which a company can fund itself: either using debt, or equity. In the words of Myers (2001), "capital structure attempts to explain the mix of securities and financing sources used by corporations to finance real investment". Capital structure literature is based on M&M theory (Modigliani and Miller, 1958, 1963), and is mainly determined by two main, and highly-studied theories: the "trade-off theory" (e.g. Hovakimian et al., 2001; de Jong et al., 2011), and the "pecking order theory" (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Concerning the relationship between leverage and those other variables that can exert some influence on leverage, the "pecking order theory" defends that there is an inverse relationship between leverage and size, leverage and profitability, and leverage and tangibility of assets (Frank and Goyal, 2009). This is the opposite of the "trade-off theory", where growth and leverage are positively related. Myers (2001) claims that the "pecking order theory" may explain why

larger and more profitable firms use less debt – which is because such firms have more internal financing available to apply to other investments.

According to Hovakimian et al. (2001) and de Jong et al. (2011), the "trade-off theory" suggests that the leverage has a positive relationship with the size and profitability of the firm, the tangibility of assets, the use of taxes and also that high industry median leverage should bring more debt. When it comes to growth, the prediction is that, due to increasing costs of financial distress, the relationship between this variable and leverage should be negative (Frank and Goyal, 2009).

Regarding the topic of capital structure and leverage after privatisation, most of the literature tends to consider that privatisation reduces the level of leverage (with less debt after privatisations). Chahyadi (2008) and Arcas and Bachiller (2008) found that firms are less leveraged following privatisation. Chahyadi (2008) added that privatised firms have a target capital structure, which does not change randomly over time. According to Borisova and Megginson (2011), privatised firms face a higher cost of debt as State-ownership diminishes. This could be due to the fact that bondholders demand higher spreads, especially when the process of privatisation occurs in several phases. This may explain why firms' leverage ratios suffer a decline after privatisation. Traditionally, State-owned firms have higher levels of leverage because their only access to equity is through retained earnings and capital injections from the government (Ferreira, 2012).

However, some authors concluded that there is an increase in leverage after a firm is privatised. Barbosa et al. (2012) claim that leverage and privatisation are positively correlated. This result is in line with the agency theory, as firms usually choose to increase their levels of leverage to discipline managers. Errunza and Mazumdar (2001) argue that as bankruptcy costs after privatisation are high, firms have to reduce their leverage levels, in order for privatisation to have a positive effect on the firm.

Regarding the influence that industries have on capital structure, Talberg et al. (2008) demonstrate that, depending on the industry of the firm, there is a

major difference in the capital structure. Myers (1984) argues that because asset type and asset risk and requirements for external funds differ from industry to industry, this leads to different average debt ratios across industries. Degrype et al. (2012) claim that the effects of firm characteristics across industries on leverage for each industry are mostly in line with the “pecking order theory”. Bradley et al. (1984) infer that leverage ratios of firms operating in the same industry are similar to intra-industry ratios.

DATA, PROPOSITIONS, AND METHODOLOGY

In this paper, we aim to test the impact of the effect of privatisation on industries and firms’ capital structure decisions, as the academic literature provides little information. Our initial sample comprises 529 firm-year observations from 60 European privatised firms, 24 of which are currently listed on a public stock exchange. The list of privatised firms was taken from the Privatisation Barometer database(1) and the accounting data was obtained from the Amadeus Bureau Van Dijk database for private firms and from Bloomberg for publicly-traded firms. The privatisation of these firms occurred from 2009 through to 2013, and the period for the financial statements data ranges from 2006 to 2015(2). Table 1 describes the countries and the industries that are included in this study.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

To test whether privatisation had changed the capital structure of industries and firms, we used firms’ leverage as a dependent variable for the capital structure. Across the literature, the definition of this variable can have slight differences. Boubakri and Cosset (2013) and Frank and Goyal (2009) consider that leverage ratio should take into account both short-term and long-term debt. Other authors, such as Talberg et al. (2008) and Chahyadi (2008) argue that only long-term debt should be considered for the measure of leverage because trade credit is associated with short-term debt and can influence the operations of a firm. Keeping in mind that the industry component is also present and that

different industries display different characteristics, the focus in this research is on leverage as the ratio between total debt and total assets.

PROPOSITIONS

Based on our research question “How do different industry characteristics affect capital structure decisions, after privatisation?”, and to test whether privatisations have an impact on firms’ capital structure, we assumed four propositions.

First, Chahyadi (2008) documents that, when State-owned firms are privatized, their leverage ratios should decrease, as there is an additional source of external capital, in the form of equity. In line with Chahyadi’s (2008) research, Boubakri and Cosset (1998) and D’Souza and Megginson (1999) found that privatised firms decrease leverage ratios substantially, which provides the first proposition:

- *Proposition 1: The level of leverage decreases after privatisation.*

With regards to ownership structure, Borisova and Megginson (2011) found evidence of a decrease in the cost of debt for fully-privatised firms, when compared to partially-privatised firms, which suggests that there it is easier for fully-privatised firms to finance their investments through debt. The decrease in the cost of debt is expected to adjust the capital structure upwards towards an optimal level. This outcome suggests our second proposition:

- *Proposition 2: The decrease in the level of leverage after privatisation is higher for fully-privatised firms.*

Talberg et al. (2008) claim that each industry has a different reaction to changes in market conditions. Berman and Pfleeger (1997) added that some industries might be relatively immune to business cycles, while others are overly sensitive. The authors found evidence that industries such as consumer-related services, construction, and manufacturing are mostly correlated with business cycles. According to Opler and Titman (1994), highly-leveraged firms

Country	Privatisations	Observations	Industry	Privatisations	Observations
Belgium	3	27	Finance	5	46
Czech Republic	2	18	Manufacturing	10	94
Estonia	1	6	Services	15	123
Finland	2	19	Telecommunications	3	25
France	5	39	Transportation	12	111
Germany	4	37	Utilities	15	130
Greece	5	46	Total	60	529
Hungary	1	10			
Ireland	1	10			
Italy	10	91			
Lithuania	1	5			
Luxembourg	1	4			
Netherlands	1	8			
Portugal	7	62			
Slovenia	1	10			
Spain	5	46			
Sweden	5	48			
United Kingdom	5	43			
Total	60	529			

Table 1: Countries and Industries in the sample

Variable	Definition
Leverage	The ratio of total debt over total assets
EBITtm	The ratio of EBIT to sales. Proxy for profitability.
Ln Assets	Size of the firm, measured by the logarithm of total assets.
Fixed Assets	The ratio of fixed assets to total assets.
Efficiency	The ratio of sales to assets. Proxy for efficiency.
GDP	The logarithm of GDP.
Money Supply	The ratio of a country's money supply to the GDP
Market Capitalization	The total value of all listed shares in a stock market as a percentage of GDP.
Privatisation	Dummy variable equal to 1 from the year when a firm is privatised until the end of the sample and 0, otherwise.
Privatisation×Partial	The interaction between Privatisation and the dummy partial, which is equal to 1 if the privatisation is partial and is equal to 0 if the firm is fully privatised
Privatisation×Partial×Perct	Interaction between Privatisation, partial and partial percentage, which is a variable that describes the percentage of privatisation for each firm
Privatisation×Industry	The interaction between Privatisation and each industry present in the sample
Privatisation×Industry×Fixed Assets	The interaction between the dummy Privatisation, the different industries, and Fixed Assets

Table 2: Variables description

Table 3: Descriptive statistics

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Min	1st Quantile	Median	3rd Quantile	Max
Dependent Variable								
Leverage	529	0.632	0.268	0.051	0.476	0.636	0.770	2.662
Controls								
EBITm	529	9.168	24.283	-132.23	1.190	6.920	18.080	157.05
LnAssets	529	19.798	3.008	13.106	17.521	19.405	22.181	27.297
FixedAssets	529	0.490	0.266	0.001	0.269	0.500	0.687	0.994
Efficiency	529	0.800	0.739	0.003	0.298	0.593	1.186	4.937
GDP	529	27.047	1.237	23.373	25.920	26.826	28.124	28.741
MoneySupply	529	0.938	0.345	0.396	0.751	0.894	1.050	3.991
MktCapGDP	529	0.586	0.358	0.085	0.285	0.474	0.804	2.247

in industries experiencing economic decline tend to experience loss of profits, when compared to firms with a lower level of leverage. Given that leverage variations are highly dependent on business cycles because of interest rates (Jordà et al., 2012), and that there is usually an inverse relationship between leverage and profitability (Titman and Wessels, 1988), the third proposition is as follows:

- *Proposition 3: The decrease in the level of leverage after privatisation is less significant for firms in those industries that are more correlated with business cycles.*

Arsov and Navmoski (2016) stated that firms investing more heavily in fixed assets show higher levels of leverage. Nevertheless, previous studies, such as that of Talberg et al. (2008), corroborate with this conclusion, which gives us reason to test the following proposition:

- *Proposition 4: The decrease in the level of leverage after privatisation is lower for firms in capital-intensive industries*

METHODOLOGY AND INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Most empirical studies present in the literature regarding the performance of privatised firms carry out the Wilcoxon signed-rank test to analyse the impact of privatisation on the key variables in their study (e.g., D' Souza and Megginson, 1999; Arcas and Bachiller, 2008; Harper, 2002). As the main objective in this research is to test the effect on capital structure over time of privatisation (treatment effect), we considered that it was adequate to apply differences in differences models. This method allows for the examination of the influence of an event on the dependent variable, by comparing the estimated averages of two groups, one before the event, and one after the event. In this case, the event is the process of privatisation. This method also allows us to control for potential endogeneity.

To evaluate these effects, a dummy variable called 'Privatisation' was created, which is equal to 1 from the year a firm is privatised onwards, and 0 otherwise. To test the first proposition, the following equation was estimated:

$$\begin{aligned} LEVERAGE_{it} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 Privatization_{it} + \beta_2 EBITm_{it} \\ & + \beta_3 LnAssets_{it} + \beta_4 FixedAssets_{it} \\ & + \beta_5 Efficiency_{it} + \beta_6 GDP_{it} + \beta_7 MoneySupply_{it} \\ & + \beta_8 MktCap_{it} + \sum_{t=1}^{10} \delta_t \\ & + \sum_{z=1}^6 \varphi_z + \sum_{c=1}^{18} \gamma_c + \varepsilon_{itzc} \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

where:

δ_t is the time fixed-effect variable for year t ; φ_z is the industry fixed-effect specification for industry z , and γ_c is the country fixed-effect variable for country c . $LEVERAGE$ represents the measure of leverage explained above. To control for firms' characteristics, common capital structure determinants present in the literature were used as variables.

$EBITm$ is equal to the ratio of EBIT to sales and, according to Hall et al. (2000), this can be used as a proxy for profitability.

$LnAssets$ is the logarithm of the total assets of the firm and is used as an approximation for the firms' size.

$FixedAssets$ is equal to the ratio between fixed assets and total assets of the firm.

$Efficiency$ is denoted as the ratio of sales to assets and is used as a proxy for efficiency.

Furthermore, for control purpose, some country-level variables were included. GDP is equal to the logarithm of the yearly GDP. $Money Supply$ is defined as the ratio of a country's money supply to the GDP. $MktCap$ is defined as the total value of all listed shares in a country's stock market, divided by the GDP.

These three country-level variables were included to verify whether the growth of a country's economy, the improvement of the access of the financial system, and the development of the financial markets are indeed important factors on capital structure ratios.

To test the second proposition, we added the interaction $Privatisation \times Partial$, which is an interaction term between $Privatisation$ and the dummy $Partial$, which is equal to 1 if the privatisation is partial and is equal to 0 if the firm is fully

privatized, and also the interaction term $Privatisation \times Partial \times Percentage$, the latter interaction term being the percentage of privatisation for each firm.

This is a similar approach to that of Borisova and Megginson (2011). The equation is the following:

$$\begin{aligned} LEVERAGE_{it} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 Privatisation_{it} \\ & + \beta_2 Privatisation \times Partial \times Percentage_{it} \\ & + \beta_3 Privatisation_{it} + Controls_{it} + \varepsilon_{itzc} \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

To evaluate the impact of an industry on leverage after privatisation, a new variable was included, $Privatisation \times Industry$. This variable consists of an interaction between $Privatisation$ and each industry present in the sample. The equation is presented below:

$$\begin{aligned} LEVERAGE_{it} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 Privatisation_{it} \\ & + \beta_2 Privatisation \times Industry_{itz} + Controls_{it} \\ & + \varepsilon_{itzc} \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

Finally, to test the relationship between capital structure and capital-intensive industries, an interaction variable was created, $Privatisation \times Industry \times Fixed Assets$, and it consists on the interaction between the

dummy $Privatisation$, the different industries and the efficiency ratio of fixed assets to total assets. The equation is presented below:

$$\begin{aligned} LEVERAGE_{it} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 Privatisation_{it} \\ & + \beta_2 Privatisation \times Industry \times FixedAssets_{itz} \\ & + Controls_{it} + \varepsilon_{itzc} \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

All firm and country-specific control variables will be applied in every equation. The standard errors were computed using White's robust procedure. The correlation matrix and the VIF tests (not formally reported) show no sign of multicollinearity amongst the independent variables. The Wald test was significant (p -value = 0.0000) presents the variables description and the descriptive statistics.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

To analyse if leverage ratios changed after privatisation, Table 4 presents, for each industry subsample, the mean of leverage before and after privatisation and the univariate t test. Overall, preliminary analysis suggests a statistical decrease in the level of leverage following privatisations of about 3.1% to 61.6%. However, preliminary evidence suggests that changes in leverage following privatisation are industry specific. Finance, Manufacturing, and Utilities are industries exhibiting a decrease in the level of leverage, being this difference statistically significant. On the contrary, Services, Telecommunication, and Transportation all show evidence of increases in the level of leverage following privatisations, although this is only significant for the Transportation industry. From this preliminary evidence, changes in leverage following privatisations are affected differently depending on the industry of the privatised firm. We can also infer that the most developed economies exhibit lower leverage ratios after privatisation (not reported for parsimony), which consistent with Harper (2002).

Industry	N	Leverage Before	Leverage After	Difference
All Industries	529	0.647	0.616	-0.031*
		(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.023)
Finance	46	0.714	0.466	-0.248**
		(0.048)	(0.057)	(0.076)
Manufacturing	94	0.706	0.614	-0.092*
		(0.046)	(0.026)	(0.058)
Services	123	0.594	0.636	+0.042
		(0.042)	(0.053)	(0.071)
Telecommunications	25	0.512	0.551	+0.039
		(0.071)	(0.054)	(0.088)
Transportation	111	0.616	0.664	+0.048*
		(0.020)	(0.023)	(0.031)
Utilities	130	0.672	0.627	-0.045*
		(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.032)

Table 4: Debt Ratios before and after Privatisation, by industry

Figure 1 illustrates the effect that time has on the sample firms' leverage ratio, in which a relationship was established between the mean of the ratio of debt to assets and t , which corresponds to the year of privatisation of any firm in the sample. In this graph, we can see the evolution of the ratio over time, starting from $t-7$ until $t+6$. The graph begins with the debt ratio on the highest point (0.703), and it decreases until $t-3$ (0.609). The average debt ratio goes up until t

$$\begin{aligned} LEVERAGE_{it} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 Privatisation_{it} \\ & + \beta_2 Privatisation \times Industry \times FixedAssets_{itz} \quad (4) \\ & + Controls_{it} + \varepsilon_{itz} \end{aligned}$$

(0.636), where it starts decreasing again until $t+2$ (0.601), rising slightly until $t+4$ (0.611) and finally decreasing, reaching its lowest point in $t+6$ (0.485).

Results from our first proposition, if privatisation affects firms' leverage, are presented in Table 5. We are unable to assess that effect, meaning that there is no evidence in our sample that privatisation has affected the level of leverage of these firms. In fact, explanations came mainly from control variables. Firms with more assets seem to be more leveraged

This was expected according to Faulkender and Petersen (2006), given that bigger firms are more diversified, face less risk, and therefore, the expected costs of bankruptcy and the probability of distress are lower. In addition to this, larger firms may have a stronger position when it comes to negotiating their financing needs (Degryse et al., 2012).


From the opposite point of view, more profitable firms (measured by the EBIT margin), as well as those with higher operational efficiency seem to be less leveraged. This is consistent with the findings of Berger et al. (1997) and Berger and di Patti (2006), whereby more efficient firms resort to using more equity to protect higher efficiency-generated future income from the possibility of liquidation. Better economic climate (measured by the GDP growth) seems to

incentive firms to underwrite more debt. The conclusions are similar with those of Column 2, with the inclusion of the fixed effect specification for the industry. Exhibit higher leverage ratios than those that are fully-privatised. The results are presented in Table 6:

Our second proposition assesses whether partially privatised firms

In this case also, in line with previous results, different types of privatisations do not seem to impact the level of leverage. For robustness purposes, we can

Fig. 1: Debt ratio evolution of the sample firms, over time



assess that our control variables remain similar to the previous regression.

Our third proposition tests the influence of the industry of the firm on the changes in its capital structure, through a series of regressions, which contain interaction terms between *Privatisation* and each of the industries present in the sample.

The results are presented in Table 7. Conclusions per industry are diverse. Column 1 presents the specific estimation for the Finance industry. Overall, firms in the Finance industry exhibit lower levels of leverage compared with the

Table 5: Effect of Privatisation on Capital Structure: Proposition I

	(1)	(2)
	Leverage	Leverage
Privatisation	-0.041 (0.046)	-0.042 (0.044)
EBITm	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)
Ln Assets	0.012*** (0.004)	0.013*** (0.004)
Fixed Assets	-0.066 (0.046)	-0.047 (0.052)
Efficiency	-0.063*** (0.018)	-0.061*** (0.019)
GDP	0.416** (0.167)	0.416** (0.171)
Money Supply	0.137 (0.156)	0.143 (0.160)
Market Capitalization	-0.109 (0.108)	-0.115 (0.106)
Finance		0.061 (0.040)
Utilities		-0.030 (0.061)
Transportation		-0.021 (0.053)
Telecommunications		-0.104** (0.046)
Manufacturing		-0.027 (0.049)
Constant	-11.286** (4.758)	-11.266** (4.885)
Time Effects	YES	YES
Industry Effects	NO	YES
Country Effects	YES	YES
Observations	529	529
F-test	34.48	30.02
Adjusted R²	0.321	0.325

NOTE: Robust standard errors are in brackets, and the symbols *, **, and *** represent significant levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Regressions were run (for robustness check) with a subsample (t-2 to t+2) and the results were similar.

Table 6: Effect of the Privatisation Type and Ownership Structure: Proposition II

	(1)	(2)
	Leverage	Leverage
Privatisation×Type	-0.039 (0.033)	
Privatisation×Partial		0.012 (0.048)
Privatisation×Partial×Perct		0.053 (0.139)
Privatisation	-0.015 (0.046)	-0.060 (0.042)
EBITm	-0.004*** (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)
Ln Assets	0.012** (0.005)	0.013** (0.006)
Fixed Assets	-0.043 (0.053)	-0.045 (0.053)
Efficiency	-0.061*** (0.019)	-0.056*** (0.020)
GDP	0.403** (0.173)	0.405** (0.172)
Money Supply	0.141 (0.160)	0.124 (0.164)
Market Capitalization	-0.121 (0.107)	-0.110 (0.109)
Constant	-10.872** (4.928)	-10.946** (4.919)
Time Effects	YES	YES
Industry Effects	YES	YES
Country Effects	YES	YES
Observations	529	529
F-test	27.65	28.04
Adjusted R²	0.325	0.324

Notes: Robust standard errors are in brackets, and the symbols *, **, and *** represent significant levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Leverage	Leverage	Leverage	Leverage	Leverage	Leverage	Leverage
Privatisation	-0.032	-0.034	-0.066	-0.049	-0.030	-0.045	-0.037
	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.043)	(0.042)	(0.071)
Privatisation×Finance	-0.112**						-0.109*
	(0.049)						(0.064)
Finance	0.125***						0.123**
	(0.046)						(0.051)
Privatisation×Utilities		-0.035					-0.030
		(0.047)					(0.069)
Utilities		-0.014					-0.015
		(0.055)					(0.054)
Privatisation×Transportation			0.105***				0.077
			(0.037)				(0.057)
Transportation			-0.075				-0.057
			(0.056)				(0.051)
Privatisation×Telecommunications				0.156***			0.143*
				(0.058)			(0.075)
Telecommunications				-0.179***			-0.161***
				(0.056)			(0.059)
Privatisation×Manufacturing					-0.081		-0.074
					(0.050)		(0.069)
Manufacturing					0.007		0.006
					(0.056)		(0.058)
Privatisation×Services						0.011	
						(0.055)	
Services						-0.068	
						(0.050)	
Other Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Time Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Industry Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	529	529	529	529	529	529	529
F-test	34.11	29.78	28.77	28.83	29.22	29.86	30.33
Adjusted R²	0.326	0.324	0.330	0.327	0.327	0.323	0.333

Notes: Robust standard errors are in brackets, and the symbols *, **, and *** represent significant levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Table 7: Effect of Industry: Proposition III

omitted industry (Services), although the level of leverage decreases on average by 11.2% following privatisation, and exclusively because of this event. Whereas Utility, Manufacturing, and Service firms appear not to experience a change in the level of leverage following privatisation, firms in the Transportation and Telecommunications industries increase the level of leverage by about 10.5% and 15.6% respectively. This result is not consistent with those of Berman and Pfleeger (1997), who they found evidence that the Telecommunications industry is among the least-correlated with business cycles. Overall, leverage appears not to be sensitive to privatisation, although significant variations can be found for specific industries. comparison of the level of leverage may be shaped by the intensity of the need for assets to be financed for a firm to grow.

Table 8 presents the results of the fourth proposition, which assesses whether industries that have more intensive fixed assets exhibit a different variation for the level of leverage following privatisations. Taking into account that capital-intensive firms are characterised by higher depreciation and more fixed assets, in this study we do not focus on whether a specific industry is capital-intensive, but rather on how the structure of the balance sheet reflects such intensity of fixed assets. Our first approach focusses on the split of our sample by the level of capital-intensity. To define capital-intensive industries, we divided the fixed assets totals per industry by the number of firms present in each industry, to find the average proportion of fixed assets per firm for each industry. The industries selected have on average, at least two billion Euros of fixed assets per firm. Results show that half of the industries have positive coefficients for the interaction variable between each Industry, Fixed Assets, and Privatisation.

Secondly, we performed Equation 4 to understand how industry-specific capital intensity shapes the level of leverage differently following privatisation. The specific results for Transportation and Telecom are presented in Columns 4 and 5. While the effect of privatisations on the level of leverage for these industries was estimated as being 10.5% and 15.6%, respectively, when firms' capital-intensity was included, these effects were amplified twice to 26.7% and 32.6% respectively. This is to say that the level of capital intensity appears to be a catalyst for the level adjusted for capital structures following privatisation. One

interesting result is presented in Column 1. The level of leverage of firms in the Finance industry is affected negatively, and this result does not contrast with the existent empirical evidence. Rampini and Viswanathan (2013) highlighted that firms with low levels of leverage are essentially firms that have few tangible assets, which is the case of Finance, due to the strong and positive relationship between leased capital and asset tangibility.

CONCLUSIONS

Over the last decades, most countries have privatised a significant number of firms. Privatisation represents the transfer (full or partial) of ownership from public to private hands. Privatisations were carried out to reduce public deficit and debt, resulting in the increase in efficiency of privatised firms and increased opportunities for the redistribution of income and wealth, as privatisation enables easier access to capital markets

The Finance literature has studied whether changes in ownership are followed by changes in capital structure. In the case of privatisation, most authors found that after privatisation, there is a reduction in the level of firms' leverage.

The aim of this study is to analyse the impact of privatisation on capital structure decisions, while also analysing the different industry characteristics and how capital structure varies from industry to industry. We collected a sample with 529 observations from 6 industries and 18 European countries, for a period between 2006 and 2015. In order to capture the effects of privatisation on capital structure over time and to address potential endogeneity, a difference-in-differences model was applied to test four propositions:

- *Proposition 1: The level of leverage decreases after privatisation.*
- *Proposition 2: The decrease in the level of leverage after privatisation is higher for fully-privatised firms.*
- *Proposition 3: The decrease in the level of leverage after privatisation is less significant for firms in those industries that are more correlated with*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	Leverage	Leverage	Leverage	Leverage	Leverage	Leverage	Leverage
Privatisation	-0.034	-0.046	-0.070	-0.050	-0.032	-0.043	-0.084
	(0.045)	(0.048)	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.040)	(0.054)
Privatisation×Fixed Assets×Finance	-0.204**						-0.137
	(0.080)						(0.085)
Finance	0.108***						0.077*
	(0.040)						(0.041)
Privatisation×Fixed Assets×Utilities		0.021					0.071
		(0.065)					(0.076)
Utilities		-0.036					-0.066
		(0.058)					(0.056)
Privatisation×Fixed Assets×Transportation			0.267***				0.293***
			(0.053)				(0.064)
Transportation			-0.087				-0.096*
			(0.055)				(0.052)
Privatisation×Fixed Assets×Telecom				0.326***			0.383***
				(0.099)			(0.109)
Telecom				-0.185***			-0.185***
				(0.055)			(0.054)
Privatisation×Fixed Assets×Manufacturing					-0.156		-0.054
					(0.108)		(0.125)
Manufacturing					0.002		-0.028
					(0.055)		(0.056)
Privatisation×Fixed Assets×Services						0.010	
						(0.104)	
Services						-0.063	
						(0.043)	
Other Controls	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Time Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Industry Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Country Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Observations	529	529	529	529	529	529	529
F-test	29.84	28.97	28.18	29.12	29.29	29.05	25.39
Adjusted R²	0.327	0.323	0.336	0.329	0.326	0.323	0.343

Notes: Robust standard errors are in bracket, and the symbols *, **, and *** represent significant levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.

Table 8: Effect of Industry and Capital Intensity: Proposition IV

business cycles - Construction and Trade (retail).

- *Proposition 4: The decrease in the level of leverage after privatisation is lower for firms in capital-intensive industries.*

Overall, the empirical analysis does not show the reduction to be statistically significant. These results persist even after controlling for characteristics of privatisations, such as type (asset sale or share issue) and percentage of privatisation.

Nevertheless, there is some evidence at the industry and the country level that privatisation may decrease the leverage ratio. By looking at the debt ratios before, and after privatisations, at both the industry and the country level, there seems to be a reduction. However, our regressions do not show this reduction to be statistically significant. By analyzing the effects of privatisations in capital structure at the industry level, which is a topic scarcely analysed in Finance research, we were able to reach some important conclusions. Firms inserted in capital-intensive industries tend to have more leverage than those firms that are less dependent on fixed assets, following privatisation. That is to say, capital intensity amplifies the statistically significant effect of privatisation on the level of leverage per industry. This outcome supports the extant literature (Talberg et al., 2008; Rampini and Viswanathan, 2013), based on the fact that firms that are more dependent on fixed assets tend to have more leverage overall.

This paper makes a contribution to the literature, in the sense that our findings suggest that the political context of a country regarding privatisation and industry-specific characteristics may be important to explain capital structure decisions for firms that are purely derived from privatisation.

Despite the contribution of this paper, further research could be carried out. One suggestion is to include the concept of market leverage and to verify whether the conclusions change. In order to have a human component for this analysis, given that Patena and Błaszczuk (2016) suggested that managers' characteristics could explain leverage variations after privatisation, it would be

interesting to include a behavioural variable, such as managers' influence on capital structure decisions.

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NOTES

1. Privatisation Barometer database: <http://www.privatizationbarometer.com>
2. Firms were excluded from the sample because: i) the accounting data did not provide observations from at least two years before and after the privatisation; ii) some privatisations registered on the Privatisation Barometer database did not actually happen; iii) other firms listed on this database were already fully private before the period of study.

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